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Abstract 
How do people make decisions when simultaneously facing strategic and 
environmental uncertainty? Do entrepreneurs differ from others in this regards? This 
dissertation addresses these questions by investigating coordination behavior under dual 
uncertainty. Four economic experiments have been conducted comparing the behavior 
of entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs in settings that contain investment decisions 
into research and development and different aspects of competition and market entry 
decisions.  
Keywords:  
dual uncertainty, coordination behavior, entrepreneurial decision making, 
competition, market entry 
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Zusammenfassung 
Wie beeinflusst das gleichzeitige Auftreten von strategischer und umfeldbedingter 
Unsicherheit das Entscheidungsverhalten? Unterscheiden sich Unternehmer in dieser 
Hinsicht von Anderen? Die vorliegende Dissertation behandelt diese Fragen und 
untersucht das Koordinationsverhalten bei dualer Unsicherheit. In vier ökonomischen 
Experimenten wird das Entscheidungsverhalten von Unternehmern und Nicht-
Unternehmern vergleichend analysiert. Die betrachteten Entscheidungssituationen 
beinhalten Investitionsentscheidungen in Forschung und Entwicklung sowie 
verschiedene Aspekte des Wettbewerbs und von Markteintrittsentscheidungen. 
Schlagwörter:  
Duale Unsicherheit, Koordinationsverhalten, unternehmerisches Entscheidungs-
verhalten, Wettbewerb, Markteintritt 
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1. Introduction 
How do people make decisions when simultaneously facing environmental and 
strategic uncertainty? Do entrepreneurs differ from others in this regards?  
In the following, I will give an introduction to these research questions that motivated 
my dissertation and point at the underlying interconnections between the different 
articles. The contributions of these studies to the literature are outlined and summarized. 
1.1 Motivation 
What we don’t know often affects our decisions more than what we do know. The 
uncertainties we face might thereby stem from developments in the environment or 
from the interaction with others. Both types of uncertainty are fundamentally different 
in quality: environmental uncertainty is exogenous, the decision maker “plays against 
nature”. Uncertainty stemming from the interaction with others is determined by the 
interdependence between the different actors and is marked by an endogenous, strategic 
character. In many decision situations both types of uncertainty appear simultaneously. 
We will refer to this as situations of dual uncertainty. 
Entrepreneurs are particularly affected by dual uncertainty. Most of the decisions they 
make are characterized by the simultaneous existence of exogenous and strategic 
uncertainty. For example, when deciding whether or not to exploit an opportunity or 
enter an emerging market, entrepreneurs are confronted with uncertainty about the 
development of this market and the future demand. Simultaneously, they face strategic 
uncertainty with respect to the entry decisions of their competitors. Other examples are 
investment decisions into research and development where spillovers might allow to 
free-ride on the investments of others, pricing decisions, or the choice of technological 
standards. Even the decision to terminate a business might be subject to dual 
uncertainty. A theory of entrepreneurship thus needs to deal with two questions:  
(1) How does dual uncertainty affect decision making?  
(2) Do entrepreneurs differ from others in dealing with dual uncertainty? 
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This dissertation addresses these questions by investigating coordination behavior 
under dual uncertainty and by examining whether entrepreneurs differ from others in 
dealing with strategic and exogenous uncertainty. Economic experiments have been 
conducted with both, entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. Their decision behavior is 
studied in scenarios that consider investment decisions into research and development 
(Article 1) and different aspects of market entry decisions and competition (Article 2 
and 4). The forth study (Article 3) analyses effects of demand uncertainty and strength 
of competition on people’s willingness to enter skill-based competition. These two 
aspects are at the heart of entrepreneurial entry decisions but also apply to a broader 
range of competitive situations.  
1.1.1 Decision making under dual uncertainty 
As a result of the fundamental differences between exogenous and strategic 
uncertainty, decision making under these two types of uncertainty has largely been 
approached in separate research streams. Decision making under environmental 
uncertainty has been studied in behavioral decision making while strategic uncertainty 
has been studied in behavioral game theory (Heukelom 2007). As a consequence, the 
number of studies dealing with behavior under dual uncertainty is limited. The results of 
these studies show that implications for decision making under dual uncertainty cannot 
readily be drawn based on the literature dealing with either strategic decision making or 
individual decisions under uncertainty (e.g., Dickinson 1998, Wit and Wilke 1998, 
Cabrales et al. 2007, Gong et al. 2009, Levati et al. 2009, Gangadharan and Nemes 
2009, Brandts and Yao 2010, Karelaia and Hogarth 2010). Instead, people might react 
very differently to exogenous uncertainty in a strategic context than in a non-strategic 
decision situation. Behavior is likely to also depend on the way exogenous uncertainty 
is involved in strategic decision making. This gives rise to investigating the effects of 
exogenous uncertainty in strategic situations where environmental uncertainty is 
ubiquitous. An example that shows how much exogenous uncertainty can change 
strategic decision behavior is given by Gong et al. (2009) who investigate group 
cooperation under uncertainty. While groups are generally found to be less cooperative 
than individuals, Gong et al. (2009) show that under exogenous uncertainty groups are 
more cooperative than individuals and have a greater chance of managing their risks 
efficiently. This example illustrates that better understanding the influence of exogenous 
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uncertainty on interactive decision making might have broad implications for risk 
management in the societal but also in the economic domain. Given the importance of 
exogenous uncertainty for societal problems it might not come as a surprise that most of 
the studies that have dealt with dual uncertainty examine resource dilemmas and public 
goods games. These studies investigate the influence of exogenous uncertainty on the 
size of the resource or the provision point of the public good (Rutte et al. 1987, 
Suleiman and Rapoport 1988, Messick et al. 1988, Budesu et al. 1990, 1992, 1995a, 
1995b, De Vries and Wilke 1992, 1995, Biel and Gärling 1995, Dickinson 1998, Wit 
and Wilke 1998, Rapoport and Au 2001, Levati et al. 2009, Gangadharan and Nemes 
2009). Only very few studies have analyzed coordination behavior under dual-
uncertainty (e.g., Cabrales et al. 2007, Heinemann et al. 2004). Inspired by the global 
games paradigm of Carlsson and van Damme (1993), Cabrales et al. (2007) examine a 
coordination game with noisy signals about the true payoffs. By iterated deletion of 
strictly dominated strategies this incomplete information game leads to a unique 
solution which, on average, coincides with the risk dominant equilibrium outcome of 
the underlying coordination game. They find small, but significant differences in 
behavior between complete and incomplete information games with the equilibrium of 
the incomplete information game describing the observed behavior well. Heinemann et 
al. (2004) find similar results. Other authors investigate exogenous uncertainty in 
market entry scenarios (Brandts and Yao 2010, Karelaia and Hogarth 2010). Brandts 
and Yao (2010) examine how ambiguous versus risky information about the market 
capacity effects entry behavior in a market entry game. They find that average entry is 
higher under ambiguous information than under risky information. Karelaia and 
Hogarth (2010) examine people’s willingness to enter skill-based competition when 
being faced with noisy signals about their skills. Here, payoffs are exogenously 
uncertain because people do not know whether they are truly good enough to succeed in 
the competition or the signal they received is faulty. This should have asymmetric 
effects on the behavior of high- and low-skilled individuals: while noisy signals on 
average increase the success chances for low-skilled people they decrease the success 
chances of high-skilled people. Their results show that low-skill individuals increase 
entry under additional uncertainty while high-skill individuals are not much affected by 
the additional uncertainty. While the behavior of low-ranked individuals is in line with 
predictions and to a large degree explained by rationality, no final conclusion could be 
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drawn for the entry behavior of high-ranked individuals. The results of Karelaia and 
Hogarth (2010) emphasize the need for further research on this topic. 
Article 1 (“Coordination under dual uncertainty: Comparing mixed strategy 
equilibria, risk dominance and a decision heuristic”) contributes to this literature by 
investigating in how far established solution concepts from game theory can account for 
coordination under dual uncertainty. We experimentally test decision behavior in a two-
player coordination game with asymmetric, risky payoffs and compare the explanatory 
power of mixed strategy equilibria, risk dominance, and a plausible decision heuristic. 
To explore the generalizability of our results we conduct the experiment with students 
and with high-tech entrepreneurs who are confronted with dual uncertainty in their 
profession. Allowing the entrepreneurs to connect to the decision scenario we frame the 
coordination game as a research and development scenario where players have to make 
an investment decision. The outcomes in this game depend on strategic uncertainty 
arising from two players’ choices and exogenous uncertainty about the outcome of the 
investment. Coordination behavior in this game is compared to the predictions of mixed 
strategy equilibrium, the predictions of the risk dominance criterion, and a decision 
heuristic based on simple cost considerations and social projection. We find that the 
most satisfactory model in our comparison assumes linear relations to each player’s cost 
and is consistent with the proposed heuristic model. Behavioral differences between 
students and entrepreneurs are surprisingly small and not statistically significant. Our 
findings suggest that under dual uncertainty simple behavioral models of behavior 
involving asymmetries and social projection might account better for behavior of actual 
decision makers than sophisticated game theoretic calculus. We propose a 
methodological approach to compare behavioral and game theoretic solution concepts. 
Also Article 3 (“Demand uncertainty in skill-based competition: How what we cannot 
influence influences how we deal with what we can influence”) contributes to the 
literature on decision making under dual uncertainty. Article 3 investigates the effect of 
exogenous demand uncertainty on peoples’ willingness to enter skill-based competition. 
A market entry experiment has been conducted to test the effect of demand uncertainty 
for markets that differ in expected demand and strength of competition. The results 
show that under risky information about the demand, people overenter markets with a 
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small expected demand and strong competition while they underenter markets with a 
high expected demand and weak competition. These findings are explained by people 
believing that competitors would shy away from entering highly competitive markets 
and assuming that they would overrun markets with weak competition. Overconfidence 
had a main effect on entry behavior but did not moderate reactions to market demand. 
These results are in line with previous research of on entry behavior in a deterministic 
market entry experiment were demand was given and payoffs did not depend on 
participants’ skills Camerer et al. (2004). Camerer et al. (2004) found a reliable 
overentry in small markets and underentry in large markets tracing this finding back to 
people’s beliefs. The article contained in this dissertation shows that the described effect 
of the size of demand is significantly more pronounced under demand uncertainty than 
under demand certainty. This leads to a s-shaped relation between the number of 
entrants and the expected demand in skill-based competition. 
1.2 Entrepreneurship “through the lens of decision making” 
Analyzing key questions in entrepreneurship as decision problems has been proposed 
by Schade and Burmeister-Lamp (2009). They argue that looking at entrepreneurial 
activity “through the lens of decision making” allows new insights and stimulates 
theory development in entrepreneurship research. Studying decision making requires 
detailed individual data which is often hard to access. Schade and Burmeister-Lamp 
(2009) suggest an experimental approach for gathering suitable data to study 
entrepreneurial decision making. Manipulating the variables of interest while keeping 
all else equal or controlled, experiments are able to provide detailed, meaningful 
individual information on decision making. Experiments thus complement surveys, field 
data, and theoretical contributions allowing focusing on individual differences between 
entrepreneurs and others. The experimental approach includes questionnaire 
experiments (e.g., Busenitz and Barney 1997, Burmeister and Schade 2007), 
hypothetical decision scenarios based on cases (e.g., Simon et al. 2000), conjoint 
experiments (e.g., Franke et al. 2006) and economic experiments that use monetary 
incentives (e.g., Sandri et al. 2010, Weitzel et al. 2010). As an understanding of the 
impact of economic incentives on decisions is crucial for understanding phenomena in 
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entrepreneurship, the use of monetarily incentivized economic experiments for studying 
key questions in entrepreneurship is advocated by Schade and Burmeister-Lamp (2009). 
While most of the other forms of experiments mentioned are already established in 
entrepreneurship research, economic experiments have only recently experienced a 
growing interest among entrepreneurship researchers. Economic experiments 
investigating the decision behavior of actual entrepreneurs are particularly rare. One of 
the reasons for this is that entrepreneurs are “hard to get”. Winning entrepreneurs to 
participate in a laboratory experiment is more difficult than recruiting them for an 
online questionnaire experiment. Controlled laboratory experiments are particularly 
difficult in this regards as investigating strategic decisions often requires that a 
sufficient number of participants interact at the same time. Authors that have run 
economic experiments with actual entrepreneurs therefore have conducted experiments 
at large start-up conventions (Elston et al. 2006) or at Science Parks and Incubators 
(Sandri et al. 2010). Another issue that arises from conducting experiments with 
entrepreneurs is the question of monetary incentives. Economic experiments rely on 
monetary incentives to elicit people’s preferences. The majority of experimental 
economics studies are conducted with student subjects. Besides many other reasons, 
students make suitable subjects because incentivizing them is cost-efficient. Incentives 
given to high income individuals like entrepreneurs need to be scaled-up compared to 
students’ payoffs to provide the same relative incentive to both groups. Using students 
or people with entrepreneurial intensions as subjects is justified in many cases where the 
research question does not concern aspects that originate from entrepreneurial 
experience. If the aim is to better understand how entrepreneurs make decisions, 
replacing them by other groups of subjects fails to accomplish the task. Studying 
individual and interactive decision making of entrepreneurs as compared to different 
groups of non-entrepreneurs in incentivized economic experiments offers a wide range 
of opportunities for future research in entrepreneurship (Schade and Burmeister-Lamp 
2009, Schade 2010).  
In a number of not incentivized studies on individual decision making behavioral 
differences between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs have been reported (e.g., 
Parlich and Bagby 1995, Busenitz and Barney 1997). Parlich and Bagby (1995) find 
entrepreneurs to be more biased and to categorize business scenarios more positively 
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than non-entrepreneurs. Busenitz and Barney (1997) compare entrepreneurs to 
managers in large organizations and find that they are more susceptible to overestimate 
their own absolute skills and to the representativeness heuristic1. Questioning that 
entrepreneurs are generally more biased than other groups, Burmeister and Schade 
(2007) study the status quo bias with entrepreneurs as compared to bankers and 
students. They find that entrepreneurs are less status quo biased than bankers and not 
more than students, who due to their age and little experience should actually be less 
status quo biased than more experienced people. Their results show that entrepreneurs 
are not generally more biased than others and demonstrate that the extent to which 
entrepreneurs are affected by certain biases as compared to others depends on the 
domain and context under consideration.  
Article 4 (“Does ‘ego’ make the entrepreneurs? Overconfidence, demand uncertainty 
and market entry”) contributes to the literature on behavioral differences between 
entrepreneurs and others by shedding light on the connection between previous results 
on entrepreneurial overconfidence. Busenitz and Barney (1997) found entrepreneurs to 
be more susceptible to overestimating their absolute skills than non-entrepreneurs. 
Elston et al. (2006) found that entrepreneurs do not differ from others in overestimating 
their skills relative to competitors. When people overestimate their skills relative to 
others, this can be caused by them either overestimating their absolute skills or 
underestimating the skill level of their competitors, or by both together. Given this 
relationship, the results of Busenitz and Barney (1997) and Elston et al (2006) lead to 
the following inference: If entrepreneurs are more overconfident in their absolute skills 
than non-entrepreneurs (Busenitz and Barney 1997) but not more or less overconfident 
in their relative skills than non-entrepreneurs (Elston et al. 2006), they should, ceteris 
paribus, be less susceptible to underestimating their competitors, i.e., they should be less 
susceptible to the reference group neglect (Camerer and Lovallo 1999). Article 4 reports 
on a controlled laboratory experiment that investigates this relationship between 
absolute and relative overconfidence. The findings show no significant differences 
                                                 
1
 Applying the representativeness heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman 1974), people judge the probability 
of a hypothesis by considering how much the hypothesis resembles available data. For example if A is 
highly representative for B, the probability that A originates from B is judged to be high. If A is not 
similar to B, the probability that A originates from B is judged to be low. Although often useful, the 
representative heuristic can lead to severe errors and result in neglecting relevant base rates. 
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between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs on either relative overconfidence or 
reference group neglect. These results suggest that it is not a pronounced level of 
relative overconfidence that distinguishes entrepreneurs from non-entrepreneurs. This 
finding adds to the growing evidence that excess market entry is rather caused by the 
nature of the decision environment and by the way people learn under uncertainty than 
by overconfidence as a fixed trait and by entrepreneurs exhibiting higher 
overconfidence levels per se (e.g., Moore et al. 2007, Karelaia and Hogarth 2010).  
Also Article 2 (“Market entry decisions after gains and losses: gender matters, being 
an entrepreneur does not”) contributes to the literature on behavioral differences 
between entrepreneurs and others. Our focus in this study is on differences between 
male and female entrepreneurs and on the question whether gender differences observed 
in context-dependent strategic decisions are smaller in the group of entrepreneurs than 
with non-entrepreneurs. Gender differences in context-dependent strategic decisions 
have been found by Schade et al. (2010). They relate their results to women’s reluctance 
to enter competition and to compete with men (Niederle and Vesterlund 2011). As 
female entrepreneurs self-selected into a risky, highly competitive and mostly male 
dominated field, we expect behavioral differences between males and females to be 
smaller with entrepreneurs than with non-entrepreneurs. While our findings confirm 
gender differences in entry behavior, contrary to our expectations, this gender difference 
maintains with male and female entrepreneurs. It also maintains for women playing 
against other women. This surprising result raises questions for research on female 
entrepreneurship and for the participation of women in entrepreneurial activities 
outlined in Article 2.  
1.3 Core results and contributions 
The studies conducted within the scope of this dissertation lead to the following core 
results: 
(1) Simple models of behavior employing payoff asymmetries and social projection 
might account better for behavior under dual uncertainty than sophisticated game 
theoretic solution concepts. 
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In Article 1, we study coordination behavior in a two-player investment game with 
asymmetric, stochastic payoffs and dual uncertainty. Under dual uncertainty, players are 
not only uncertain about their own payoffs but also about the payoffs of their 
counterparts. This causes a fundamental lack of knowledge about the preferences of 
counterpart players stemming from their differences in risk attitudes and other-regarding 
preferences (cf. Cabrales et al. 2007) or from reference point and context they refer to 
(cf. Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Schade et al. 2010). Comparing mixed strategy 
equilibria, risk dominance and a decision heuristic based on asymmetric cost and social 
projection, we find that the behavior is best describes by linear relations to each player’s 
cost which are consistent with the proposed heuristic model. Predictions based on risk 
dominance, however, also predict behavior well. The proposed heuristic model and the 
risk dominance criterion lead to qualitatively similar results, i.e., predicting that the 
player with the lower costs invests and that the other tries to free ride. These findings 
are related to the results of Cabrales et al. (2007) who find that the equilibrium outcome 
in a game with incomplete information from noisy signals, on average, coincides with 
the risk dominant equilibrium of the underlying coordination game. Our findings are 
also related to the results on behavior in global games of Heinemann et al. (2004). 
Heinemann et al. (2004) argue that limited levels of reasoning about the other players’ 
strategies and strategic uncertainty are the major forces that drive people to play the 
threshold-strategies observed in their experiment. Together with the results of Cabrales 
et al. (2007) and Heinemann (2004) our findings imply an underlying connection 
between mental short-cuts used in dual uncertainty games like focusing on payoff 
asymmetries and using social projection to by-pass uncertainty about the preferences of 
strategic counterparts and the incentive structure leading to risk dominance. Further 
research in this area might explore this connection in detail.  
(2) Demand uncertainty leads to pronounced overentry in skill-based competition 
when the strength of competition is very high and to pronounced underentry when the 
strength of competition is very weak.  
In Article 4, the focus is on exogenous demand uncertainty in skill-based competition. 
The study focuses on the interplay between the strength of competition and demand 
uncertainty. The results show that entry into skill-based competition is almost linearly 
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increasing in expected demand when demand is given but s-shaped with asymmetric 
effects for extreme values of expected demand under demand uncertainty: under 
demand uncertainty people overenter markets with a low expected demand where 
competition is intense and they underenter markets with a high expected demand where 
competition is weak. The findings show that the pattern of over- and underentry is 
related to participants’ beliefs about the entry behavior of their competitors but not 
moderated by either their level of overconfidence or by the true skill level. Some people 
belief that their competitors’ shy away from entering markets with intense competition 
leading them to enter more. At the same time, people belief that their competitors 
overrun markets with weak competition leading them to underenter these markets. 
These results are in line with previous studies that documented overentry in markets 
with small certain capacities (Bolger et al. 2008, Pogrebna and Schade 2009) and with 
studies showing that reliable market over- and underentry can be explained by peoples’ 
beliefs’ about their competitors entry behavior (Camerer et al. 2004). The study 
contributes to this stream of literature by showing that demand uncertainty can amplify 
this phenomenon. This finding has implications for entrepreneurial start-up decisions in 
different types of markets. It implies that overentry might occur in industries that are 
subject to fierce competition and extremely risky in demand particularly because some 
entrepreneurs might assume their potential competitors to shy away from fierce 
competition. Correspondingly, the same logic might cause underentry in markets that 
are less competitive because demand is relatively high compared to the number of 
potential entrants. Similar implications can be drawn for other domains of skill-based 
competition where the expected demand is either extremely low or extremely high.  
Article 1 and Article 3 both underline the role of limited reasoning about the choices 
of strategic counterparts. The fact that outcomes are often exogenously uncertain and 
that players have private information about their individual preferences towards risk, 
“fairness”, and relevant reference points lead to a high degree of uncertainty concerning 
the utility strategic counterparts derive even from given strategy combinations. Thus 
social projection, although error-prone in some situations, might be a justified short-cut 
for dealing with strategic uncertainty of higher orders.  
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(3) Entrepreneurs’ coordination behavior does not differ significantly from that of 
students. 
In Article 1, Article 2 and Article 4, entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs have been 
compared with respect to their behavior under strategic uncertainty. No significant 
differences in coordination behavior of entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs have been 
found. In particular, Article 4 shows that entrepreneurs do not act more on their 
confidence in relative skills than non-entrepreneurs. The conclusion derived from this is 
that it is not a pronounced level of relative overconfidence that distinguishes 
entrepreneurs from non-entrepreneurs. This result is in line with the growing evidence 
that excess market entry is rather caused by the nature of the decision environment and 
by the way people learn in an uncertain environment than by entrepreneurs being 
particularly overconfident. The sample sizes in these studies were relatively small. Thus 
small differences might not have been detected in our studies. The fact that we find 
large and highly significant gender differences suggests, however, that compared to the 
effect of gender between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs are negligible.  
(4) Gender differences are more important for strategic decision making in a 
competitive decision scenario than differences between entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs.  
In Article 2 we investigate whether gender differences observed in strategic decision 
making after gains and losses are smaller between male and female entrepreneurs than 
between male and female non-entrepreneurs. Contrary to our expectation that self-
selection and the “training” in competition would lead to smaller gender differences 
with entrepreneurs, the gender gap in behavior largely remains with male and female 
entrepreneurs. The results on entry into skill-based competition in Article 4 point into 
the same direction: here as well, gender has a significant effect on behavior while being 
an entrepreneur does not. Together these results indicate that gender effects outweigh 
the effect of being an entrepreneur in strategic decision making. This finding has two 
interesting implications for research on female entrepreneurs and the participation of 
gender differences: (a) female entrepreneurs are not necessarily more willing to take 
strategic uncertainty than other women. Aspects that might help female entrepreneurs to 
overcome their reluctance to enter skill-based competition might be related to different 
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motivations of male and female entrepreneurs that have been reported by surveys in 
female entrepreneurship. (b) The observed gender differences in entry decisions are 
large while differences between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs are insignificant. 
This implies that gender specific research on entrepreneurship and affirmative action 
warrant further exploration and have the potential to have a large impact on 
entrepreneurial activity. 
1.4 Conclusions 
This dissertation comprises four experimental studies that investigate decision making 
under simultaneously existing strategic and exogenous uncertainty. Entrepreneurs’ and 
non-entrepreneurs’ decision making in this context has been compared. The core results 
suggest that people might rely on rather simple heuristics when coordinating under dual 
uncertainty. Two aspects that might play a role in these mental short-cuts are payoffs 
asymmetries and social project. Future research should investigate the connection 
between payoffs asymmetries and social project, on the one hand, and the consolidating 
results on risk dominance, on the other hand. This might explain why risk dominance 
often accounts very well for decision making under strategic uncertainty of higher order 
even though this concept requires a sophisticated calculus. Furthermore, results indicate 
that exogenous demand uncertainty amplifies the overentry observed in small markets 
and the underentry in large markets. This gives rise for further research on the influence 
of exogenous demand uncertainty on entry behavior in different types of markets. 
Comparing entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs no significant differences in strategic 
decision behavior have been found. This result adds to the growing evidence that 
entrepreneurs might not be so different from others after all and that excess market entry 
is rather caused by the nature of the decision environment and by the way people learn 
in an uncertain environment than by entrepreneurs being particularly overconfident. 
Instead, results show significant gender differences in strategic decision making that 
remain within the group of entrepreneurs. The result that gender is important and being 
an entrepreneur does not significantly impact on strategic decision making supports 
specific research on female entrepreneurship. 
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2. Coordination under dual uncertainty 
 
Article 1: 
Coordination under dual uncertainty: Comparing mixed strategy 
equilibria, risk dominance, and a decision heuristic 
Sabrina Boewe, Christian Schade, David Krantz and Anna Kostanovskaya 
 
This paper investigates coordination behavior in a two-player game with 
dual uncertainty, i.e., strategic uncertainty and exogenous payoff 
uncertainty. Coordination behavior is compared with mixed strategy 
equilibria, with equilibrium selection based on risk dominance, and with a 
plausible decision heuristic. In the most satisfactory model, investment 
probability varies linearly with each player’s cost. We interpret this as a 
heuristic based on the player’s cost and on social projection. Exploring 
the generalizability of our results, we found no evidence of behavioral 
differences between students and high-tech entrepreneurs who are 
confronted with dual uncertainty in their profession. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Behavioral game theory is concerned with interactive decisions behavior of 
interdependent decision makers. Uncertainty is considered to be strategic. Behavioral 
decision theory instead considers individual decision making or ‘games against nature’ 
and treats uncertainty as exogenously given. While this distinction between strategic 
uncertainty and exogenous uncertainty has widely separated the literature on behavioral 
game theory and behavioral decision theory, a growing number of studies investigate 
behavior in games that involve stochastic payoffs where uncertainty stems from both 
strategic and exogenous sources. The aim hereby is to understand how exogenous 
uncertainty influences strategic decision making. 
Most studies in this domain examine resource dilemmas and public goods games 
where the size of the resource or the provision point of the public good is uncertain 
(Rutte et al. 1987, Suleiman and Rapoport 1988, Messick et al. 1988, Budesu et al. 
1990, 1992, 1995a, 1995b, De Vries and Wilke 1992, 1995, Biel and Gärling 1995, Wit 
and Wilke 1998, Rapoport and Au 2001, Levati et al. 2009, Gangadharan and Nemes 
2009). Gong et al. (2009) analyze group cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma with 
stochastic payoffs. Only very few studies have analyzed coordination behavior under 
dual-uncertainty (e.g., Cabrales et al. 2007). Cabrales et al. (2007) examine a 
coordination game with dual-uncertainty where noisy signals about the true payoffs lead 
to a unique Nash-equilibrium. Other authors have investigated coordination in market 
entry games with uncertain payoffs (Brandts and Yao 2010, Karelaia and Hogarth 
2010).  
This paper contributes to the literature on coordination under dual-uncertainty by 
testing established game theoretic concepts – the mixed strategy equilibrium and the 
risk dominance criterion – against a plausible decision heuristic. 
For classic coordination games that only involve strategic uncertainty, the explanatory 
power of the mixed strategy equilibrium and equilibrium selection concepts such as 
payoff dominance and risk dominance (Harsanyi and Selten 1988) has been debated 
because results are mixed (e.g., Cooper et al. 1990, Crawford 1991, Straub 1995, Ochs 
1995, Schmidt et al. 2003, Sundali et al. 1995, Van Huyck et al. 1990, Cabrales et al. 
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2000, Février and Linnemer 2006). For non-strategic individual decisions under 
exogenous uncertainty, people have often been found to use decision heuristics rather 
than sophisticated utility maximizing calculus (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 
Kahneman et al. 1982, Payne et al. 1993, Thomas and McFadyen 1995, Gigerenzer et 
al. 1999). But although the idea that people use heuristics is widely accepted in 
individual decision making, only few studies have tested the empirical relevance of 
heuristics in games (e.g., Leland, 2006, Deventag and Di Guida 2010). Given the results 
on individual decision making under uncertainty, it is plausible to assume that people 
also use decision heuristics when coordinating under dual-uncertainty where payoffs are 
subject to strategic and exogenous uncertainty. 
We study coordination behavior under dual-uncertainty in a two-player coordination 
game with asymmetric, risky payoffs. To explore the generalizability of our findings we 
ran economic experiments with students – the group most widely considered in studies 
on coordination behavior – and high-tech entrepreneurs who regularly encounter 
decisions under dual-uncertainty in their profession. Testing the explanatory power of 
mixed strategy equilibria, risk dominance, and a decision heuristic against each other 
required setting up a ‘realistic’ decision situation that was still parsimonious enough to 
apply equilibrium and equilibrium selection concepts. Giving the group of high-tech 
entrepreneurs a possibility to connect to their experiences with dual-uncertainty we 
chose to analyze a coordination game that is framed as a research and development 
investment scenario. The outcomes in this game depended on strategic uncertainty 
arising from two interacting decision makers’ choices and exogenous uncertainty about 
the outcome of the investment. Coordination behavior in this game was compared to the 
predictions of mixed strategy play, risk dominance and a decision heuristic that is based 
on simple cost considerations and social projection. We find that the most satisfactory 
model in our comparison assumes linear relations to each player’s cost and is consistent 
with the proposed heuristic model. We discuss the plausibility of this behavioral 
concept. Behavioral differences between students and entrepreneurs are surprisingly 
small and not statistically significant.  
The remaining paper is organized as follows: in the next section the game underlying 
the experiment is analyzed and hypotheses are derived. In section three the experiment 
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is described. In section four we present the analysis and results. The findings are 
discussed in section five. Section six contains the conclusion. 
2.2 Coordination game with dual uncertainty 
The decision scenario for our experiment is based on the general interdependent 
security model of Heal and Kunreuther (2005). The game involves exogenous 
uncertainty concerning success of research and development and concerning success of 
free-riding which leads to stochastic payoffs. Strategic uncertainty is based on possible 
research investments by others.  
2.2.1 Game 
In the game, two players have to decide simultaneously and without being able to 
observe the other’s choice whether or not to invest into a putative research and 
development project. The project will generate an innovative technology with a stated 
success probability 1p  and 2p  for Player 1 and Player 2, respectively. Investing in the 
project results in cost 1c  for Player 1 and 2c  for Player 2, where 1 2c c . Both players 
have an initial endowment Y , incurred costs are deducted from Y  and realized gains 
are added to Y . Success yields a monetary gain G . Thus, the profits from investing are 
uncertain: the expected gains from the players’ own investments are 1 1p G c  and 
2 2p G c , respectively. Additionally, players face technological spillovers. With a 
spillover probability 2q  Player 2 will gain G  from a successful investment by Player 1, 
by copying or imitating the innovation. Thus, if Player 2 does not invest or does not 
succeed, but Player 1 does invest, Player 2 obtains G  nonetheless by copying, with 
probability 2 1q p  (probability that Player 1 succeeds and then Player 2 copies 
successfully). Technological spillover exists in both directions, i.e., Player 1 is also able 
to copy from Player 2. Copying is assumed costless and therefore occurs whenever 
possible. This leads to bilateral free-riding incentives. Thereby, the solution that nobody 
invests in research can be worst for both players, but at the same time neither player 
wants to be the one investing. This general incentive structure is shared with the 
Chicken game, which has received attention in economics as well as political science. In 
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the scenario modeled here, spillover and success uncertainty modify the incentives. 
Letting I  denote the strategy to invest in the project and let N  denote the strategy not 
to invest, we obtain the following two-player matrix of expected payoffs: 
TABLE 1. MATRIX OF EXPECTED PAYOFFS 
 PLAYER 2 
I  N  
 
 
PLAYER 1 
I  
GpqpGpcY
21111
)1( 
  
GpqpGpcY
1222
)1(2   
GpcY
11
  
GpqY
12
  
N  
GpqY
21

 
GpcY
22
  
Y  
Y  
The entries in each cell of this matrix are the expected values for Player 1 (above) and 
Player 2 (below). They are readily derived following through the logic sketched in the 
preceding paragraph. Implicit in this model are certain simplifying assumptions, e.g., 
that copying by one player does not reduce the other’s payoff and that copying costs can 
be neglected. The former assumption might be valid if the two players want to use the 
new technology in different markets. When investment costs for both players are neither 
low enough to justify investing even if the counterpart player invests as well nor higher 
than the expected payoff from investing, i.e., GpcGppq iiiji  )1( , the game has 
two pure strategy Nash equilibria and thereby induces a coordination problem. As we 
are interested in coordination behavior, we limit our analysis to these intervals of 1c  and 
2c . Stochastic payoffs lead to dual uncertainty and make our decision situation 
reflective of numerous situations that decision makers face outside the laboratory. 
Outcomes are uncertain even if the strategy vector is given. Nash equilibria are derived 
by assuming that players choose strategies in accordance with the expected payoffs 
from these strategies.  
2.2.2 Nash equilibria and mixed-strategy play 
For GpcGppq 11121 )1(   and GpcGppq 22212 )1(  , the game has the two 
pure strategy Nash equilibria ),( NI  and ),( IN . For the intervals of 1c  and 2c  
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satisfying the above inequalities, only one player should invest and the other player 
should try to copy
2
. Since copying is costless, the expected payoff is higher for the 
player who plays N  in each of these equilibria: neither wants to be the one who invests 
in innovation, rather, both prefer to speculate on being able to free-ride.  
There is also a mixed-strategy equilibrium )~,~( 21 mm . Suppose that each player chooses 
a mixed strategy, and let im  be the probability that Player i  invests, for  
i = 1, 2. The mixed-strategy equilibrium for this game is given by  
(1) 
Gppq
cGp
m
jii
jj
i

~  
At equilibrium, each mixing probability depends only on the counterpart player’s cost 
jc , not on the player’s own cost ic . Previous studies have reported on coordination 
behavior converging to the mixed strategy equilibrium after a sufficient number of 
rounds and on aggregate behavior that is close to the mixed strategy equilibrium (e.g., 
O’Neill 1987, Mookherjee and Sopher 1994, McCabe et al. 2000). With hypothesis 1 
we test whether coordination behavior in the given one-shot dual-uncertainty scenario 
can be described by mixed strategy play:  
HYPOTHESIS 1: Peoples’ investment decisions are related to the mixed strategy 
equilibrium probabilities. 
Analyzing the data, we translate this hypothesis into a hierarchy of models (model 
family 1), including a 0-parameter model in which the players’ investment probabilities 
are simply compared to the mixed strategy equilibrium values. Such a strict 0-parameter 
model does not allow for individual biases. To assess the value of the different concepts 
for describing behavior, we embedded the concepts into linear models that do allow for 
biases and initial propensities to invest. These models parsimoniously add additional 
parameters which capture initial investment propensities by intercept   and gradual 
reactions to the factors mixed strategy equilibrium (hypothesis 1), risk dominance 
(hypothesis 2), and own cost and counterparts cost (hypothesis 3) by slopes   and  . 
                                                 
2
 For a general equilibrium analysis see Appendix II. 
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In addition to the 0-parameter model where the players’ investment probabilities are 
simply compared to the mixed strategy equilibrium values we therefore also considered 
more complex models in which players’ investment probabilities are fitted by different 
linear functions of the mixed strategy equilibrium values.  
2.2.3 Equilibrium selection 
As players have different preferences, the two pure-strategy equilbria in this 
coordination game cannot be Pareto ranked
3
. When selecting between equilibria the 
payoff dominance criterion thus cannot be applied
4
. Still, the risk dominance criterion is 
applicable (Harsanyi and Selten 1988). The risk dominance criterion compares the 
product of the two players’ payoff gains from correctly predicting the equilibrium 
choice of the other player as compared to making a wrong prediction. The equilibrium 
with the largest risk-product is the one that is risk dominant. 
In the considered game, ),( NI is the risk dominant equilibrium if and only if the risk-
product of ),( NI is greater than the risk-product of ),( IN . Calculating the risk-products 
for ),( NI  and ),( IN  from Table 1 leads to the following inequality: 
(2) ))(())(( 12111221222211 GppqGpccGpGppqGpccGp   
Subtracting the later product from the first gives the risk-product difference r , with  
(3) )( 2112211221 GpqGpqqcqcGppr   
Under the assumption (fulfilled in the experiment described below) that 21 pp   and 
21 qq   this expression reduces to  
                                                 
3
 Initial interests in coordination games stem from ‘common interests’ situations with multiple Pareto rank 
able Nash equilibria, in which people might get stuck in undesirable outcomes. As a consequence, 
most studies consider either games with a payoff dominant equilibrium only or they investigate the 
conflict between payoff dominance and risk dominance (e.g., Van Huyck et al. 1990, Mehta et al. 
1994, Cachon and Camerer 1996, Schmidt et al. 2003). 
4
 For proof see Appendix III. 
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(4) )( 12
2 ccGqpr   
The equilibrium ),( NI  is risk dominant if and only if the risk-product difference r  is 
positive, which is the case if and only if 21 cc    Accordingly, ),( IN  is risk dominant if 
and only if the risk-product difference r  is negative; i.e., if and only if 21 cc  . If the 
risk-product difference r  is zero, the risk dominance criterion does not apply. The 
equilibrium in which the player with the lower cost invests and the player with the 
higher cost does not invest but hopes to be able to free-ride is risk dominant when 
success and copying probabilities are equal for both players. The predictive power of 
the risk dominance criterion has received empirical support in coordination games with 
strategic complements (e.g., Cabrales et al. 2000, Schade et al. 2010). It has been also 
found to account well for behavior in a global game (Cabrales et al. 2007). With 
hypothesis 2 we test whether this result also holds for coordination behavior in the 
considered dual-uncertainty game. 
HYPOTHESIS 2: People’s decisions follow risk dominance, i.e., investment decisions 
vary linearly with the sign of the risk-product difference r .  
A strict 0-parameter model would postulate that the risk-dominant equilibrium is 
always chosen; i.e., investment probability %100I  for the player with lower cost and 
probability %0I  for the player with higher cost. A slightly more general 2-parameter 
model would assert that the investment probability takes two different values: a high 
value if the player’s own cost is lower than his opponents cost and a lower value if the 
player’s own cost is higher than the opponent’s cost. Another variant might be a 2-
parameter model in which the investment probability is a linear or a log-linear function 
of r . For the current experiment, however, the risk-product difference r  is constant, 
and so this latter variant reduces to the model with only two probability values, i.e., to a 
linear function of the sign of r . As in the case of hypothesis 1, we translate the risk 
dominance concept into a hierarchy of linear models with varying numbers of 
parameters for individual subjects for the analysis. 
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2.2.4 Cost heuristic plus social projection 
Coordination under dual uncertainty is more complex than in “standard” coordination 
games. It involves additional uncertainty from exogenous sources and the payoffs are 
probabilistic even if strategy choices of all players are given. Dealing with exogenous 
uncertainty in non-strategic decision scenarios, people have been found to often use of 
heuristics (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1974, Kahneman et al. 1982, Payne et al. 1993, 
Thomas and McFadyen 1995, Gigerenzer et al.1999). As an alternative to mixed 
strategy equilibria and the risk dominance criterion we thus test whether peoples’ 
decisions in our dual-uncertainty scenario can be explained by a heuristic.  
In the considered game, a plausible decision heuristic is based on cost, a crucial 
aspect of any investment decision. The higher the up-front cost the less attractive the 
investment, all else equal. Hence, cost affects investment propensity. Furthermore, in 
coordination games, “all else” is not equal, because players do not know what their 
counterparts will do. We propose that a decision maker fills this gap, not by assuming 
rationality of the other player but by assuming that the counterpart will follow a 
decision rule similar to her own: to invest less frequently when faced with high 
investment cost and more frequently with low. This is consistent with social projection. 
Social projection as a means to build beliefs about other’s behavior is a widely accepted 
concept in social psychology (Allport 1924, Festinger 1954, Orive 1988, Krueger, 2000, 
2007). It has been introduced into the equilibrium analysis with coordination games by 
Schade et al. (2010); behavior in such games has been reported to be consistent with a 
prediction based on social projection for many respondents. Since in our scenario it is 
better to invest oneself than to face a situation where nobody does so, investment 
propensity should also be higher when a player projects that his counterpart is unlikely 
to invest. Investment propensity should thus be a decreasing function of the player’s 
own cost and an increasing function of the counterpart’s cost. This leads us to a third 
hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 3: People’s decisions follow simple cost considerations and social 
projection; i.e., they vary negatively with the decision makers’ own cost and positively 
with the opponent’s cost. 
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2.3 Experiment 
2.3.1 Participants 
The experiment was conducted with students – the typical group of subjects in most 
of the previous studies on coordination behavior – as well as with a group of high-tech 
entrepreneurs who are typically confronted with dual-uncertainty in their profession. 
We assumed that most high-tech entrepreneurs would have faced similar research and 
development investment decisions in their professional lives already or at least have 
thought about such a situation before. By comparing these two groups, we explore the 
generalizability of our findings in terms of describing real decision makers’ behavior. 
This is important as previous research has reported on a number of differences in the 
decision making of entrepreneurs as compared to others (e.g., Cooper et al. 1988, Baron 
1998, Busenitz and Barney 1997). The differences in entrepreneurs’ decision behavior 
have been discussed to be a consequence of dealing with a high degree of uncertainty 
and time pressure in their profession. Thus, they might play a role for dealing with dual-
uncertainty as well.  
Our sample consisted of 56 participants, 38 business and economics students and 18 
entrepreneurs from the high-tech industry. Students were recruited at the School of 
Business and Economics at a German university. Entrepreneurs were recruited in a large 
science and technology park. We conducted six sessions; entrepreneurs and students 
played in separate sessions. The student sessions were conducted in the experimental 
laboratory at their university. The entrepreneur sessions were partially conducted in the 
same experimental laboratory. Partially they were conducted using a mobile laboratory 
that was set up at the science and technology park. Entrepreneurs were aware of the fact 
that they played against other entrepreneurs. The average age of the students was 24 
years. Of the students 17 were male and 21 female. 20 had majored in business and 
management, 11 in economics, and the rest in mathematics or computer science with a 
minor in economics. 22 stated that they were trained in game theory. Of the student 
participants five had previously participated in an economic experiment but not in a 
similar one or more than twice, and none in a psychological experiment. The rest had 
never participated in any kind of experiment before. The average age of the 
entrepreneurs was 41.9 years. 14 of them were male and 4 were female. All were 
 37 
 
founders and managers of high-tech companies. On average, they had been active in 
their current business for 9.5 years. Most held a university degree; two of them held a 
Ph.D. None of the entrepreneurs had previously participated in an economic or 
psychological experiment and none indicated prior knowledge of game theory.  
2.3.2 Incentives 
To assure incentive compatibility, monetary compensation depended on the 
participant’s performance in the experimental task. Throughout the experiment we used 
the experimental currency ‘Talers’, with 10,000 Talers equal 1 € for the students and 
4.50 € for the entrepreneurs. At 15 € per hour, the average student payoff was close to a 
student assistant hourly salary. Entrepreneurs’ payoffs were scaled up by a factor of 4.5 
to account for the income differential between the two groups. 
2.3.3 Experimental design and procedure 
The experiment was programmed and conducted using the software z-Tree 
(Fischbacher 2007). We considered the coordination game modeled in section two, 
focusing on selected cost combinations (see Figure 1 below) that lead to two pure Nash 
equilibria in ),( NI  and ),( IN . Each session took approximately 60 minutes, including 
15 minutes for instructions.  
On their arrival at the laboratory, participants were placed at separated computer 
desks. Experimental instructions (in German) were presented via computer screens, 
individually for each participant. Instructions were also read aloud to the participants at 
the beginning of each session. Additionally, printed copies of instructions were handed 
out: participants could easily go back if they missed a detail. An English translation of 
the instructions can be found in Appendix V. After the general instructions, each 
participant was matched with an anonymous counterpart. Matching was conducted 
randomly by the computer and remained fixed throughout the experiment. Participants 
played 9 rounds of the coordination game. In each round, they decided whether or not to 
invest into a certain research and development project, at a stated cost, knowing that the 
counterpart was simultaneously confronting the same decision, and knowing the 
counterpart’s cost. Success probability for the project was set to 0.30 for both players. A 
player who did not invest in one round nevertheless received the gain by copying, with 
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probability 0.80, provided that the counterpart had invested successfully in that round. 
The copying occurred automatically, with no additional decision step. Due to the 
simultaneous move, players were unable to observe their counterparts’ decisions, 
leading to a need for coordination. To avoid learning effects, participants did not receive 
between-round feedback. Instead, feedback about the outcome of each round was given 
in form of a result list at the end of the experiment. In each round, the players faced a 
different individual cost levels. In some rounds, a player’s own investment cost was 
lower than the counterpart’s investment cost and it was higher in other rounds. Figure 1 
shows the different cost combinations that were presented to the two players. The 
presentation order of these paired costs was randomized for each pair of players.  
 
FIGURE 1. COST COMBINATIONS 
In some rounds, the player’s own cost was lower than his opponent’s cost; in other 
rounds his cost was higher than his opponent’s cost. Still, for each round the difference 
between the costs of both players was constant at 2,250
5
. There are 13 different values 
for a player’s own cost. 10 of these values occur only once per dyad while three of these 
values (25,500; 25,950; 26,400) occur twice per dyad – once paired with an opponent’s 
cost of +2,250 and once paired with an opponent’s cost of -2,250 (see also Table 5 in 
Appendix I). Participants were not confronted with all 13 values for own cost but with 8 
values making the design complete for dyads and not for individuals. As will be shown 
                                                 
5
 One round accidently presented a cost difference of 450 (respective cost combination: c1 = 26850; c2 = 
26400). We excluded this one round from the analysis.  
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in the results section, these three double paired cost values generate important evidence 
against the mixed strategy model. 
All other parameters were kept constant: the monetary gain G  from using the 
innovative technology was 100,000 Talers, as was the initial endowment Y . Even 
though the amount of the initial endowment Y  does not make a difference for the 
game-theoretic analysis we chose to endow participants with a positive amount from 
which investments could be made so that negative payoffs were impossible. This also 
allowed them to judge investment costs not only relative to expected gains but also in 
terms of affordable loss aspects. The success probability p was set to 0.30, mirroring 
the low success rates predominating in most industries. The spillover probability q  was 
set to 0.80 to achieve high strategic interdependence. All parameters, including the cost 
level of a player’s counterpart, were common knowledge and announced in each round 
of the game. 
Participants were able to state their responses as investment probabilities making use 
of a randomizing device similar to Anderhub et al. (2002) and Schade et al. (2010). In 
each round, participants could determine the number of white balls in a bingo cage 
containing a total of 100 black and white balls. From this bingo cage the computer 
randomly drew one ball to determine whether or not the investment was executed: when 
the ball was white the investment was executed; when it was black the respective player 
did not invest. This procedure is called explicit randomization in the literature (cf. 
Camerer 2003). We used this response mode in order to allow comparisons with mixed 
strategy equilibria. Furthermore, this response mode allowed participants to state 
attitudes towards investing instead of only having the possibility to make ‘yes or no’ 
decisions.  
Following the experimental task, risk attitudes were measured in accordance to Holt 
and Laury (2002)
6
 and demographic data were gathered. At the end, one round was 
randomly chosen for each participant. The payoff achieved by the participant in this 
round determined the payoff from the experimental task. By adding the payoff from the 
                                                 
6
 Risk attitude measures from the Holt and Laury measurement did not have an influence on behavior in 
our experiment. Results can be requested from the authors.  
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Holt and Laury (2002) test, the total payoff was calculated and paid out anonymously to 
the participants at the end of each session. 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Analysis 
We analyze the data in three steps: First, we test the three competing hypothesis 
separately to evaluate the explanatory power of each of the presented concepts. Second, 
we compare the explanatory power of these concepts to identify which of them 
performs best. Third, the question of generalizability of the findings is addressed by 
comparing the coordination behavior of students and high-tech entrepreneurs.  
The total dataset consists of 38 students and 18 entrepreneurs. For the main linear 
modeling, we excluded 11 participants because they made the same decision in all 
rounds; eight from the students sample and three from the entrepreneurs sample. Six 
students always stated an investment probability of 1. The other two students stated an 
investment probability of 0 in each round. One entrepreneur indicated an investment 
probability of 1 over all rounds, a second indicated a constant investment probability of 
0.50, and the third always specified a probability of 0.10. One further participant was 
excluded from the entrepreneurs’ sample because he was a top manager but did not hold 
any shares in the company at the time the experiment was conducted. The analysis 
presented below thus used a dataset consisting of 30 students and 14 entrepreneurs. 
Although the above subjects were not included in the modeling, we consider this group 
important in thinking about conclusions and we return to them in the discussion section. 
2.4.2 Mixed-strategy equilibria – Hypothesis 1 
For testing Hypothesis 1, we specify possible models as subfamilies of Model 1: 
(5) 
ititiiit my    (Model family 1). 
Here, ity  denotes the response (investment probability, ranging from 0% to 100%) for 
subject i on trial t. itm  is the mixed strategy equilibrium probability of Player i on trial t 
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which dependents on the opponent’s cost 
jtc  
on that trial. Coefficient i  is the 
intercept, which can be thought of as the i
th
 individual’s propensity to invest when 
0itm , i.e., when expected gain pG  falls to the level of investment cost. The slope i  
represents the weight for the i
th
 player on mixed strategy equilibrium probabilities. 
Finally, it  is an error term. 
This family of models has two components of individual variation, intercepts and 
slopes. Important special cases arise when one or both of these have zero variance, i.e., 
 i  or  i  or both. Two important sub-cases involve slope zero )( itiity    
and slope one with intercept zero )( ititit my  . This last is a 0-parameter model in 
which (apart from random error) the investment probability of each player in each round 
matches the equilibrium mixed strategy. Note that this general model family has 2 
parameters per subject, leaving 6 df for error, and thus, across 44 subjects, we estimate 
88 parameters, with 264 df for error. Treating either of the two variance components as 
null eliminates 43 parameters. Setting all slopes to 0 drops an additional parameter, 
while )( ititit my   eliminates all parameters. For the general model family we 
estimated a linear model for each subject, using least squares, via the lm( ) function in 
R. Special cases were similarly estimated across subjects using the same method. 
Findings – Figure 2 shows the number of parameters (bold), the residual df and 
residual sum of squares (italic) for each of the sub-models mentioned above, together 
with the appropriate model comparisons, taking into account the nesting of the various 
sub-models. The arrows show model nesting (less to more general). A dotted arrow 
indicates that models are non-nested. Differences in residuals and corresponding F 
statistics accompany some arrows. 
The best model is the model with individual intercepts and zero-slope )( itiity   . 
The residual standard deviation from that model is 36.7; scarcely greater than the 
residual from the most general model (36.2). The strict game-theoretic model with zero-
prarameters ( ititit my  ; RSS = 856893) fits worse in terms of residual sum of 
squares than the 1-parameter model  itiity   ; RSS= 577047). 
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FIGURE 2. MODEL COMPARISONS – MIXED STRATEGY MODEL 
From the comparisons of the constant-slope model and the constant-intercept model 
with the full model we conclude that the slope component of individual variation might 
be null, while the intercept component cannot be. Moreover, the hypothesis of zero 
slope cannot be rejected. Consistent with this we find that the slope estimates from the 
full model do not reject the hypothesis of zero mean, t = -1.38, df =43.  
Hypothesis 1 is rejected; the best model within this model family is the 0-slope model 
with individual intercept )( itiity   . In this model, mixed-strategy equilibria play no 
role at all.  
2.4.3 Risk dominance criterion – Hypothesis 2  
In accordance to the risk dominance criterion, Player i should decide to invest into the 
R&D project, when investing (pure strategy “I”) is the risk dominant strategy and not to 
invest when not-investing (pure strategy “N”) is risk dominant. Thus we assume a 
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general model in which the probability ity  of investing is a linear function of the risk-
product difference r : 
(6) 
ittiiit ry     (Model family 2). 
where )(
2
ij ccGqpr   is positive if and only if ji cc   and negative if and only if 
ji cc  , respectively. Coefficient i is the intercept, which can be thought of as the ith 
individual’s propensity to invest when 0r , i.e., when ji cc  . The slope i  
represents the weight for the i
th
 player on risk dominance r .  
As in the case of hypothesis 1, this family of linear models has two components of 
individual variation, and most of the analogous sub-models make sense: constant 
intercept, constant slope, or both. An important sub-case involves slope zero where risk 
dominance has no effect )( itiity   . The strict 0-parameter sub-model ittit ry    
states that the investment probability is either 0 or 100%, depending on which cost is 
lower. This can also be written as a special case of equation (5). 
The parameters and nesting status of the sub-models in model family 2 parallel the 
ones in model family 1 above. It is important to note that the 0-slope sub-models 
)( itity    and )( itiity    are identical for model family 1 and model family 2. 
Thus they are nested in a special case of both full models. 
Findings – Equivalent to Figure 2, Figure 3 shows number of parameters (bold), the 
residual df and residual sum of squares (italics) for the relevant sub-models, together 
with the appropriate model comparisons, taking into account the nesting of the various 
sub-models.  
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FIGURE 3. MODEL COMPARISON – RISK DOMINANCE MODEL 
2.4.4 Cost heuristic plus social projection – Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 states that players following a cost heuristic plus social projection invest 
more frequently when their own costs are low and when their counterpart’s costs are 
high. This implies a negative effect of own cost and a positive effect of counterpart’s 
cost. Subject  ’s investment decision ity  can be described as a function of own cost ic  
and opponent’s cost 
jc : 
(7) 
itjtiitiiit ccy    (Model family 3). 
where i  is the individual intercept, i  represents the influence of own cost on the 
investment decision, and i  
represents the influence of opponents’ cost.  
For this model we estimated three parameters per subject (3* 44 subjects = 132 
parameters; leaving 5 df for error per subject). Each of the three components of 
variation can be tested against the null hypothesis of a coefficient that is constant across 
subjects, giving rise to a family of sub-models depicted in Figure 4 below. The most 
important special case in this model family is the full model for Hypothesis 2, which is 
equivalent to the assumption that all pairs of coefficients for own and counterpart’s cost 
are equal and opposite, i.e., 0 ii   for all i. 
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Findings – Figure 4 shows the residual sum of squares and residual df for the full 
model (132 parameters) and for the four special sub-models testing each component of 
variance and the risk dominance sub-model discussed above.  
 
FIGURE 4. MODEL COMPARISON – HEURISTIC MODEL 
The best model is most likely the full 132-parameter model. Also tenable is the 
constant-intercept model: it is not rejected by the F-test but it is not very plausible. The 
tests of sub-models show that all three components of variance are needed in the model 
for Hypothesis 3. The comparison with model family 2 ( r  model) shows that the 
hypothesis of symmetric opposite slopes for own and other’s cost can be rejected, 
though statistical significance is less than convincing (p < 0.05). Examining the 
distribution of individual coefficients for own cost i  we find that the average reaction 
to own cost is negative: subjects’ investment probability decreases with increasing 
investment cost. The average reaction to counterpart’s cost i  
is positive indicating that 
investment probability increases when the costs of a player’s counterpart increase. Thus, 
we find support for hypothesis 3: under dual uncertainty coordination behavior can be 
explained by choosing strategies in accordance to the cost heuristic plus social 
projection. 
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2.4.5 Model comparison 
In this section we want to answer question which of the concepts (mixed strategy 
play, risk dominance, or cost heuristic plus social projection) describes individual 
behavior best. We thus review the explanatory power of the models. Table 2 shows the 
Multiple R square values for all three models. Values are estimated for the overall 8-
round dataset including both students and entrepreneurs. Model 2 is nested in model 3. 
Model 1 is nested in Model 3 under the assumption that the slope of own cost is zero 
(for details see Appendix IV). We compare models 1, 2 and 3 via the F-test to provide 
statistical significance levels for the comparison. 
TABLE 2. FIT MEASURES FOR FULL MODELS 
                                                                FULL MODELS 
MULTIPLE R-
SQUARED 
M1: Mixed-strategy equilibria
 ititii
m  
 0.752 
M2: Risk dominance criterion
 ittii
r     0.811 
M3: Cost heuristic plus social projection
 itjtiitii
cc  
 0.855 
The F-test of the comparison between model 3 and model 2 yields F44,220 = 1.51,  
p < 0.05. The F-test of the comparison between model 3 and model 1 yields  
F44,220 = 3.56, p < 0.001. Model 1 is included in this comparison taking into account the 
slope effect as we attempted to be generous in favor of model 1. We feel this is a 
reasonable comparison. Otherwise, this would have given rise to a comparison between 
a 44-parameter model and a 132-parameter model, as the condition for nesting model 1 
is that the slope is zero. Comparing the full model 3 with the individual incept and zero 
slope version of model 1 yields F88,220=2.64, p < 0.001. A comparison between the full 
model 3 with the constant intercept and zero slope version of model 1 yields  
F131,220 = 3.11, p < 0.001.  
The linear model for mixed strategy play revealed that mixed-strategy equilibrium 
plays no role at all. This is reflected by the result that model 1 fits the data worst of the 
three models. Model 3 (cost heuristic plus social projection) exhibits better fit measures 
than Model 2 (risk dominance). The comparison of model 2 and model 3 shows that the 
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hypothesis of symmetric opposite slopes for own and other’s cost can be rejected. 
Plotting the observed means of investment probability against the predicted mixed 
strategy equilibrium illustrates the results: 
 
FIGURE 5. OBSERVED MEAN INVESTMENT PROBABILITY AS A FUNCTION OF MIXED STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA (ERROR BAR = 
ONE ESTIMATED STANDARD ERROR) 
Figure 5 shows the value of the mixed strategy equilibrium on the abscissa. The 
ordinate is the observed mean investment percentage for the subset of trials with a given 
value of the mixed strategy equilibrium, i.e., a given value of opponent’s cost. Given the 
values chosen for our experiment the mixed strategy equilibrium takes 13 different 
values.  
The strict zero-parameter model for hypothesis 1 ( ititit my  ) would predict that 
the observed investment means fall on a 45 line through the origin of Figure 5. This is 
obviously false, and in fact, the variation is severely non-monotonic. The detailed non-
monotonicity is approximately explained by cost differences, as shown by the solid line, 
which gives the fit of the 2-parameter model for risk dominance )( ittit ry    . 
There are exactly three levels of cost-difference corresponding to the 13 levels of 
opponent’s cost: a positive difference (+2,250 Talers), an equal but opposite negative 
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difference (-2,250 Talers), and a zero difference arising from the situation where the 
same opponent’s cost is paired in the design with both a positive and a negative cost 
difference (see Table 5 in Appendix I). These three levels, adjusted by the linear fit of a 
2-parameter r  
model are visible in the flat portions of the solid curve in Figure 5. A 
slightly better fit can be obtained using the multi-component version of the r  model 
but this improvement would barely be noticeable in Figure 5, so we have omitted that fit 
for the sake of readability. A distinctly better fit is obtained when different coefficients 
are used for own and opponent’s cost (dashed line in Figure 5). Here, we use the multi-
component general model )( itjtiitiiit ccy   , with 132 intercept and slope 
parameters; but the fit of a 3-parameter model, omitting the components of individual 
variation, is only just noticeably worse in Figure 5. 
Figure 5 cannot substitute for the components-of-variance analyses shown in the three 
diagrams above (Figures 2-4), since there is little sensitivity to individual variation, but 
it does show clearly the qualitative differences among the three classes of explanatory 
models. Models based on opponent’s cost alone, as realized by the mixed strategy 
equilibrium, are grossly wrong; models based on risk dominance, which here reduces to 
cost difference, are much better but fail in detail, precisely because the weighting on a 
player’s own cost is roughly double that on the opponent’s cost. The heuristic model 
based on linear reactions to own and opponents cost performs better.  
To help understand the lack of sensitivity to individual variation in this way of 
comparing models, note that Figure 5 would not make any distinction between a 1-
parameter model (  in Figure 2) versus the 44-parameter i , the best model in Figure 
2. Because all 44 individuals are averaged in each of the 13 means in Figure 5, and the 
mean of the estimated i  is exactly the estimate of the single parameter  , these two 
models would just fit the same horizontal line to the data in Figure 5. For the more 
complex models related to hypotheses 2 and hypothesis 3, there is some sensitivity to 
individual variation in this comparison method, but not enough for purposes of model 
selection. 
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2.4.6 Generalizability 
To test the generalizability of these results, we compared coordination behavior of 
students and entrepreneurs. For model 2, we calculated the average effect of risk 
dominance (mean of the coefficients i  in model 2) for each group. A 95% confidence 
interval for the difference between mean risk-dominance slopes of students and 
entrepreneurs is (-0.0028, +0.0077). While we cannot conclude that students and 
entrepreneurs differ in average weight placed on risk dominance (in the framework of 
hypothesis 2), the difference between the two groups could be very large – the sample 
size of entrepreneurs is small and the variability within both groups is considerable. 
For model 3, we calculated the average reactions to own cost (mean value of 
coefficient i  in model 3) and the average reaction to counterparts cost (mean value of 
coefficient i  in model 3). While own cost had a negative effect on investment 
probabilities for both students and entrepreneurs this effect is stronger for students  
(-0.0093) compared to entrepreneurs (-0.0073). A 95% confidence interval for the 
difference between mean own cost slopes of students and entrepreneurs is  
(-0.0079, +0.0039). The independent sample t-test for the between group comparison of 
the coefficient i  gives a p > 0.05. Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis, that 
coefficients for own cost are equal for entrepreneurs and students. Similarly, the average 
reaction to increases in counterpart’s cost (mean value of coefficient i  in model 3) is 
stronger for students (0.0047) than for entrepreneurs (0.0021). A 95% confidence 
interval for the difference between the mean of opponents’ cost slopes of students and 
entrepreneurs is (-0.0030, +0.0082). The sample t-test for the between-group 
comparison of coefficient i  gives p > 0.05. Hence, we can neither reject the null 
hypothesis that coefficients for counterpart’s cost are equal for both groups. As in the 
case of hypothesis 2, these differences between students and entrepreneurs are 
accompanied by wide confidence intervals, so we remain unsure whether or not the 
differences are negligible or substantial.  
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2.5 Discussion  
2.5.1 Mixed strategy equilibria, risk dominance and decision heuristics 
Given that the analyzed coordination game is a one-shot game, the poor performance 
of the mixed strategy equilibrium in explaining behavior is not surprising  
(e.g., Heinemann et al. 2009). However, as the mixed strategy equilibrium is a central 
concept in the literature on classic coordination games, we consider it important to test 
this concept for dual uncertainty coordination. Having allowed people to explicitly state 
mixed strategies, we are confident that the poor performance of the mixed strategy 
equilibrium in our dual-uncertainty game is robust.  
Risk dominance and the suggested decision heuristic both explain coordination 
behavior under dual-uncertainty well. The predictions of both concepts point into the 
same direction: predicting a negative influence of increases in own cost and a positive 
influence of increases in opponents cost. Even though similar in directional predictions, 
the heuristic model performed better in our statistical analysis. If we would have 
compared the heuristic model with a strict 0-parameter model for risk dominance the 
heuristic model would have performed even better. This result is driven by two aspects: 
(a) The heuristic model has 132 parameters while the risk dominance model has 88 and 
is thus per se less sensitive to individual variation (please note that a strict risk 
dominance model would have no free parameter); (b) More importantly, the risk 
dominance model fails in detail precisely because the weighting on a player’s own cost 
is roughly double that on the opponent’s cost. This is a strong argument in favor of the 
suggested heuristic model. Table 3 provides an overview of the sign of the reactions to 
own and opponents cost (parameters 
 
and  , respectively). 
TABLE 3. OVERVIEW REACTIONS TO OWN AND OPPONENTS COST IN MODEL 3 (BASED ON 44 SUBJECTS) 
  REACTION TO OWN COST    
  negative  positive 
REACTION TO OPPONENT’S COST   positive  26 3 
negative  12 3 
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Across 44 subjects, 26 followed the predicted pattern exactly (negative reaction to 
own cost and positive reactions to opponent’s cost), while 12 exhibit negative reactions 
to increases in own and opponent’s cost. Only a small fraction of participants reacted 
positively to increases in own cost. Moreover, the absolute magnitude of reaction to 
own cost is larger than that of reactions to opponent’s cost. Thus, expectations are met 
fairly well, although there is a strong minority that reacts negatively to increases in 
opponent’s cost. For this group the assumption of social projection is implausible. 
Including cost values outside the coordination interval to which we restricted our 
experiment, the proposed heuristic would offer an advantage to the decision maker: For 
cost values outside this range (see Appendix II, especially Figure 6 therein), the game 
can have a unique equilibrium in ),( II  when costs are sufficiently low for both players 
or a unique equilibrium in ),( NN  when costs for both are higher than expected payoffs 
from investing. In practice, with limited analysis and calculation, players might be 
uncertain whether or not the cost situation they face leads to a coordination problem. 
The proposed heuristic will lead them in the right direction, no matter which cost range 
they are in. It is robust against situational changes. 
2.5.2 Participants who did not react to changes in cost levels 
Some participants were excluded from the regression analysis because they made the 
same decision in all rounds. From these 11 participants, seven always invested with a 
100% probability, one indicated a 50% investment probability in each round, another 
always indicated a 10% investment probability and two never invested. These decisions 
can be explained within the concept of the suggested heuristic model while they are not 
plausible within the concepts of mix strategy play and risk dominance. Within the cost 
heuristic concept, these responses could be interpreted as mirroring that the variability 
of own and opponent’s cost is too low to cause changes in investment probability of the 
respective participants. Taking into account both, the results from the model comparison 
and the behavior of the excluded participants, participants’ behavior in the experiment 
favors the heuristic model stronger. 
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2.5.3 Asymmetries as coordination device 
The result that coordination behavior under dual-uncertainty is better explained by a 
heuristic that is based on a salient asymmetry (in our game with respect to own cost and 
opponent’s cost) is in line with related studies on classic coordination games where 
asymmetries play a crucial role (e.g., Cabrales et al. 2000, Leland 2006, Di Guida and 
Devetag 2011). Coordination problems in real life situations typically involve 
asymmetries between the different decision makers. It is thus promising to further study 
the role of asymmetries for coordination behavior under dual-uncertainty. In particular 
the link between payoff asymmetries and the concept of risk dominance seems to be a 
fruitful area for further research. Future research should clarify if peoples’ tendency to 
use salient asymmetries as a coordination device could explain why in many situations 
the risk dominance criterion predicts behavior well in dual uncertainty coordination 
even though it is unlikely to be actually applied by decision makers as a decision rule. 
2.5.4 Generalizability 
Testing the generalizability of our results with a sample of entrepreneurs, we cannot 
conclude that decision patterns of students and entrepreneurs differ. However, as the 
sample size of entrepreneurs is small and the variability within both groups is 
considerable the difference between the two groups could be very large. In line with 
these results Table 4 show coordination outcomes for both groups separately: 
TABLE 4. COORDINATION OUTCOMES 
                    STUDENTS 
 
                 ENTREPRENEURS
 
 
 
      ji
cc   
      ji
cc   
  
I 
(60%) 
N 
(40%) 
 
I (64%) N (36%) 
ji cc   
I (37.8%) 22.7% 15.1% I (46.5%) 29.8% 16.7% 
N (62.2%) 37.3% 24.9% N (53.5%) 34.2% 19.3% 
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When own cost was lower than the opponent’s cost, the mean investment probability 
of the student participants was 60percent while the mean investment probability of the 
entrepreneurs was 64 percent. When own cost was higher than the opponent’s cost, the 
mean investment probability of the students participants was 37.8 percent; 
entrepreneur’s mean investment probability was 46.5 percent in this case. Calculating 
coordination outcomes for a representative agent leads to the two outcome tables above. 
Students’ coordination behavior would have lead to playing the risk dominant 
equilibrium in 37.3 percent of the cases, while the risk-dominated equilibrium would 
have been played only in 15.1percent of the cases. For the entrepreneurs’ sample we a 
very find a similar pattern: the entrepreneurs would have coordinated on the risk 
dominant equilibrium in 34.2 percent of the cases. The risk-dominated equilibrium 
would have been played in 16.7 percent of the cases. Furthermore, we entrepreneurs 
exhibit a slightly stronger tendency towards investing than the students. This is mirrored 
in reaching the off-equilibrium strategy combination ),( II  more often than the students. 
2.5.5 Other concepts 
In this paper we focused on mixed strategy equilibria, risk dominance and a decision 
heuristic based on cost and social projection. Another concept that could be considered 
is the concept of Lebesque stability sets. For 2x2 games the Lebesque stability set 
predictions the same outcome as the risk dominance criterion. Hence, for the considered 
game we can conclude that the Lebesque stability measure would have describes 
behavior well. Future research might investigate the relationship between the Lebesque 
stability measure and decision heuristics in coordination under dual uncertainty.  
2.6 Conclusions and future research 
We conducted experiments on coordination behavior under strategic uncertainty and 
exogenous payoff uncertainty. Results show that while the explanatory power of the risk 
dominance criterion is relatively high, a decision heuristic based on cost and social 
projection explains coordination behavior under dual-uncertainty better. This has 
implications for future research: the risk dominance criterion might predict behavior 
relatively well although decisions are actually driven by other factors. If one studies the 
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impact of risk dominance without testing it against other concepts, one might find that 
risk dominance is important for understanding behavior in a coordination game. What 
individuals instead might have done, e.g., orienting on asymmetries and descriptive 
features and heuristically choose an action, might be hidden by the mere fact that this 
alternative was not tested against risk dominance. This suggests that studies on 
equilibrium selection should also test alternative concepts. The methodology provided 
in this paper shows how this could be done. By identifying what actually drives 
behavior, future research might help to make better predictions for coordination 
behavior under dual-uncertainty, and to understand why risk dominance makes good 
predictions. This requires analyzing the link between those features that make an 
equilibrium point risk dominant and the features that shape potential heuristics, such as 
i.e., payoff asymmetry. 
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Appendices 
Appendix I: Tables 
TABLE 5. COST COMBINATIONS USED IN EXPERIMENT 
COST LEVELS PLAYER I COST LEVELS  PLAYER J 
23,250 
23,700 
25,500 
25,500 
25,950 
25,950 
26,400 
26,400 
27,300 
27,750 
28,650 
29,100 
29,550 
 
25,500 
25,950 
23,250 
27,750 
23,700 
28,200 
24,150 
28,650 
29,550 
25,500 
26,400 
26,850 
27,300 
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TABLE 6. OVERVIEW F-TESTS 
MODEL      UNRESTRICTED MODEL         RESTRICTED MODEL     F-TEST 
Model 1 ititiiit my    
ititiit my    
F(43,264) = 1.183 
p-v=0.214 
ititit my    
F(43,307) = 2.772 
p-v=0.000 
Model 2 ittiiit ry     
ittiit ry     
F(43,264) = 2.132 
p-v=0.000 
ittit ry     
F(43,307) = 3.160 
p-v=0.000 
Model 3 itjtiitiiit ccy    
itjtiitiit ccy    
F(43,220) = 1.746 
p-v=0.005 
itjtitiiit ccy    
F(43,220) = 1.958 
p-v=0.001 
itjtitiit ccy    
F(43,263) = 1.522 
p-v=0.026 
itjtitit ccy    
F(43,306) = 1.522 
p-v=0.000 
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TABLE 7. R-SQUARED AND R-SQUARED ADJUSTED 
MODELS                 SUB-MODELS R SQUARED R SQUARED ADJUSTED 
Model 1 
ititiiit my    0.752 0.669 
ititiit my    0.704 0.660 
ititit my     0.006 0.004 
Model 2 
ittiiit ry     0.811 0.748 
ittiit ry     0.746 0.708 
ittit ry     0.114 0.111 
Model 3 
itjtiitiiit ccy    0.855 0.768 
itjtiitiit ccy    0.805 0.740 
itjtitiiit ccy    0.799 0.732 
itjtitiit ccy    0.757 0.720 
itjtitit ccy    0.141 0.136 
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Appendix II: Equilibrium analysis for R&D investment game 
The expected return on the research and development investment and therewith the 
incentive to invest decreases with the number of other players investing. Consequently 
the incentive to invest is highest when no other entrepreneur invests. Equilibrium 
analysis for pure strategies shows that:  
If costs for both players are sufficiently low, i.e., Gppqc ijii )1(   and 
Gppqc jijj )1(  , ),( II  is the only pure Nash equilibrium and both players should 
invest into R&D even though there is an option to copy the innovation from the 
opponent. Since the success of the other entrepreneur’s investment is uncertain and 
since costs for own research and development activities are sufficiently low, the 
expected return from one’s own investment exceeds its costs )( Gpc ii   and the 
incentive to invest )ii cG(p   exceeds the free riding incentive G)p(q ji . If costs for both 
players are sufficiently high which is the case when they exceed expected return from 
the investment, i.e., Gpc ii   and Gpc jj   then ),( NN  is the only pure Nash 
equilibrium and none of the players should invest. With this parameter constellation the 
interdependence between the players’ decisions losses its crucial influence on the 
decision of each individual player because the R&D project is not attractive enough to 
invest the necessary resources no matter what the other player is doing.  
If Gpc ii   and Gppqc jijj )1(   then ),( NI  is a Nash equilibrium, meaning that 
player i should invest because his investment costs are lower than the expected returns 
from the investment, hence investing is a dominant strategy for her. Player j should try 
to copy the new technology, because his costs are higher than the expected returns from 
relying on entrepreneur i’s investment and trying to copy the innovation. Thus, his 
expected payoffs are higher when he decides not to invest but to try copying as when he 
decides to invest himself. The same holds contrariwise: If Gppqc ijii )1(   and 
Gpc jj   then (N,I) is a Nash equilibrium. For GpcGppq iiiji  )1(  and 
GpcGppq jjjij  )1(  (I,N) and (N,I) are both Nash equilibria.  
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The equilibrium intervals for the 2-player scenario are depicted as a function of ic  
and jc  in Figure 6: 
 
FIGURE 6. EQUILIBRIUM PREDICTIONS AS A FUNCTION OF C1 AND C2 
  
 65 
 
Appendix III: Payoff dominance criterion 
In order to be strictly payoff dominant, the respective equilibrium must yield higher 
payoffs for all players than any other equilibrium. Weak payoff dominance requires that 
none of the players yields a lower payoff than in any other equilibrium.  
Thus, in order for (I,N) to be payoff dominant, the payoffs of both players need to be 
higher than their respective payoffs in (N,I). This is the case when: 
GpqYcGpY jiii   and GpqYcGpY ijjj   with ji pp   and ji qq    
)1( qpGci   and )1( qpGc j  . But if this condition holds, (N,I) is not an 
equilibrium and there exists a single unique pure equilibrium in (I,N), as )1( qpG  < 
pG  and )1( qpG  > )1( qppG   for any 1q  and 1p . As the game structure is 
symmetric, this also accounts for the reverse case. Hence, for ji pp   and ji qq   none 
of the two equilibria is payoff dominant 
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Appendix IV: Model nesting 
Model 1: ititiiit my    where qGp
cpG
m
jt
it 2

  
Model 2: ittiiit ry     
Model 3: 
itjtiitiiit ccy    
 
Model 1 and model 2 are nested in model 3 under the following conditions: 
Model 2 is nested in model 3 under the restriction: 
33 M
i
M
i    
Model 1 is nested in model 3 under the restriction: 03 Mi  
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Appendix V: Instructions 
 
Welcome to our experiment! 
The following experiment investigates your decision behavior. It consists of two parts.  
In the first part of the experiment, you will play 9 rounds of an investment game with the same, randomly 
chosen, anonymous person. Your payoff from this game depends on your own decisions but also on the 
behavior of your counterpart. Your counterpart has the same information that you have.  
At the end of the experiment you will be given an overview of the results of each of the 9 rounds that you 
played. One of these rounds will be randomly chosen to determine your payoff from the game. Between 
rounds you will not receive any information about your counterpart’s decision.  
The experiment uses the currency ‘Talers’. For 10,000 ‘Talers’ achieved in the chosen round you will be 
paid 1 € in cash at the end of the experiment.  
In the second part of the experiment you will be asked to decide between lotteries. Also for this part of the 
experiment, you will be paid in accordance to your decisions. After you have completed the first part of 
the experiment, you will receive further instructions for the second part.  
At the end of the experiment we are going to ask you some additional questions concerning your person.  
Good Luck! 
 
General rules 
For this experiment it is essential that you do not communicate with the other participants.  
In each round, the computer will wait until all participants have made their decisions. Please remain 
absolutely quiet should any waiting pauses emerge. 
The instructions for this experiment will be displayed on the computer screen step by step. They are also 
distributed to you as hard copies in case you want to go back to parts you might have forgotten. You are 
free to use a calculator. You will find a calculator symbol in the lower corner on the right hand side of 
your display. Please note: The calculator does not automatically perform according to the order of 
operation rules, i.e. multiplication has precedence over addition. 
Please raise your hand in case you have any questions. The experimenter will come to you and answer 
your questions. Please remain absolutely quiet meanwhile. 
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Part one: Research and development investments 
Please, imagine the following situation: You are the owner of a high-tech enterprise and you have the 
opportunity to invest into a new R&D project. Your endowment is 100,000 ‘Talers’. You can either invest 
the ‘Talers’ into the project or not. The innovation you could develop in this project generates an 
additional profit of 100,000 ‘Taler’ if your research project turns out to be successful. 
The success rate of research projects in your industry and for your enterprise is 30 percent, i.e. three out 
of ten research projects are successful. However, you might can still be able to copy the innovation from 
your competitor in case your effort turns out to be not successful or in case you did not invest in the 
project in the first place. Copying will be successful in 80 percent of the cases. It is costless and happens 
automatically, if you did not generate the innovation but you counterpart has invested into the project and 
was successful. Your counterpart will not experience losses if you copy his innovation.  
In the following nine rounds, you will be confronted with different levels of investment costs – for you as 
well as for your counterpart. Each round you have to decide on whether you would like to invest or not, 
given the respective scenarios.  
Please turn to the next page in order to get an explanation of how to submit your investment decision. 
 
How to submit your investment decision: 
Your investment decision will be determined with the help of a bingo cage. You will fill this bingo cage 
with balls. In the end, there will always be 100 balls inside the cage. There are black and white balls, 
whereas any mixture of both colors is possible. You will determine the content by indicating the amount 
of white balls you want to fill the cage with. Afterwards, the bingo cage will be filled with black balls 
until the number of 100 balls is reached. 
Now, one ball will be randomly drawn out of the cage by chance. In case this ball is white, your 
investment will be conducted. In case a black ball is drawn, the investment will not happen. 
 
How to submit your investment decision (cont.): 
With deciding on putting more white balls into the bingo cage the probability of drawing a white ball, i.e. 
conducting the investment, increases. However, less white balls in the cage imply a lower probability of 
drawing a white ball and thus no investment.  
Hence, if you decide to fill the bingo cage with 100 white balls you will definitely invest since a white 
ball will always be drawn. On the other hand, if you decide to put no white ball inside the cage you will 
never invest. We will ask for your investment decision in each round by determining the number of white 
balls you wish to provide the bingo cage with. 
The question will look like the following: 
How many white balls do you want to put into the bingo cage? (0 to 100)? 
Note that you can only point out numbers from 0 to 100 since there always have to be 100 balls in the 
cage.  
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You will now start with the investment game. 
Please, make sure to make the best possible decision in each round since any of the rounds played might 
be relevant for your payoff. 
 
R&D investment 
Your endowment and the endowment of your counterpart is 100,000 ‘Talers’, each. 
If you invest, you will be successful with a probability of 30 percent and gain another 100,000 ‘Talers’ 
because of the innovation you generated. Your investment costs amount up to 27,300 ‘Talers’. 
In case your counterpart invests, he will be successful with a probability of 30 percent and gain 100,000 
‘Talers’ because of the innovation he generated. His investment costs add up to 29,550 ‘Talers’.  
If you or your counterpart do not invest or turn out to be not successful, one can try to copy the 
innovation of the counterpart, given the other has invested and was successful. Copying happens 
automatically and is costless. A 100,000-Taler-gain will be generated with a success probability of 80 
percent.  
None of the players can observe the other’s decision. Your counterpart received the same information as 
you. 
Please provide your investment decision now by determining the number of white balls you choose to be 
put into the bingo cage. In case a white ball is drawn the investment will be conducted.  
How many white balls do you want to put into the bingo cage? (0 to 100)? 
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3. Market entry decisions after gains and losses 
 
Article 2: 
Market entry decisions after gains and losses: 
Gender matters, being an entrepreneur does not 
Christian Schade and Sabrina Boewe 
 
We study whether gender differences that have been found in a market 
entry experiment with pre-game gain and loss experiences also hold for 
entrepreneurs. As male and female entrepreneurs self-select into a highly 
risky and competitive field our hypothesis is that gender differences 
should be smaller among entrepreneurs. While our findings confirm 
gender differences in entry behavior, contrary to our expectations, this 
gender difference maintained for male and female entrepreneurs and also 
for women playing against other women. Entry behavior of most male 
and female participants is consistent with the assumption of social 
projection.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, School of Business and Economics, Institute for Entrepreneurial Studies and Innovation 
Management, Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin, Germany (e-mail: cds@wiwi.hu-berlin.de). This research was funded by the 
German Research Foundation. We are grateful to the attendees at the Humboldt-University Research Seminar (2009) and the 
participants at the SEIB colloquium at the University of Oxford (2011) for their valuable comments and useful suggestions. We also 
thank Uwe Ritschke for his technical assistance in conducting the experiment. 
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3.1  Introduction 
Behavioral economics has documented significant gender differences in several 
domains of decision making that are related to occupational choice. Most prominently 
gender specific attitudes towards risk taking and competition have been discussed to 
explain labor market differences (e.g., Cramer et al. 2002, Bonin et al. 2007, Sapienza 
et. al. 2009, Niederle and Vesterlund 2011). This raises the question whether women 
who have self-selected into a risky and competitive occupation, i.e., entrepreneurship, 
act more similarly to their male counterparts. We thus experimentally investigate the 
decision behavior of female entrepreneurs as compared to that of male entrepreneurs as 
well as that of female and male non-entrepreneurs, and examine whether the behavioral 
gender gap is smaller with entrepreneurs than with non-entrepreneurs.  
For our experiment we used the framework of the market entry game (Selten and 
Güth 1982; Kahneman 1988) which has been used to study decision making related to 
entrepreneurship (e.g., Camerer and Lovallo 1999, Elston et al. 2006, Moore et al. 2007, 
Brandts and Yao 2010). In the market entry game, several players simultaneously decide 
on entering or not entering an experimental market with a limited capacity. Payoffs from 
entering decrease with the number of entrants. If too many players enter, all entrants 
suffer a loss. Players cannot observe, communicate, and collude with their opponents. 
When making their entry decision, they face strategic uncertainty about the choices of 
the other players. Studying coordination behavior in this game, breaking the symmetry 
this game otherwise implies, and making the decision situation more realistic by 
randomly inducing pre-game gain and loss experiences, Schade et al. (2010) found 
significant gender differences. Giving participants the possibility to use their own and 
their opponents’ prior experiences as a coordination device, they found that entry 
patterns of men and women differed significantly. While men entered clearly more after 
a loss than after a gain experience, women did not react as much to own gains and 
losses. Also the reactions to the opponents’ gain and loss experiences differed between 
men and women. Men entered systematically more when playing against opponents 
with a gain experience and less when playing against opponents with a loss experience. 
Women’s reactions were less clear. They played mixed strategies much more often than 
men and entered on average more when playing against opponents with a loss 
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experience than when playing against opponents with a gain experience. Schade et al. 
(2010) suggest that these findings can be explained by men using social projection more 
often than women; i.e., that men more often than women presume their counterparts to 
behave in the same way as they would behave (Allport 1924, Festinger 1954, Krueger 
2000). Also, women seem to interpret the initial random lottery outcomes used to 
manipulate prior experiences as a signal for the players’ abilities to compete. We expect 
the behavioral gender difference to be smaller for entrepreneurs where women self-
select into an occupation which is risky, competitive, and still widely dominated by 
men. Our hypothesis is that due to self-selection and learning to compete in a male 
dominated field, female entrepreneurs should exhibit decision patterns more similar to 
their male counterparts than women in general. 
Our experiment partially replicates the study by Schade et al. (2010) with male and 
female entrepreneurs and male and female non-entrepreneurs. We ran mixed-sex 
sessions and sessions with only female participants to allow a robustness check of our 
results as previous research found behavioral differences between mixed- and single-sex 
sessions, especially with females (Gneezy at al. 2003). We find that while gender 
matters for behavior, being an entrepreneur does not. Contrary to our expectations, we 
find that the market entry decisions of female entrepreneurs are not more similar to 
those of male entrepreneurs than the entry decisions of men and women in general. 
Women entered less than men independent of whether they were entrepreneurs or not. 
Risk propensity matters but was not correlated with either gender or group. The gender 
composition within a session did not have a significant effect on women’s behavior 
although reaction patterns to opponents’ gain and loss experiences tend to be less 
structured in sessions with only female participants. Our results further show that 
participants enter more after a loss than after a gain and that most participants – males 
and females – enter less when playing against opponents’ with a loss experience than 
when playing against two opponents with a gain experience. These findings largely 
confirm the results by Schade et al. (2010). Differences in results on reactions to 
opponents’ experiences are discussed in the discussion section.  
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Our unexpected and quite surprising core result that the behavioral gap between male 
and female entrepreneurs is not smaller than between male and female non-
entrepreneurs is discussed within the context of research on female entrepreneurship.  
The next section gives a brief summary of the main results on gender differences in 
decision making related to entrepreneurial activity and our hypotheses. In section three 
the experimental design and procedure is described. The analysis and results are 
presented in section four, followed by the discussion in section five. Section six contains 
the conclusion.  
3.2 Gender differences in decision making and entrepreneurial activity 
Previous research has shown that in most domains women take fewer risks than men 
(Hudgens and Fatkin 1985, Levin et al. 1988, Sexton and Bowman-Upton 1990, 
Johnson and Powell 1994, Powell and Ansic 1997, Eckel and Grossman 2002, Weber et 
al. 2002, Johnson et al. 2004, Harris et al. 2006). In a meta-analysis of 150 risk 
experiments on gender differences Byrnes et al. (1999) conclude that the literature 
clearly indicates that male participants are more likely to take risks than female 
participants (p. 377). They also show that the gender difference in risk taking depends 
on the situation that was considered. Weber et al. (2002) and Johnson et al. (2004) 
investigated gender differences in risk taking across different content domains. They 
also found males to be less risk-averse and more likely to engage in risky activities in 
all of the studied domains – but one: social decision making. Harris et al. (2006) 
confirm this result. 
Men and women have also been found to differ in tournament performance and in 
their propensity to participate in tournaments (Gneezy et al. 2003, Niederle and 
Vesterlund 2007, Niederle and Versterlund 2011). While men’s performance 
significantly increased with tournament incentives, women’s performance did not 
increase. The gender gap in performance was larger in mixed gender tournaments than 
in single-sex tournaments. When participants were paid according to piece rates, no 
gender gap was found. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) examined, whether men and 
women with the same ability differ in their selection into competitive environments. 
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They found a gender gap in tournament entry, which cannot be explained by 
performance. Factors such as risk and feedback aversion play a negligible role. Instead 
the tournament entry gap is driven by men being more overconfident and by gender 
differences in preferences for performing in a competition. “The result is that women 
shy away from competition and men embrace it.” (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007, 
 p. 1067). 
Aspects of risk aversion, competitiveness, and confidence might also underlie the 
lower rates of women in entrepreneurial activities. In most Western countries, 
entrepreneurship is still dominated by men while women decide for an entrepreneurial 
career less often (Reynolds et al. 2001, Blanchflower 2004, Minniti et al. 2004, Allen et. 
al 2007, Bosma et al. 2009). Cramer et al. (2002) find support for the supposedly 
negative effect of risk aversion on entrepreneurship selection; however, they do not 
derive a conclusion concerning the causality of this relationship. Koellinger et al. (2007, 
2010) find that women exhibit a lower confidence in own entrepreneurial skills. Those 
women that did decide for an entrepreneurial activity self-selected into a competitive 
and still widely male-dominated field. Studying gender differences in a market entry 
game with entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs allows analyzing in how far self-
selection and learning to survive in a competitive environment might reduce gender 
differences in decision making. Based on the above findings we test the following 
hypothesis:  
HYPOTHESIS 1: Men enter the experimental market more often than women. 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Entrepreneurs enter the experimental market more often than non-
entrepreneurs.  
HYPOTHESIS 3: The gender gap in entry decisions is smaller between male and female 
entrepreneurs than between male and female non-entrepreneurs.  
Based on previous results by Schade et al. (2010) we test the influence of own and 
opponents’ pre-game gain or loss experiences on entry behavior:  
HYPOTHESIS 4: People enter more after a loss than after a gain.  
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HYPOTHESIS 5: People enter more playing against opponents with a gain experience 
than against opponents with a loss experience.  
3.3 Experiment 
Building on the experimental design by Schade et al. (2010) we used a simultaneous 
market entry game (Selten and Güth 1982, Kahneman 1988) and induced random pre-
game gain and loss experiences. Based on the outcome of a draw from a bingo cage, 
each participant either made a gain or a loss prior to the market entry game. These gain 
and loss experiences were common knowledge in the subsequent market entry game 
while all other individual characteristics were hidden from the participants during the 
experiment. 
3.3.1  Market entry game 
In our experiment, three players decided on entering a market with a capacity of two; 
e.g., only a maximum of two players could enter the market without exceeding the 
market capacity. If one player entered, his payoff from entering would be one 
experimental currency unit. If two players entered, their payoff would be zero. If all 
three entered the market, all would suffer a loss of one experimental currency unit. The 
payoff function for our decision scenario is given by:  
(6) 
0 0
2 1
i
i
i
if s
u (s)
r [ N(s)] if s

 
  
 
where ui(s) represents player i’s payoff given the vector of individual decisions is  (0 = 
stay out; 1 = enter) with i = 1,2,3. N(s) is the total number of players who enter the 
market. The constant r represents the monetary gain or loss players could make by 
entering. Staying out of the market ( 0is  ) leads to a payoff of zero.  
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3.3.2 Equilibrium predictions 
In the considered market entry game, profit maximizing players should prefer to enter 
the market as long as nobody else enters. They should be indifferent between entering 
and staying out if one other player enters since their payoff would be zero in both cases. 
As soon as two other players enter, a profit maximizing player should prefer to stay out 
in order not to suffer losses. However, in a simultaneous market entry game players 
make their entry decisions under strategic uncertainty without knowing how their 
opponents decide. Analyzed from the viewpoint of standard game theory, this game has 
six pure strategy Nash equilibria: all situations in which the number of entrants equals 
the market capacity of two and all situations in which there is only one entrant and the 
others stay out because they are indifferent between entering and staying out. The mixed 
strategy equilibrium is given by all players entering with a probability of ½ (cf. 
Rapoport et al. 1998). For equilibrium predictions accounting for reference-dependence 
of prospect evaluation see Schade et al. (2010) and Schröder (2008).  
3.3.3 Experimental design and procedure 
All sessions were conducted separately for entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. The 
entrepreneurs were aware that they were in a session with other entrepreneurs. When the 
participants arrived in the experimental laboratory, they received a show-up fee. Like all 
other payoffs, the show-up fee was scaled up by the factor 4.5 for the entrepreneurs in 
order to account for potential effects of income differentials between the entrepreneurs’ 
sample and the non-entrepreneurs’ sample which consisted of students. The show-up fee 
of 14 Euro (63 Euro for the entrepreneurs) was paid out directly in cash and participants 
were asked to pocket it before they were seated at separated computer desks. Before the 
market entry game started, a lottery was conducted. For each participant a random draw 
from a bingo cage determined whether they won or lost a sum of 6 Euro (27 Euro for 
the entrepreneurs). Half of the participants in a session won, the other half lost. This 
created two sub-groups per session: one with a gain experience and another with a loss 
experience. The instructions for the experiment were displayed on the computer 
monitors during the experiment. Additionally, hard copies of the instructions were 
distributed. Communication between the participants was not allowed.  
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Participants played 16 rounds of the market entry game described above. In each 
round they were re-matched with two other opponents. The only information they 
received about their opponents was whether they experienced a gain or loss in the 
lottery prior to the market entry game. Participants were confronted with all possible 
combinations of opponents (gain/gain; gain/loss; loss/loss). All other information, like 
age and gender (in the mixed-sex sessions) was unknown. Participants did not receive 
feedback between rounds in order to avoid learning effects. The results of each round 
were presented in a table at the very end of the experiment. Participants were able to 
explicitly state mixed strategies in form of entry probabilities. This method has been 
also used by Anderhub et al. (2002) and Schade et al. (2010) and is called explicit 
mixing (cf. Camerer 2003). In each round participants could determine the proportions 
of ‘Entry’-balls and ‘No-Entry’-balls in a 100-ball urn to state their entry decisions. If 
an Entry-ball was drawn from the urn the player entered the market. If a No-Entry-ball 
was drawn the player did not enter the market. After the market entry game, participants 
answered a questionnaire on their beliefs about the entry behavior of others, and a 
second questionnaire including basic statistical data like age and gender. Furthermore, 
participants’ risk propensity was measured in accordance to Holt and Laury (2002). At 
the end of the experiment, one of the sixteen rounds of the market entry game was 
randomly selected for the final payoff. The final payment included the participant’s 
payoff from the market entry game and the Holt and Laury (2002) task. Table 1 below 
shows the order of the different parts of the experiment. 
TABLE 8. EXPERIMENT 
Arrival: Show-up fee was paid 
Part 1: Lottery [inducing random gain and Loss experience] 
Part 2:  Market entry game [16 rounds with varying opponent constellations] 
Part 3:  Belief questions 
Part 4: Holt  and Laury (2002) test on risk aversion 
Part 5: Demographic questionnaire 
Part 6: Overview of all results, random choice of payoff-relevant round, payments 
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3.3.4 Samples and sessions 
The experiment was conducted with 90 participants: 18 entrepreneurs and 36 non-
entrepreneurs in mixed-sex sessions and 12 female entrepreneurs and 24 female non-
entrepreneurs in single-sex sessions. The control sessions with only female participants 
served as a robustness check for our results and tested whether women were influenced 
by the gender composition of the group they interacted with (cf. Gneezy at al. 2003). 
The entrepreneurs sample consisted of small business owners from the service, 
consulting, and technology industry. The number of employees per business was 
between 10 and 50. All of the entrepreneurs were founders and managers of their 
companies. The student samples consisted of undergraduate and graduate students from 
various fields. The experiments were programmed and conducted using the software z-
Tree (Fischbacher 2007). All sessions were run in the experimental laboratory of a 
German university.  
3.4 Results 
Analyzing the data we ran GLS random-effects linear regressions in STATA. The 
dependent variable entry represents the stated entry probability [0;1] of the participants 
in the respective round. The between-subjects variables are group (entrepreneurs = 1; 
non-entrepreneurs = 0), gender (female = 1; male = 0), and own experience (gain = 1; 
loss = 0). As a robustness check we also considered the gender mix in sessions via 
gendergroup (male = 0; female in mixed-sex session = 1; female in single-sex session = 
2). Risk propensity was measured in accordance to Holt and Laury (2002). Participants’ 
entry beliefs for players with different pre-game experiences were gathered in form of 
percentage estimates via a questionnaire at the end of the experiment. The dummy 
variable opponents’ experience 1 represents rounds against one opponent with a gain 
and one opponent with a loss experience while opponents’ experience 2 represents 
rounds against two opponents with a gain experience. Correlations between ‘risk 
aversion’ and ‘group’, ‘risk aversion’ and ‘sex’, and ‘risk aversion and ‘own 
experience’ were insignificant. Differences in risk propensity between entrepreneurs 
and non-entrepreneurs and between men and women were also insignificant. 
 79 
 
Model 1 contains only own and opponents pre-game experiences and shows that 
participants with a gain experience entered less than participants with a loss experience. 
People entered more when playing against one opponent with a gain and one opponent 
with a loss experience (opponents’ experience 1) or playing against two opponents with 
a gain experience (opponents’ experience 2) as compared to rounds playing against two 
opponents with a loss experience. Model 2 additionally considers group and gender. 
Results show that while gender has a significant effect on entry – women enter less than 
men – while being an entrepreneur has not. Model 3 shows that the interaction of group 
and gender is not significant, i.e., the gender difference in entry is not smaller within the 
group of entrepreneurs. Model 4 further controls for risk aversion which had a 
significant negative influence on entry. In model 5 we consider interaction effects of 
opponents’ experience1 and opponents’ experience2 with gender. While the interaction 
of opponents’ experience1 and gender is significant the interaction between opponents’ 
experience2 and gender is not. Other interactions of the independent variables did not 
reach statistical significance.  
TABLE 9. RANDOM-EFFECTS LINEAR MODELS 
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
own experience (0/1) 
 
 
-0.078*(0.427) 
(0.427) 
((()()()(.0426) 
()()()0.115) 
-0.070*(0.042) -0.068*(0.042) -0074*(0.449) -0.073*(0.045) 
opponents’ experience1 (0/1) 0.060**(0.018) 0.060**(0.018) 0.060**(0.018) 0.052**(0.019) 0.120**(0.040) 
opponents’ experience2 (0/1) 
 
0.063**(0.021) 0.063**(0.021) 0.063**(0.021) 0.067**(0.022) 0.090*(0.046) 
group (0/1)  0.016 (0.045) 0.092 (0.089) -0.006 (0.048) 0.005 (0.048) 
gender (0/1)  -0.094*(0.049) -0.058 (0.061) -0.315*(0.197) -0.015 (0.063) 
group*gender   -0.102 (0.102)   
risk aversion 
 
   -0.074**(0.028) -0.044**(0.015) 
Risk aversion*gender    0.042 (0.033)  
opponents’ exp.1*gender     -0.089**(0.046) 
opponents’ 
experience2*gender 
 
    -0.030 (0.052) 
Consta t 0.473***(0.033) 0.535 ***(0.051) 0.507 ***(0.058) 0.962***(0.166) 0.746***(0.100) 
σu 0.190 0.187 0.187 0.186 0.187 
σe  0.282 0.282 0.282 0.284 0.284 
ρ 0.311 0.306 0.306 0.300 0.303 
χ2 
 
15.86 19.75 20.74 28.90 31.36 
Number of observations 
 
1440 1440 1440 1280 1280 
Number of subjects 
 
90 90 90 80 80 
Dependent variable = entry  
Random-effects specification = subject id 
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 
Running additional regressions and testing behavior of female participants in mixed-
sex sessions versus single-sex sessions, we found no significant influence on entry 
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behavior. Reaction patterns to opponents’ experiences, however, tend to be less 
structured within the single-sex groups. Here, female entrepreneurs and female non-
entrepreneurs seem to have been less sure about what an appropriate reaction to 
different opponent types might be as indicated in Figure 7, where female single sex 
groups are depicted in (c) and (f). 
 
FIGURE 7. MEAN ENTRY RATE IN ROUNDS AGAINST OPPONENTS WITH DIFFERENT EXPERIENCES 
Figures 7 (a) and (b) show that male entrepreneurs reacted more to own loss 
experiences than female entrepreneurs. Reacting to the prior experiences of their 
opponents male entrepreneurs entered most when being confronted with a mixed 
opponent group (gain/loss), while in mixed-gender sessions female entrepreneurs’ entry 
patterns are highly consistent with assuming that players with a loss experience enter 
more than players with a gain experience.  
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Analyzing entry beliefs, we find that most participants believed that players with a 
loss experiences would enter more than players with a gain experience (see Table 10 
below and for a more detailed overview Table 12 in the appendix). These overall beliefs 
are consistent with the general reaction patterns observed with most of the participants 
who entered less when playing against opponents with a loss experience and more when 
playing against opponents with a gain experience. An additional analysis including 
individuals’ beliefs about the entry rates of participants with a gain experience and 
about the entry rates of participants with a loss experience confirms these effects: belief 
entry gain (F1,141 = 33.7; p < 0.001) and belief entry loss (F1,141 = 15.6; p < 0.001) had a 
large and highly significant main effect on entry as well as highly significant effects on 
entry patterns with respect to opponents’ experiences (Greenhouse-Geisser correction:  
(F2,141 = 11.9; p < 0.001; F2,141 = 34.1; p < 0.001 respectively). The directions of the 
effects reported above remain. Participants with a loss experience have a slight tendency 
to better predict entry behavior of other participants with a loss experience. This 
tendency is however not statistically significant. Women’s beliefs about entry rates of 
participants with a loss experience are significantly lower than the beliefs stated by men 
(t = 2.68; p < 0.01), the confidence interval is [0.0449666; 0.3015935]. Beliefs for 
participants with a gain experience did not significantly differ between men and women.  
TABLE 10. OVERVIEW ENTRY BELIEFS 
SAMPLE GENDER  OWN  BELIEF ENTRY OF PARTICIPANTS WITH 
   EXPERIENCE  GAIN EXPERIENCE LOSS EXPERIENCE 
Entrepreneurs 
male  gain  0.44 
 
0.44 
 
  loss  0.49 
 
0.67 
female (mixed-sex sessions) gain  0.47 0.56 
 
  loss  0.48 0.55 
female (single-sex sessions) gain  0.55 
 
0.52 
 
  loss  0.35 
 
0.65 
 
Non-
entrepreneurs 
male  gain  0.47 
 
0.61 
 
  loss  0.50 
 
0.62 
female (mixed-sex sessions) gain  0.46 
 
0.49 
 
  loss  0.44 
 
0.41 
female (single-sex sessions) gain  0.56 
 
0.61 
 
  loss  0.48 
 
0.57 
 Schade et al. (2010) reported that in their study women used mixed strategies much 
more often than men. They interpreted this finding as a potential insecurity of women 
about their entry decision. Analyzing the use of mixed versus pure strategies for our 
data we find that men and women in mixed-sex sessions did not differ significantly. 
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However, women in single-sex sessions used pure strategies significantly less often than 
women in mixed-sex sessions (p < 0.05; mean difference = -2.88; [-4.86869; -0.89520]). 
Furthermore, entrepreneurs used pure strategies more often than non-entrepreneurs but 
this difference did not reach statistical significance (p > 0.10). 
Summarizing our results, we find that entry behavior is driven by gender  
(Hypothesis 1) while being an entrepreneur does not have a significant effect 
(Hypothesis 2). Contrary to our expectation, female entrepreneurs acted not more 
similar to male entrepreneurs than women and men in the non-entrepreneur sample 
(Hypothesis 3). Results show that own and opponents’ pre-game experiences 
significantly affect entry behavior (Hypotheses 4 and 5): participants with a gain 
experience entered less than participants with a loss experiences. When playing against 
two opponents’ with a loss experience participants entered less than when playing 
against one player with a gain experience and one with a loss experience or when 
playing against two opponents with a gain experience. Further analyses show that 
reactions to opponents’ experiences were moderated by gender and that the results are 
relatively robust also for females in single-sex sessions. Entry beliefs are consistent with 
these behavioral patterns. Most participants – males and females – believed that players 
with a loss experience enter more than players with a gain experience.  
3.5 Discussion 
We find that behavior in the considered market entry scenario is driven by gender and 
not by being an entrepreneur. Entry decisions of female entrepreneurs were not more 
similar to those of male entrepreneurs than the entry decisions of women and men in 
general. This is surprising as the self-selection of female entrepreneurs and learning to 
compete in a male dominated field would suggest that they are more similar to male 
entrepreneurs. This finding indicates that female entrepreneurs are not necessarily more 
willing to take strategic uncertainty than other women and that other aspects might 
overweigh their gender specific reluctance to take strategic uncertainty. While the 
industry female entrepreneurs operate in does not account for this effect, an alternative 
explanation would be that the women in our sample have chosen to found their 
businesses in a less male dominated niche of their industry.  
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The result that entry did not significantly differ between entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs is interesting as entrepreneurs have often been discussed to exhibit larger 
deviations from rational choice models than others (Busenitz and Barney, 1997, Parlich 
and Bagby 1995). The fact that we do not find significant behavioral differences 
indicates that entrepreneurs might not be so different from non-entrepreneurs in their 
decision making after all. This result is in line with other recent studies on 
entrepreneurs’ decision making in incentivized experiments, which also found 
surprisingly small differences between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs (Sandri et 
al. 2010, Boewe 2011, Boewe et al. 2011).  
While our findings largely confirm the results of Schade et al. (2010), in our study, 
most male and female participants entered more when playing against players with a 
gain experiences than when playing against players with a loss experience. Their beliefs 
were largely consistent with these patterns and with the assumption of social projection. 
However, female non-entrepreneurs in mixed-sex sessions did not react much different 
to varying types of opponents (see also Figure 7e). In the study by Schade et al. (2010) 
the reactions of some women to their opponents’ pre-game experience were almost 
opposed to those of men. Schade et al. (2010) argue that the behavior of these women 
might be explained by women interpreting the initial random lottery outcomes as a 
signal of the players’ abilities to compete. A possible explanation for this difference in 
results might be that in our study participants were confronted with either a gain or with 
a loss experience. In the study by Schade et al. (2010) there were also “neutral” players 
who neither experienced a gain or a loss prior to the game. The players with a neutral 
history might have triggered results by enhancing the salience of gains and losses. 
Together with the results of Schade et al. (2010) our results give rise to further 
investigating the reference-dependence of beliefs (cf. Malter and Schade 2011). 
The fact that we do not find significant differences in entry rates between women 
participating in mixed-sex sessions and women who participated in single-sex sessions 
further suggests that it is not women’s unwillingness to enter when playing against 
potentially male opponents. Observed entry patterns with respect to opponents’ 
experience (Figures 7 b, c, e, and f) rather indicate that women have difficulties with 
building beliefs about other women’s entry behavior while they do not seem to be 
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insecure about their beliefs when playing in mixed-sex sessions. This interpretation is 
supported by women’s higher frequency of choosing mixed strategies in single-sex 
sessions.  
There are two interesting additional results: (1) Overall entrepreneurs did not react 
stronger to own gain or loss experiences than non-entrepreneurs. This indicates that 
entrepreneurs might not be more affected by loss experiences than others. The question 
whether managers of larger companies exhibit a stronger or weaker tendency to increase 
risk taking after losses than entrepreneurs is still open and worth answering. (2) 
Women’s entry rates were very close to or below the mixed strategy equilibrium while 
men sometimes overentered the market. Thus, women’s entry behavior leads to 
generally fewer losses caused by overentry. Interestingly this result does not seem to be 
driven by women believing that their opponents enter more. Women’s entry beliefs 
rather suggest that they judge the entry situation as more risky per se and think that all 
players will enter less.  
3.6 Conclusion  
We experimentally investigated gender differences in a strategic market entry scenario 
with random pre-game gain and loss experiences and tested whether gender differences 
are smaller with female and male entrepreneurs. We found that market entry behavior is 
driven by gender but not by being an entrepreneur. Women entered the experimental 
market less often than men. Contrary to our expectation, entry decisions of female and 
male entrepreneurs were not more similar than entry decision of men and women in 
general. Overall, participants with a gain experience entered less than participants with a 
loss experience. Most participants believed that players with a loss experience would 
enter more than players with a gain experience. Their entry patterns were largely 
consistent with these beliefs. The result that being an entrepreneur did not significantly 
influence behavioral differences indicates that entrepreneurs might not be so different 
from non-entrepreneurs in their decision making after all.  
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Appendices 
Appendix I: Tables  
TABLE 11. OVERVIEW OF ENTRY RATES 
SAMPLE GENDER  OWN  OPPONENTS’ EXPERIENCE 
   EXPERIENCE TOTAL GAIN/GAIN GAIN/LOSS LOSS/LOSS 
Entrepreneurs 
male 
gain 0.41 0.43 0.49 0.25 
loss 0.74 0.68 0.78 0.74 
female (mixed-sex sessions) 
gain 0.36 0.51 0.34 0.24 
loss 0.54 0.63 0.55 0.44 
female (single-sex sessions) 
gain 0.45 0.43 0.47 0.41 
loss 0.48 0.55 0.45 0.45 
Non-
entrepreneurs 
male 
gain 0.50 0.55 0.54 0.38 
loss 0.54 0.56 0.56 0.47 
female (mixed-sex sessions) 
gain 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.40 
loss 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.45 
female (single-sex sessions) 
gain 0.48 0.42 0.50 0.50 
loss 0.48 0.52 0.48 0.43 
 
TABLE 12. OVERVIEW OF BELIEFS 
SAMPLE GENDER OWN 
EXPERIENCE 
BELIEF ENTRY PARTICIPANTS WITH  
GAIN EXPERIENCE LOSS EXPERIENCE 
GAIN/GAIN GAIN/LOSS LOSS/LOSS
S 
GAIN/GAIN GAIN/LOSS LOSS/LOSS
S 
Entrepreneurs 
male gain 0.23 
 
0.60 
 
0.50 
 
0.50 
 
0.37 
 
0.47 
 
 loss 0.34 
 
0.56 
 
0.56 
 
0.70 
 
0.70 
 
0.60 
 
female 
 
gain 0.47 
 
0.48 
 
0.46 
 
0.66 
 
0.66 
 
0.35 
 
(mixed-sex s.) loss 0.56 
 
0.44 
 
0.43 
 
0.59 
 
0.51 
 
0.55 
 
female gain 0.64 
 
0.53 
 
0.49 
 
0.55 
 
0.48 
 
0.53 
 
(single-sex s.) loss 0.31 
 
0.42 
 
0.32 
 
0.60 
 
0.69 
 
0.65 
 Non-
entrepreneurs 
male gain 0.20 
 
0.63 
 
0.58 
 
0.55 
 
0.64 
 
0.65 
 
 loss 0.50 
 
0.56 
 
0.44 
 
0.67 
 
0.65 
 
0.54 
 
female gain 0.43 
 
0.52 
 
0.43 
 
0.43 
 
0.55 
 
0.49 
 
(mixed-sex s.) loss 0.42 
 
0.47 
 
0.44 
 
0.44 
 
0.37 
 
0.41 
 
female gain 0.52 
 
0.58 
 
0.57 
 
0.62 
 
0.62 
 
0.59 
 
(single-sex s.) loss 0.42 
 
0.52 
 
0.51 
 
0.61 
 
0.54 
 
0.56 
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Appendix II: Instructions – selected parts 
Explanations of experimental procedures are added in italics. All payoffs were scaled up by 
factor 4.5 for the entrepreneurs. The values in parentheses varied depending on the participant’s 
own result and the result of their opponents in the lottery. 
At arrival in the experimental laboratory participants were paid a participation fee of 14 Euro 
in cash. After being seated at their computer desks, and before beginning with the actual 
experiment, they received following information: 
 
Welcome to our experiment! 
 
 
Lottery 
We will now conduct a lottery with the following features:  
There are 12 balls with numbers from 1 to 12 in a bingo cage. They will be drawn without 
replacement, i.e. once drawn a ball will not be placed back into the cage. 
A draw of a ball with the numbers 1-6 will result in a gain of 6 Euro*for you. 
A draw of a ball with the numbers 7-12 will result in a loss of 6 Euro*. 
The draws will take place in private at each participant’s seat and will only be seen by that 
participant. 
 
The individual lotteries were then conducted using a bingo cage and the respondents were 
informed about their outcome (gain or loss).  
 
Your ball has the number ‘X’. Hence, you ‘won / lost’ 6 Euro. 
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You will play a game with changing counterparts. In addition to the rules of the game, the only 
information all of you will have is the outcome of the lottery we just conducted. In other words, 
you will always be informed about the outcome of your respective counterparts, as they will be 
about your outcome. 
 
You are now starting with the experiment: 
Please note: 
Your decisions in this experiment will depend on your skill and luck, and will result in real 
payments of different amounts. 
This experiment consists of several rounds. 
While the results of each round will not be displayed, a summary of the whole experiment’s 
results will be provided at the end of the experiment. 
Out of all rounds, one will randomly be selected by the computer. Your game result in this 
randomly chosen round will then be added to your result of the lottery conducted at the 
beginning of the experiment. 
At the end of the experiment, the experiment’s supervisor will settle your account by paying 
out or collecting the payments from you. 
You will find a red button at the bottom of each screen. When you understood and completed 
all tasks on that screen, press it to continue. 
All information is anonymous and will be kept confidential. 
Good luck. 
 
You will now play a three person game over several rounds. Your opponent will change from 
round to round as previously and randomly determined by the computer. 
 
Reminder 
In the lottery conducted at the beginning of the experiment you {suffered a loss of 6 Euro / 
gained a profit of 6 Euro} which (in addition to any potential gains or losses made during the 
experiment) will be settled at the end of the experiment. Thus your current account balance is 
{- 6 Euro / + 6 Euro}. 
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Your Game Situation: 
You and your two opponents have the choice of entering a market with limited demand. If all 
three of you decide to enter the market, everyone will suffer a loss of 6 Euro. If two of you 
decide to enter the market, the two entering players as well as the not entering player will 
receive 0 Euro. If only one of you decides to enter the market, he receives 6 Euro and the other 
two players who did not enter receive 0 Euro. If none of you decide to enter the market, all 
three players receive 0 Euro.  
In the lottery at the beginning of the experiment, your two opponents in this round had the 
following results: 
One opponent {suffered a loss of 6 Euro/ gained a profit of 6 Euro}. 
Your other opponent {suffered a loss of 6 Euro/ gained a profit of 6 Euro}. 
Your decision: 
You will make your decision using of a virtual raffle drum. You will decide about the tickets in 
this drum. You can fill it with a total of 100 tickets (Entry tickets and NoEntry tickets). If an 
Entry ticket is drawn, you will enter the market. If a NoEntry tickets is drawn, you will not 
enter the market. Please, specify the content of the drum by stating the number of Entry and 
NoEntry tickets to be included: 
Please indicate the number of Entry tickets to be placed in the drum: _______ 
Please indicate the number of NoEntry tickets to be placed in the drum: _______ 
 
Subsequently, multiple rounds with changing opponents were played. To ensure that participants 
noticed that conditions changed from round to round, the following screen was shown before to 
each round. 
Information 
Attention: In this round, the conditions of the game have changed. Please pay close attention to 
the information concerning the outcomes. 
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4. Demand uncertainty in skill-based competition 
 
Article 3: 
Demand uncertainty in skill-based competition:  
An explanation for market over- and underentry 
Sabrina Boewe 
 
This paper investigates the effect of exogenous demand uncertainty on 
peoples’ willingness to enter skill-based competition. A market entry 
experiment has been conducted to test the effect of demand uncertainty for 
markets that differ in expected demand, i.e., strength of competition. The 
results show that under risky information about the demand, people 
overenter markets with a small expected demand and strong competition, 
while they underenter markets with a high expected demand and weak 
competition. These findings are explained by people believing that 
competitors would shy away from entering highly competitive markets 
while assuming that they would overrun markets with weak competition. 
Overconfidence had a main effect on entry behavior but did not moderate 
reactions to market demand.  
 
 
 
 
* Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, School of Business and Economics, Institute for Entrepreneurial Studies and Innovation 
Management, Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin, Germany (e-mail: boewe@wiwi.hu-berlin.de). The author is grateful to Christian 
Schade, Avichai Snir, Ganna Pogrebna, and the attendees at the Humboldt-University Research Seminar at Schorrentin (2010) for 
their valuable comments and useful suggestions. I also thank Uwe Ritschke and Andre Nikolski for their technical assistance in 
conducting the experiment. This research could not have been realized without the financial support of the Volkswagen Foundation 
(VolkswagenStiftung) grant “Innovation and Coordination” for which I am deeply thankful. 
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4.1 Introduction 
When entering competitive markets, people are confronted with two types of 
uncertainty
7
: ability uncertainty regarding their skills as compared to their competitors 
and demand uncertainty. For example, in academic job search, job market candidates 
are confronted with uncertainty about their ranking as compared to other applicants and 
they are also confronted with demand uncertainty concerning the number of offered 
positions in their field. Further examples are business start-up decisions where the 
future market demand is uncertain or applications for research funds where the 
applicants do not know the sum of funds that will be granted.  
While the role of ability uncertainty has been extensively investigated
8
 (cf. Moore and 
Healy 2008), scholars have only recently begun to study the influence of exogenous 
uncertainty on behavior in skill-based competition (e.g., Wu and Knott 2006, Karelaia 
and Hogarth 2010). Wu and Knott (2006) modeled entrepreneurs’ entry decisions 
simultaneously accounting for ability uncertainty and exogenous demand uncertainty. 
They argue that entrepreneurs – while being risk-averse with respect to demand 
uncertainty – decide to start a business because they are risk-seeking with respect to 
ability uncertainty, i.e., because they are overconfident in their own skills. Their model 
predicts that entrepreneurs’ overconfidence outweighs risk aversion with respect to 
demand uncertainty and leads to excess market entry when the degree of ability 
uncertainty is comparable to that of demand uncertainty. Testing their model with a data 
from the banking industry, Wu and Knott find empirical support for their predictions. A 
different type of exogenous uncertainty is examined by Karelaia and Hogarth (2010). 
Based on the idea that people receive a signal about their relative skills, Karelaia and 
Hogarth (2010) experimentally investigate how uncertainty about the degree to which a 
person’s skills actually matter for her ranking, i.e., the signal quality, influences entry 
decisions. They find that uncertainty about the signal quality increases entry rates for 
people with initially low ranks but does not have a large effect on people with initially 
                                                 
7
 In this paper the term ‘uncertainty’ is used as an umbrella term for risk where probabilities of an event 
are known, and all forms of ambiguous situations where probabilities are unknown. 
8
 To the authors best knowledge there is no comprehensive literature overview of this research stream. 
Moore and Healy (2008) give a very good overview of the literature on overconfidence.  
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high ranks. While the behavior of low-ranked individuals is in line with predictions and 
to a large degree explained by rationality, no final conclusion could be drawn for the 
entry behavior of high-ranked individuals. As competition typically takes place in an 
inherently uncertain environment it is necessary to better understand how people deal 
with exogenous uncertainty in skill-based competition, and how this impacts on the 
outcome of competition. The results of Karelaia and Hogarth (2010) emphasize the need 
for further research on this topic. 
This paper experimentally investigates how exogenous demand uncertainty influences 
skill-based competition. The focus thereby is on examining the interplay between the 
strength of competition and demand uncertainty. In a market entry experiment with 
skill-based payoffs, demand uncertainty is varied between subjects while the expected 
demand is varied within subjects. Effects of overconfidence have been controlled for by 
comparing entry behavior before and after partial feedback about the true skill-rank of 
participants. The results show that while entry is almost linearly increasing in expected 
demand when demand is given, under demand uncertainty entry is instead s-shaped with 
asymmetric effects for extreme values of expected demand. Under demand uncertainty 
people overenter markets with a low expected demand where competition is intense and 
they underenter markets with a high expected demand where competition is weak. 
Surprisingly, this over- and underentry was not moderated by the skill level or by the 
degree of overconfidence. The results are discussed in the context of previous findings 
on skill-based competition, excess market entry and demand uncertainty. Implications 
are discussed for behavior under different market conditions.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section gives a brief 
overview of previous research on uncertainty in skill-based competition. Section three 
contains details on the experimental design and procedure, and the underlying model. 
Section four presents the data analysis and the results, followed by a discussion of the 
findings of this study and its possible implications.  
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4.2 Uncertainty in skill-based competition 
4.2.1 Ability uncertainty  
People prefer to bet on gambles involving skill components over equivalent gambles 
involving chance components (Cohen and Hansel 1959, Howell 1971). Based on this 
observation, Heath and Tversky (1991) formulated the competence hypothesis. The 
competence hypothesis states that people prefer betting on their own judgments over an 
equiprobable chance device when they consider themselves knowledgeable in the 
respective domain of judgment. They explained this preference with people’s psychic 
payoffs of satisfaction or embarrassment related to the attribution of credit and blame. If 
a person is competent in a certain domain, success will be attributed to skill and failure 
will sometimes be attributed to chance. If a person is not competent, success will be 
attributed to chance while failure will be attributed to a lack of skill. Heath and Tversky 
(1991) proposed that the balance of credit and blame is most favorable when a person is 
competent, leading to a pronounced preference for ability uncertainty over exogenous 
uncertainty in this domain. In a number of experimental studies they found evidence for 
the competence hypothesis. But even in domains where people are no experts, i.e., in a 
general knowledge quiz or logic puzzles, they have been found to prefer skill 
components over random components (Cohen and Hansel 1959, Howell 1971, Camerer 
and Lovallo 1999). The systematic approach of Camerer and Lovallo (1999) helped to 
quantify how much this behavior is driven by people’s preference to bet on themselves 
and their pronounced willingness to do so when they feel competent. In their seminal 
article, Camerer and Lovallo (1999) studied how people’s beliefs about their relative 
competence affect their decisions to enter skill-based competition. They experimentally 
tested the hypothesis that market overentry results from people acting on 
overconfidence about their relative skills. For their experiment, they combined the 
experimental paradigm of the classic market entry game (Selten and Güth 1982; 
Kahneman 1988; Rapoport 1995; Rapoport et al. 1998; Sundali et al. 1995) with skill-
based payoffs that are also used in tournaments. In their experiment, participants 
simultaneously decided about entering or not entering an experimental market where 
payoffs from entering depended on the participant’s ‘rank’. The c best ranked entrants 
made a profit from entering. All other entrants made a loss. Thus, only participants who 
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believed to be among the c best ranked entrants should enter. In some rounds, ranks 
depended on a chance device (random condition) and in others on participants’ relative 
skill compared to that of other players in a logic puzzle, trivia quiz, or sports questions 
(skill condition). Importantly, these ranks were determined after the entry decisions 
were made. Hence, when making their entry decisions, participants did not know their 
actual rank, but had to base their decision on their belief about their relative 
performance. Camerer and Lovallo (1999) compared entry rates in rounds with random 
ranks with the entry rates in rounds with skill ranks within subjects. They showed that 
entry rates were significantly higher in rounds where payoffs were based on relative 
skill (skill condition) than in rounds with random ranks (random condition), leading to 
over-entry and negative industry profits in most rounds with skill-based payoffs. 
Furthermore, they compared entry rates of participants that were recruited via standard 
recruiting instructions with participants that were recruited using a ‘self-selection’ 
instruction. In the self-selection condition, students were asked to participate in an 
experiment in which performance on sports or current event trivia would determine their 
payoff. By this comparison they tested whether the entry differential between rounds 
with skill ranks and rounds with random ranks is larger for groups that self-selected into 
the task because they considered themselves as especially competent in this domain. 
Indeed, they found that the gap between entry rates in both conditions was three times 
larger in the self-selection group, a finding they explained by peoples’ tendency to 
neglect whom they are competing against und thus to underestimate the ability level 
among their competitors. Camerer and Lovallo (1999) coined the term reference group 
neglect for this phenomenon and trace it to people neglecting that their competitors self-
selected into the task as well. Their results support the hypothesis that overconfidence in 
own relative skill and reference group neglect lead to excess market entry. This 
phenomenon is especially pronounced in domains into which people have self-selected 
and in which they feel competent in
9
. With their study Camerer and Lovallo (1999) 
developed a rich experimental paradigm to investigate self-confidence in skill-based 
competition that has stimulated research and an ongoing debate about the origin of 
market overentry (cf. Moore and Healy 2008). Some scholars see the origin of excess 
                                                 
9
 Alternative interpretations of the findings of Camerer and Lovallo (1999) are discussed by Hogarth and 
Karelaia (2009). 
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market entry in people’s myopic self-focus (Moore et al. 2007) or in their 
underestimation of competitors (Camerer and Lovallo 1999, Bolger et al. 2008), and 
some trace it back to psychological payoffs of credit and blame and their perceived 
competence (Heath and Tversky 1991, Grieco et al. 2007) or ego-utility (Koeszegi 
2010). Others have discussed the distorted error distribution with entry decisions (Soll 
1996) and highlighted the influence of environmental aspects such as task difficulty 
(Ferrell, 1994; Ferrell & McGoey, 1980; Suantak, Bolger, & Ferrell, 1996, Moore et al. 
2007) and task representativeness (Gigerenzer et al. 1991). Further perspectives include 
the conditions under which people sample and derive their beliefs (Hoffrage 2011) or 
the signal quality of their own ability (Karelaia and Hogarth 2010). 
4.2.2 Exogenous uncertainty  
An extensive body of literature deals with peoples’ preferences for ability uncertainty 
over exogenous uncertainty. The interplay between these two types of uncertainty has 
been widely neglected. Often skill-based competition involves both, ability and 
exogenous uncertainty. Explicitly accounting for ability and exogenous demand 
uncertainty, Wu and Knott (2006) investigate entrepreneurs’ market entry decisions and 
analyze how different preferences for ability and demand uncertainty affect decision 
outcomes. They aim at reconciling the risk-bearing characterization of entrepreneurs 
with the stylized fact that entrepreneurs exhibit conventional risk aversion profiles. 
Similarly to March and Shapira (1987), they argue that being risk-averse with respect to 
exogenous uncertainty, entrepreneurs are overconfident and apparently risk-seeking 
when it comes to ability uncertainty. Their model suggests that entrepreneurs’ 
overconfidence outweighs risk aversion with respect to demand uncertainty when the 
degree of ability uncertainty is comparable to the degree of demand uncertainty. Testing 
their model with a large dataset from the banking industry, Wu and Knott (2006) find 
that people in the aggregate behave as their model predicts: risk-averse with respect to 
demand uncertainty and apparently risk-seeking or overconfident with respect to ability 
uncertainty. A high demand uncertainty and a low ability uncertainty lead to insufficient 
entry. When demand uncertainty is low and ability uncertainty is high they find excess 
entry. Due to the structure of their data, conclusions for individual decision making are 
limited.  
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Karelaia and Hogarth (2010) demonstrate how peoples’ willingness to enter skill-
based competition is influenced by the degree to which skills matter for the ranking. 
Based on the idea that people receive a signal about their relative skills, Karelaia and 
Hogarth (2010) investigate the influence of the signal quality on peoples’ willingness to 
enter competition. They consider exogenous uncertainty that perturbs relative skill-
ranks and determines which final rank people will actually hold. Thereby, they 
experimentally manipulate the signal quality people receive. For people with low skills, 
a low signal quality is more likely to increase their final rank thereby increasing their 
chances of success when entering. The effect of high-skill individuals is reversed. Their 
chances of success reduce with a low signal quality. Karelaia and Hogarth (2010) find 
that the additional uncertainty about the final ranks increases entry rates for people with 
initially low ranks, but does not have a large effect on people with initially high ranks. 
To a large degree the behavior of lower ranked individuals is congruent with rational 
decision making. The behavior of the high ranked individuals is, however, not in line 
with the predictions. Karelaia and Hogarth (2010) discuss this finding without coming 
to a finite conclusion. The results of Karelaia and Hogarth (2010) demonstrate the 
importance to better understand how people deal with exogenous uncertainty in skill-
based competition.  
4.2.3 Demand uncertainty and the strength of competition - Hypotheses 
This study focuses on the interplay between demand uncertainty and the strength of 
skill-based competition. Many competitive situations involve uncertainty about the size 
of the future market, the number of positions in a certain field, or other resources for 
which people compete. This paper examines whether people are more or less willing to 
enter skill-based competition when they face risky as compared to certain information 
about the demand. Thereby, the strength of competition, i.e., the size if the expected 
demand, is expected to mediate people’s reaction to demand uncertainty.  
Demand uncertainty alone should, ceteris paribus, reduce the willingness to enter 
skill-based competition for people who are risk-averse with respect to demand risk. 
People who are risk-seeking with respect to demand risk should more often enter. 
Riskiness of demand should not affect the behavior of risk-neutral people. In a market 
entry game without skill-based payoffs, Brandts and Yao (2010) have found that people 
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entered more when information about the market capacity was ambiguous than when 
the information about the market capacity was risky. They explain their result by the 
increase of the complexity of strategic decisions in the ambiguous condition. Given the 
finding of Brandts and Yao (2010) people should enter more under demand risk as 
compared to certain demand information.  
The strength of competition, i.e., the size of the expected demand, might also 
influence entry behavior. Two plausible ways in which the strength of competition 
might influence peoples’ behavior are the following: On the one hand, people might shy 
away from entering a market with a small expected demand because chances of being 
sufficiently skilled are small. Similarly, people might overenter markets with a large 
expected demand because chances of being sufficiently skilled are high. On the other 
hand, one can argue that people who expect others to shy away from entering markets 
with a small expected demand should enter these markets relatively more. Similarly, if 
they expect their competitors to overenter markets with a large expected demand they 
should enter these markets relatively less. Some studies have reported on overentry into 
markets with a small capacity (e.g., Bolger et al. 2008, Pogrebna and Schade 2009). In 
these studies, the demand was given. Under demand uncertainty, people might be more 
sensitive to small and large capacities as they might include beliefs about their 
competitors’ risk attitude in their considerations. Furthermore, the confidence level of 
people might moderate their reactions to demand uncertainty. Wu and Knott (2006) 
demonstrated that overconfidence in own skills might outweigh the risk aversion with 
respect to exogenous demand uncertainty. Based on these findings and consideration, 
the following hypotheses are tested: 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Demand uncertainty effects people’s willingness to enter skill-based 
competition.  
HYPOTHESIS 2: The size of the expected demand has a positive effect on entry.  
HYPOTHESIS 3: The effect of demand uncertainty is moderated by the expected 
demand. 
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HYPOTHESIS 4: Peoples’ entry behavior is influenced by their confidence level in their 
skills.  
HYPOTHESIS 5: Reactions to the expected demand are moderated by the confidence 
level.  
4.3 Experiment 
4.3.1 Experimental design and procedure 
The experiment is based on the experimental paradigm of Camerer and Lovallo 
(1999). In order to test hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 demand uncertainty was varied between 
subjects and the expected demand was varied within subjects. One group received 
certain information about the demand c (certainty condition). Another group received 
risky information about the demand c (risky condition). Demand uncertainty was varied 
between subjects in order to avoid problems related to the comparative ignorance 
phenomenon
10
. The expected demand was varied also taking into account extremely 
small and extremely large markets. Behavior is assumed to be influenced by the 
possibility of extreme values of demand, i.e., by the possibilities of a zero demand or 
the possibility that all players might be able to enter at a profit and competition is non-
existent. In these cases entry patterns should be more pronounced as they include the 
possibilities of a skill-independent loss and a skill-independent profit, respectively. To 
test hypothesis 4 and 5, participants’ overconfidence was measured by comparing their 
entry rates before and after partial feedback on their true skill-rank. Direct elicitation of 
beliefs about peoples’ absolute skill or rank forces them to calibrate, thereby changing 
subsequent entry behavior
11
. Thus, an indirect measurement was preferred. One group 
of participants received feedback on their own absolute skill, another group received 
information about the skill dispersion among their competitors. This partial feedback on 
                                                 
10
 According to the comparative ignorance hypothesis of Fox and Tversky (1995) ambiguity aversion is 
the result of a comparison with less ambiguous events, or with more knowledgeable individuals. In 
this view, ambiguity is largely an artefact caused by the within-subject design used in most 
experimental studies on decision making under ambiguity versus risk. 
11
 The author is grateful to Christian Schade who highlighted this problem and related it to the 
Heisenberg’s (1927) uncertainty principle.  
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true skill rank allows to disentangle effects of overestimating own absolute skills and 
underestimating the performance level of competitors
12
 that have been discussed to 
cause market overentry in previous studies (Camerer and Lovallo 1999, Moore et al. 
2007, Bolger et al. 2008).  
The experiment was conducted in the experimental laboratory of the School of 
Business and Economics of a German university. Participants were recruited via an 
experimental database (ORSEE, Greiner 2004) and via online announcements. Eight 
sessions were run with 14 participants each, yielding 56 participants in each session and 
a total of 112 participants in the experiment. 45 percent of the participants were male, 
55 percent were female. The majority of the participants had some experience with 
economic experiments but none of them had taken part in a market entry experiment 
before. The experiment was computerized using the z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).  
Upon arrival, participants were paid a show-up fee of 12 € in cash that they were 
asked to put in their pockets. They were then seated in random order at computer desks 
without visual contact to each other. Communication was not allowed throughout the 
experiment. All instructions were displayed on the computer monitors guiding 
participants through the experiment; additional hard copies of the instructions were 
distributed. Digital calculators were available on all computer screens. After some 
general instructions, participants started with the first part of the experiment.  
In part one, participants completed a general knowledge quiz consisting of 14 binary 
choice questions knowing that their payoff from the subsequent experiment would also 
depend on their performance in this quiz. Having completed the quiz, participants did 
not receive any feedback about their performance. Part two of the experiment was the 
market entry game. After some general instructions and comprehension questions, 
participants were matched in groups of seven players. Then they played five rounds of 
the market entry game. In each round they decided on entering or not entering an 
experimental. The payoff from entering depended on the skill-rank of the participant 
and on the demand in the respective round. Ranks were determined by the participants’ 
                                                 
12
 The effect of partial feedback on performance has been studied in other set-ups by Grieco and Hogarth 
(2009), and by Urbig et al. (2009). 
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performance in a general knowledge quiz. The player with the highest number of 
correctly answered questions obtained rank 1, the player with the second highest 
number of correct answers rank two, ect.. The demand c varied from round to round. In 
each round the c best entrants would make a gain of 7.50 € by entering, all further 
entrants would make a loss of 10 €. In half of the sessions participants were confronted 
with certain information about the demand (certainty condition), in the other half of the 
sessions participants received only risky information about the demand (risky 
condition). In each round participants were randomly re-matched with another group of 
six players. No feedback about the round outcomes or the number of entrants was given 
until the very end of the experiment in order to avoid learning effects.  
After participants completed the first block of five rounds, they played a second block 
of five rounds. In this block, participants were given partial information about their true 
rank. Group (a) received feedback on their own number of correct answers in the quiz. 
Group (b) received information about the performance dispersion among their 
competitors.  
In part three of the experiment peoples’ beliefs about the number of entrants in each 
condition were elicited. For correct estimates the participants received a small additional 
payoff. In part four risk attitudes were elicited according to Holt and Laury (2002). Part 
five contained a demographic questionnaire. Finally, in part six participants received a 
detailed overview of the results of all rounds and feedback about their own and the 
reference group performance. A random device determined one of the rounds. 
Participants were paid for the market entry game in accordance to their payoff in this 
round. Payoffs from all parts were added and final payments were made privately for 
each participant. Table 13 gives an overview over the different parts of the experiment. 
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TABLE 13. EXPERIMENT OVERVIEW 
 
Part 1: 
 
 
Part 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part 3: 
Part 4: 
Part 5: 
Part 6: 
 
General knowledge quiz [identical for all participants] 
14 binary choice questions 
 
Market entry game [two conditions: (1) and (2)] 
(1) Certain information about the capacity 
(2) Risky information about the capacity  
 
 I    5 rounds with varying market capacities 
          II   5 rounds with varying market capacities and 
additional information [two sub-groups: (a) and (b)] 
(a) Information about own skill 
(b) Information about skill dispersion in reference group 
 
Belief elicitation, incentive compatible 
Holt and Laury (2002), risk propensity measurement, incentive compatible 
Demographic questionnaire 
Overview of all results, random choice of payoff relevant round, payments 
The order of quiz and market entry game differed from the original design of Camerer 
and Lovallo (1999). In the experiment by Camerer and Lovallo (1999) the quiz was 
conducted after the market entry game. In this experiment the quiz was conducted 
before, but participants did not receive feedback about their performance. This change 
in task order was made to avoid potential confound of overconfidence and effects of 
illusion of control. Previous research has shown that people prefer betting on future 
events rather than on past events (Rothbart and Snyder 1970). This finding has been 
attributed to peoples’ illusion of control but can also be explained by people’s aversion 
to take bets with outcomes that could generally be known but are not known to them 
(Heath and Tversky 1991, Fox and Tversky 1995). In order to avoid this potential 
confound, the general knowledge quiz was conducted before the market entry game. 
Also, this set-up is closer to some real world situation where people compete about 
resources based on their previous achievement. Examples for such situations are job 
markets, the competition about research funds, or applications for colleges or 
universities.  
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4.3.2 Nash equilibria 
If players knew their rank, the best c players in a group should enter. All others should 
stay out. As ranks were unknown, entry decisions mirrored the players’ beliefs about 
their ranks. Assuming, however, that players are risk-neutral and have common ignorant 
priors, i.e., that they believe to have equal chances to be among the c best-ranked 
players, following equilibrium predictions can be derived: 
Each of the seven players decides whether to enter, denoted by strategy 1is  , or not 
to enter, denoted by 0is  . If a player decides to stay out of the market her payoff is 
zero. If a player decides to enter, the payoff from entering depends on her rank. If she is 
among the best c ranked entrants, she will gain 7.50 €, if not, she will lose 10 € by 
entering.  
(7) 
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where
i denotes the payoff for player i given his strategy choice is and the total number 
of entrants m including player i. The demand is given by c . If the total number of 
entrants does not exceed the demand, the average entrant’s profit is 7.50 €. If the total 
number of entrants does exceed the demand, the payoff of the average entrant equals the 
industry profit divided by the number of entrants. The industry profit is the accumulated 
payoff (gains and losses) of all entrants, whereby c entrants make a profit of 7.50 € and 
(m-c) entrants make a loss of 10 €. 
In equilibrium, players must be indifferent about entering or staying out of the market. 
If cm  , entering is a dominant strategy as 7.50 € is more than 0 €. If 
m > c, the average player should be indifferent between entering and staying out when
0)/]€[10€50.7(  mcmc . This happens when m = 1.75 c. Consequently, in pure 
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strategy equilibria the number of entrants is m = 1.75 c; e.g., the highest integer of 
entrants below 1.75 c.  
To derive the mixed strategy equilibrium, let )(
1
sp denote the probability with which 
each player selects to enter and let )(1)(
10
spsp  be the probability with which each 
player selects to stay out of the market. Then the probability that m players enter and N-
m players stay out is 
(8)  mN
mNm spspmp  ))(1()()( 11  
In the mixed strategy equilibrium, players enter with probability *p solving: 
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Table 14 shows the total number entrants for which the players are indifferent 
between entering and staying out for different values of c, the number of entrants in 
pure strategy equilibria and the corresponding mixed strategy equilibrium. 
TABLE 14. OVERVIEW EQUILIBRIA 
c m = 1.75 c enter if # ENTRANTS IN PURE EQUILIBRIA MIXED STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA p* 
1 1.75 75.11m  1 0.14 
2 3.50 50.31m  3 0.43 
3 5.25 25.51m  5 0.71 
4 7 enter always 6 or 7 - 
5 8.75 enter always 7 - 
In the experiment, the effect of demand uncertainty was tested by giving part of the 
participants risky information about the market capacity. Instead of the certain values of 
demand c=1, c=2, c=3, c=4, and c=5, they were told that the demand would be c = [0; 1; 
2], c = [1; 2; 3], c = [1; 3; 5], c = [2; 4; 6], and c = [3; 5; 7], respectively. All possible 
values in a round would realize with a chance of 1/3. Assuming risk-neutral players 
formed expected values and believed other players to be risk-neutral, the equilibrium 
predictions above also hold for the risky condition.  
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4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Independent variables 
On average people answered 8.1 out of 14 questions correctly. Men gave on average 
one correct answer more than women (Mean men = 8.7; Mean women = 7.7). This 
difference was statistically significant, t = -2.64; p < 0.01. The gender gap in 
performance is surprising as the questions had been pre-tested and were chosen by task 
difficulty and gender neutrality. Previous research documented tournament specific 
gender differences in performance, especially in mixed gender groups (Gneezy et al. 
2003, Niederle and Vesterlund 2007). The observed gender gap in performance is thus 
likely to be a result of the tournament character of the task in the actual experiment 
which was absent in the pre-test. Marginally significant gender differences were also 
found with respect to risk aversion; women being more risk-averse than men, t = 2.11; p 
< 0.05 (Mean men = 5.3; Mean women = 6.2). This result is in line with previous 
research (Eckel and Grossman 2002). Point-biserial correlations between gender and 
skill and gender and risk attitude are rpb = 0.244 and rpb = -0.211, respectively. Gender 
accounts of R
2 
= (0.244)
2 
= 6.0 percent of the variability in skill and R
2 
= (-0.211)
2 
= 4.5 
percent of the variability in risk attitude. There are no gender differences with respect to 
participants’ beliefs about the number of entrants.  
4.4.2 Regressions 
Several logit models of entry have been estimated to test Hypotheses 1 and 5. Subject-
specific random-effects have been employed to control for unobserved heterogeneity
13
. 
The dependent variable entry is binary and coded with ‘1’ when a participant decided to 
enter and ‘0’ when a participant decided not to enter. Demand risk is coded ‘1’ for risky 
information about demand and ‘0’ for certain information about demand. The variable 
skill represents the number of correct answers in the quiz. Beliefs about the number of 
entrants for each capacity are captured by variable belief. The variable overconfidence 
represents the entry differences before and after the partial feedback about the rank. If a 
person decreased her mean entry probability in the second block of rounds after having 
                                                 
13
 All analyses have been run in STATA. 
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received feedback on either her or her reference groups’ performance in the quiz, this 
variable is positive and indicates that the respective participants is overconfident. 
Gender is coded ‘1’ for male participants and ‘0’ for female participants. The 
correlations between gender and skill and gender and risk attitude are below 0.5. Also 
collinearity statistics report uncritical values (variance inflation factor VIF = 1.221 < 10; 
tolerance statistic = 0.819 > 0.2). 
Models have been estimated for the entry data of the first five rounds. Entry is always 
the dependent variable. Model 1 contains demand risk, capacity and the interaction 
effect of demand risk and capacity as independent variables. Model 2 adds skill, gender, 
and belief. Model 3 additionally considers overconfidence and risk aversion. Finally, 
model 4 further includes interactions of demand risk*demand*skill and demand 
risk*demand*overconfidence. Table 15 shows the results. 
TABLE 15. RANDOM-EFFECTS LOGIT MODELS 
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Demand risk (0/1) 2.112***(0.519) 2.161***(0.532) 
 
0.532 
) 
1.845**(0.532) 
 
1.859**(0.538) 
 
Demand 1.877***(0.289) 2.072***(0.319) 
) 
2.004***(0.317) 
 
2.025***(0.321) 
Demand risk*demand -0.754***(0.165) -0.777***(0.168) -0.727***(0.175) 
 
-0.489*(0.233) 
 
Skill  
 
 
 0.177**(0.062) 0.243***(0.058) 
 
0.393**(0.116) 
 
Gender (0/1)  0.564**(0.259) 0.637**(0.239) 
 
0.637**(0.240) 
) 
Belief entry 
 
 -0.161 (0.087) -0.203*(0.083) 
 
-0.200*(0.083) 
** 
Overconfidence   2.823***(0.556) 
  
2.852**(1.081) 
 
Risk aversion   -0.092*(0.055) -0.097 (0.055) 
Demand risk*demand*skill    -0.030 (0.020) 
Demand risk*demand*overc. 
 
   0.001 (0.190) 
Constant -4.943***(0.886) -6.667***(1.044) -6.197***(1.075) -7.442***(1.387) 
 
) 
σu 0.728 (0.191)   0.639 (0.215) 0.007 (0.115) 0.004 (0.038) 
ρ 0.139 (0.063) 0.111 (0.066) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
χ2 
 
76.55 81.36 95.24 95.03 
Number of observations 
 
560 558 482 482 
Number of participants 
 
112 112 97 97
Dependent variable = entry (0/1) 
Random-effects specification = subject id 
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 
Analyses show that people who were confronted with risky information about the 
demand were more likely to enter than people who had certain information about the 
market capacity; demand risk had a highly significant positive effect on entry. People 
were also more likely to enter when the expected demand was higher; demand had a 
highly significant main effect on entry. Thereby effect of demand risk was negatively 
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moderated by demand. The higher the expected demand, the lower the positive effect of 
demand risk on entry. People with a higher skill level were more likely to enter than 
people with a low skill level. Men entered more frequently than women. Risk aversion 
had a negative influence in entry. Furthermore, people’s belief about the number of 
entrants negatively influenced entry; the more other people they believed to enter the 
market the less they were likely to enter. Being overconfident had a highly significant 
positive effect. Interactions of demand risk*demand*skill and demand 
risk*demand*overconfidence were not significant. No other interactions have been 
found to be significant. 
4.4.3 Numbers of entrants 
Figure 1 shows the mean number of entrants as a function of demand. For the 
certainty condition, the mean number of entrants is almost linear in demand and 
between c and 1.75*c, except for c =1 where entry is slightly higher. This entry pattern 
is largely in line with the equilibrium predictions. Mean payoffs from entering are 
positive for all values of c except for c =1 where the mean payoff is just below zero with 
-0.64 €. For the risky condition, the relationship between the mean number of entrants 
and the expected demand is s-shaped: when the expected demand is low, i.e., when c = 
[0; 1; 2], people overenter the market. In this situation the average number of entrants is 
3.5 leading to a loss of 5€ for the average entrant. When the expected demand is high, 
i.e., when c = [3; 5; 7], people underenter the market and do not fully use the profit 
opportunities. The average number of entrants is 3.9 in this situation. Figure 1 shows the 
linear and s-shaped relation of entrants and demand in both conditions.  
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FIGURE 8. MEAN NUMBER OF ENTRANTS 
4.4.4 Beliefs 
In section II, two possible reactions to the extreme values of demand, c = [0; 1; 2] and 
c = [3; 5; 7], have been discussed. On the one hand, one can argue that people might shy 
away from entering a market with a very small expected demand where there is a 1/3 
chance that all entrants will make a loss because the realized demand is zero. On the 
other, one can argue that people who expect others to shy away from entering in this 
situation might be more likely to enter themselves as they expect the number of entrants 
to be very small. For the other extreme, c = [3; 5; 7], corresponding arguments can be 
made: on the one hand, one can argue that people might try their luck entering a market 
with a very high expected demand where there is a 1/3 chance that all entrants will 
make a profit because the realized demand is seven. On the other hand, one can argue 
that people who expect others to excessively enter in this situation might be more likely 
to stay out themselves as they expect the number of entrants to be very high. Examining 
the beliefs of entrants and non-entrants in each of the situations shows that people seem 
to apply the second way of reasoning.  
Figure 9 (a) shows that entrants’ and non-entrants’ beliefs in the certainty condition 
are almost linear in capacity and relatively accurate for small and medium sized 
markets. For large markets, participants underestimate the number of entrants. Figure 9 
(b) shows the beliefs of participants in the risky condition. Here as well, entrants’ and 
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non-entrants’ beliefs are increasing in capacity. However, while entrants’ beliefs are 
almost linear, the beliefs of non-entrants are non-linear. The observed overentry at c = 
[0; 1; 2] can be explained by entrants believing that less than 1 other player would enter 
in this situation. The entrants’ underestimation of the number of entrants seems to have 
caused the excess entry in this situation. The observed underentry at c = [3; 5; 7] can be 
explained by non-entrants believing that more than 5 other players would enter in this 
situation. The non-entrants overestimation of the number of entrants seems to have 
caused the underentry in this situation. Table 16 gives an overview of the beliefs.  
 
FIGURE 9. (A) BELIEFS CERTAINTY CONDITION / (B) BELIEFS RISKY CONDITION 
 
TABLE 16. OVERVIEW BELIEFS 
 CERTAINTY RISK 
E[C] 
 
# entrants entrants belief non-entrants belief # entrants entrants belief non-entrants belief 
1 1.87 1.47 1.41 3.50 0.96 1.75 
2 2.00 1.94 2.38 1.25 2.00 1.80 
3 3.75 3.23 3.69 5.87 3.30 3.78 
4 6.13 4.16 4.43 5.75 3.72 3.10 
5 6.63 4.81 5.00 3.92 4.38 5.20 
 
4.4.5 Skills and overconfidence 
The regression analysis above shows that the interactions of demand 
risk*demand*skill and demand risk*demand*overconfidence are not significant. Across 
groups (certainty condition and risky condition) people with higher skill levels do not 
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react differently to increases in demand. The same accounts for overconfident people, 
i.e, Hypothesis 5 is not supported by the results. Overconfidence however has a 
significant positive main effect on entry (Hypothesis 4). Overconfidence is measured 
indirectly by comparing entry rates before and after partial feedback on the participants’ 
true ranks. In half of the sessions, group (a), people receive feedback on their own 
number of correct answers, in the other half of the sessions, group (b), people receive 
feedback on the number of correct answers of the other players. Comparing individual 
entry rates before and after the feedback reveals the degree of absolute overconfidence 
for participants in group (a), and the degree of relative overconfidence for the 
participants in group (b). Table 17 shows entry rates before and after the feedback for 
the different sub-groups. In both conditions peoples’ overconfidence levels are similar.  
TABLE 17. MEAN ENTRY RATES AND OVERCONFIDENCE LEVELS 
 CERTAINTY  RISK 
Feedback 
Entry before 
feedback 
Entry after 
feedback 
Overconfidence 
Entry before 
feedback 
Entry after 
feedback 
Overconfidence 
own skill 0.61 0.56 0.05 0.61 0.57 0.04 
skill reference 
group 
0.56 0.53 0.03 0.55 0.48 0.07 
An additional logit regression is estimated including entry data of the last five rounds 
to test the effect of partial information about the rank on entry (see Table 19 in 
Appendix I). Feedback and feedback type do not have a significant effect on entry.  
4.5 Discussion 
In this study, the effect of demand uncertainty on people’s willingness to enter skill-
based competition is moderated by the strength of competition in the respective market. 
Under demand uncertainty, people overenter small markets where competition is intense 
and they underenter large markets where competition is less intense. A similar effect is 
observed under certain information about the demand, however, this is less pronounced. 
The significant difference in behavior between the certain and risky condition is likely 
to be a consequence of the possibility of extreme values of demand in the risky 
condition. Here, an expected demand of one (c = [0; 1; 2]) would allow a 1/3 chance 
that independent of the skill-levels all of the entrants would make a loss by entering. An 
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expected demand of five (c = [3; 5; 7]) would instead allow a 1/3 chance that 
independent of skill levels all players would make a profit by entering. The results show 
that the pattern of over- and underentry is related to participants’ beliefs about the entry 
behavior of their competitors but not moderated by either their level of overconfidence 
nor by the true skill level. Thus, while people belief that their competitors’ shy away 
from entering markets with intense competition leading them to enter more, at the same 
time they belief their competitors’ to overrun markets with weak competition leading 
them to underenter these markets. These results are in line with previous studies that 
found people to overenter markets with small certain capacities (Bolger et al. 2008, 
Pogrebna and Schade 2009) and with studies that show market over- and underentry can 
be explained by peoples’ beliefs’ about their competitors entry behavior (Camerer et al. 
2004).  
In markets without skill-based payoffs, people have been found to enter more under 
ambiguous information than under risky information about the market capacity  
(Brandts and Yao 2010). Thus, the observed effects of demand uncertainty might be 
even stronger for markets where information about the realization of the demand is 
ambiguous. 
Furthermore, previous studies have found that overconfidence in one’s absolute skills 
affects entry behavior more than underestimating the skill level of competitors (Bolger 
et al. 2008). In this study, there was no significant difference between the effects of 
absolute overconfidence and reference group neglect, i.e., the type of feedback did not 
have a significant effect on entry behavior. This might be due to the different order of 
quiz and market entry game or due to the self-calibration question before the market 
entry game in Bolger et al. (2008). A pre-test of this study has shown that people 
entered less when being asked to state their expectation about their own performance. 
Alternative, the difference in findings might be also caused by the strong effect of the 
varying demand size on entry that was absent in Bolger et al. (2008) who examined 
certain capacities of four and eight in a 12-player market entry game.  
Different to the study by Karelaia and Hogarth (2010), in the present study high and 
low ranked individuals do not react differently to the additional exogenous uncertainty. 
The difference between high- and low-skill individuals in the experiment of Karelaia 
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and Hogarth (2010) was caused be the different consequence of the signal quality for 
the two groups. In this study, exogenous uncertainty does not lead to opposing 
consequences for the two groups.  
Results show that overconfident individuals enter more often than underconfident 
individuals. This is in line with the many previous findings on overconfidence and entry 
decisions. However, overentry is only found in very few situations, when the expected 
capacity of the market is low. This result might be mainly driven by two aspects in the 
experimental design: (1) In the present experiment people did not self-select into the 
task which has been found to increased the entry rate and rates of overentry by factor 
three in Camerer and Lovallo (1999). (2) In the present study the effects of 
overconfidence and illusion of control have been disentangled. This was not the case in 
many of the studies that reported on high rates of overentry. Part of the effects found in 
previous studies might thus be caused by the simultaneous effect of overconfidence and 
people’s preference for bets on outcomes that did not yet realize (Heath and Tversky 
1991, Fox and Tversky 1995).  
The gender differences that were found are in line with previous research on gender 
differences in competition (for an overview see Niederle and Versterlund 2011). 
4.6 Conclusion 
This study shows that people’ reactions to demand uncertainty in skill-based 
competition differs with the expected strength of competition. People overenter markets 
with small expected demand and intense competition and underenter markets with high 
expected demand and weak competition. People’s entry behavior can be explained by 
their beliefs about their competitors’ reactions to the expected demand. Assuming that 
their competitors shy away from entering markets with a small expected demand they 
overenter these markets. Assuming that their competitors overrun markets with a high 
expected demand they underenter these markets. These findings are consistent with 
previous results of a market entry game without skill-based payoffs and with certain 
demand by Camerer et al. (2004). Under demand uncertainty the observed pattern of 
over- and underentry is much more pronounced than under certain demand conditions. 
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Overconfidence and skill level had significant main effects on entry but did not 
moderate reactions to different market sizes. These results show opportunities for 
further research on the influence of exogenous uncertainty in skill-based competition 
and about the influence of the strength of competition. 
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Appendices 
Appendix I: Tables 
TABLE 18. MEAN ENTRY RATES AND MEAN PAYOFFS (FIRST FIVE ROUNDS) 
           CERTAINTY RISK 
E[C]     Mean entrants Mean payoff Mean entrants Mean payoff 
1 1.87 -0.64 € 3.50 -5.00 € 
2 2.00 7.50 € 1.25 7.50 € 
3 3.75 4.00 € 5.87 -1.06 € 
4 6.13 1.42 € 5.75 2.17 € 
5 6.63 3.20 € 3.92 7.50 € 
 
TABLE 19. RANDOM-EFFECTS LOGIT MODEL FOR ROUND 1-10 
MODEL COEF.     SE 
Demand risk 2.541*** (0.550) 
Demand 2.026*** (0.295) 
Demand risk*demand -0.894*** (0.167) 
Feedback type -0.295 (0.246) 
Skill 0.309*** (0.067) 
Gender 0.636* (0.267) 
Constant -7.955*** (1.179) 
σu 0.687 (0.202) 
ρ 0.125 (0.064) 
χ2 
 
82.12  
Number of observations 
 
560  
Number of participants 
 
112  
Dependent variable = entry (0/1) 
Random-effects specification = subject id 
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 
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Appendix II: Instructions – selected parts 
Explanations of experimental procedures are added in italic. All payoffs were scaled up down 
by factor 3 for the non-entrepreneurs. 
At arrival in the experimental laboratory participants were paid a participation fee in cash. 
After being seated at their computer desks, and before beginning with the actual experiment, 
they received following information: 
 
 
Welcome! 
In this experiment, you will be asked to take various decisions. At the end of the experiment 
you will be paid for your participation. The amount you will receive depends on the decision 
you have made and on the decisions other participants have made. 
The experiment consists of three parts. In the first part, you will take a knowledge quiz. In the 
second part, you will play a game with six other players. In the third part, you will be asked to 
compare different lotteries. In the end we will ask you a few further questions. The entire 
experiment will take about 60-90 minutes. 
After you have concluded all parts of the experiment we will clear the payoffs from each part 
of the experiment and pay out the final amount to you in cash. 
All information will be treated as strictly confidential. Your anonymity is being ensured at any 
time. 
Next 
 
Participants then answered 14 binary choice quiz questions. They did not receive information 
about their results. 
 
 
Part 2: The Game 
In the second part of the experiment you will play 10 rounds of a 7-player game. In each 
round you will play against another randomly chosen group of 6 anonymous counterparts. 
Next 
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Part 2: The Game 
Rules of the game:  
In this game 7 players will decide simultaneously on enter a market or not. The market has a 
limited size, i.e., only a certain number of players can enter with profits. The rest who enters 
will suffer a loss. Whether you gain a profit or make a loss when you enter depends on the 
number of correct answers given in the quiz in part 1. 
From all entrants only the ones who performed best in the quiz will make profits. The ones 
who enter the market and did worse in the quiz will suffer a loss. The number of players that 
can possibly make a profit (the so called market capacity c) might vary from round to round.  
I.e., if the market capacity is c=3 the three best ranked players who enter the market will make 
profits and all the other players who enter will make a loss. If we have a market capacity of c=4 
the four best ranked players will make profits while the rest who enters gets losses, and so on. 
If a player decides not to enter he will make either profits or losses in this particular round. 
None of the players either know their own number of correct answers from the quiz nor the 
number of correct answers of their counter players. 
Next 
 
 
Part 2: The Game 
During the experiment you will not receive feedback about the results of previous rounds. 
Instead the results of all rounds will be summarized in an overview at the end of the 
experiment. One of the rounds will be randomly chosen. The profit/ loss that you achieved in 
this round will then be added or deducted from your payoff from the experiment. The other 
rounds will not be paid out. 
Since every round could be chosen, please consider all decisions with equal attentiveness. 
Next 
 
Participants played 5 rounds with the following instructions: 
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Version (1) 
 
Round 1 
You and six other players will decide simultaneously to enter a market or not.  
The market has a limited size so that only a certain number of players can enter with profits. 
The payoffs for those who enter the market are determined in the following way: 
According to number of right answers in the quiz, a rank is assigned to each entering player. 
The player with the highest number of correct answers is ranked number 1, the player with 
second highest number of correct answers is ranked number 2 and so on. In case several 
players have the same number of correct answers they will additionally be ranked by their 
speed answering the quiz. Thereby the fastest player gets the best and the second fastest player 
the second best rank and so on.  
The four best ranked entrants (rank 1 to rank 4) will make a profit of 7.50 €. All other 
entrants will make a loss of 10 €.  
In case of market entry: 
 Rank of the player in the quiz 
C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 7.50 € 7.50 € 7.50 € 7.50 € - 10 € - 10 € - 10 € 
 
In case of not-entering: If a player chooses not to enter he neither makes a profit nor a loss in 
this round. 
Please decide now whether you want to enter the market or not: 
 
Entry  No Entry 
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Version (2) 
 
Round 1 
You and six other players will decide simultaneously to enter a market or not.  
The market has a limited size so that only a certain number of players can enter with profits. 
The payoffs for those who enter the market are determined in the following way: 
According to number of right answers in the quiz, a rank is assigned to each entering player. The 
player with the highest number of correct answers is ranked number 1, the player with second 
highest number of correct answers is ranked number 2 and so on. In case several players have the 
same number of correct answers they will additionally be ranked by their speed answering the 
quiz. Thereby the fastest player gets the best and the second fastest player the second best rank 
and so on.  
Depending on the market capacity c either the six best ranked players (rank 1 to rank 6), the four 
best ranked entrants (rank 1 to rank 4) or the two best ranked entrants (rank 1 to rank 2) will make 
a profit of 7.50 €. All other entrants will make a loss of 10 €.  
The market seize is unknown. Each of the three capacities might realize with 33.3% (i.e. in one 
third of all cases). Once each player has taken his decision the size will be determined via a 
random mechanism.  
The possible payoffs are presented below. 
In case of market entry: 
 Rank of the player in the quiz 
C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 7.50 € 7.50 € - 10 € - 10 € - 10 € - 10 € - 10 € 
4 7.50 € 7.50 € 7.50 € 7.50 € - 10 € - 10 € - 10 € 
6 7.50 € 7.50 € 7.50 € 7.50 € 7.50 € - 10 € - 10 € 
In case of not-entering: If a player chooses not to enter he neither makes a profit nor a loss in 
this round. 
Please decide now whether you want to enter the market or not: 
    
Entry  No Entry 
 
After five rounds, participants entered a second block of rounds in which they received partial 
feedback about their rank. They either received feedback about their own number correct 
answers in the general knowledge quiz (group a) or about the performance distribution in their 
reference group (group b): 
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Version (a) 
 
New Information 
Your result from the quiz: you have answered ‘x’ questions out of 14 correctly.  
Next 
 
 
 
Further Rounds 
All players have just received information about their result in the quiz in part 1.  
You will now continue playing the game for another five rounds. The same conditions apply 
as before: 
In each round players are randomly re-matched so that you play against another group of 6 
players in each round.  
The results of each round will only be reported to you by the end of the experiment. 
At the end of the experiment the payoff relevant round will be determined via a random draw.  
Next 
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Version (b) 
 
New Information 
For each of the following rounds players will receive information on their counterparts’ results 
from the knowledge quiz, i.e. the number of correct answers in the knowledge quiz. 
Since you will be playing against different players in each round, you will receive information 
on your counterparts’ results before each round.  
Next 
 
 
 
Further Rounds 
In each of the following rounds players will be informed about their counterparts’ number of 
correctly answered quiz questions (out of 14). 
You will now continue playing the game for another five rounds. The same conditions apply 
as before: 
In each round players are randomly re-matched so that you play against another group of 6 
players in each round.  
The results of each round will only be reported to you by the end of the experiment. 
At the end of the experiment the payoff relevant round will be determined via a random draw.  
Next 
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Example screen for reference group information: 
 
 
Round 6 
The following table presents the quiz results of each of your counterparts in this round. 
For instance, you see how many questions (out of 14) your counterparts answered correctly. 
 
Counterpart Number of Correct Answers 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Number of Correct Answers 
 
Participants played five further rounds (round 6-10) receiving reference group information in 
each round.  
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5. Does ‘ego’ make the entrepreneur? 
 
Article 4: 
Does ‘ego’ make the entrepreneur? 
Overconfidence, demand uncertainty and market entry 
Sabrina Boewe 
 
This paper investigates whether entrepreneurs have a higher willingness 
to enter skill-based competition under demand uncertainty than non-
entrepreneurs. A special focus is on the role of reference group neglect, 
i.e., underestimating the skill level of one’s competitors. The findings 
suggest that entrepreneurs do not significantly differ from non-
entrepreneurs with respect to their willingness to enter skill-based 
competition, relative overconfidence and susceptibility to the reference 
group neglect. Instead, gender differences have been found. Results are 
discussed in the context of previous findings on entrepreneurs’ 
overconfidence, market entry, and women’s participation in 
entrepreneurial activities.  
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Schade, Avichai Snir, Ganna Pogrebna, Philipp Koellinger and the attendees at the Humboldt-University Research Seminar at 
Schorrentin (2010) for their valuable comments and useful suggestions. I also thank Uwe Ritschke and Andre Nikolski for their 
technical assistance in conducting the experiment. This research could not have been realized without the financial support of the 
Volkswagen Foundation (VolkswagenStiftung) grant “Innovation and Coordination” for which I am deeply thankful. 
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5.1 Introduction 
In the light of low average returns and high failure rates, explanations for 
entrepreneur’s business entry decisions have been linked to a higher risk tolerance 
(Knight 1921, Khilstrom and Laffont 1979, Stewart and Roth 2001, Cramer et al. 2002), 
a different risk perception (March and Shapira 1987, MacCrimmon and Wehrung 1990, 
Kahneman and Lovallo 1993) and to entrepreneurs’ susceptibility to a number of 
cognitive biases (Busenitz and Barney 1997, Baron 1998, Camerer and Lovallo 1999, 
Bernardo and Welch 2001, Hayward et al. 2006, Wu and Knot 2006, Koellinger et al. 
2007). Among these biases the most important one is overconfidence, i.e., people’s 
tendency to be overly optimistic about their own skills.  
While the image of the entrepreneur as a risk seeker has been empirically refuted 
(Brockhaus 1980, Masters and Meier 1988, Miner and Raju 2004) and the relationship 
between risk perception and cognitive biases is still being debated (Simon et al. 2000), a 
number of studies provide evidence that entrepreneurs are indeed overconfident and 
overly optimistic about their chances of success (Cooper et al. 1988, Busenitz and 
Barney 1997, Wu and Knott 2006, Koellinger et al. 2007). Wu and Knott (2006) argue 
that business entry decisions can be explained by entrepreneurs’ overconfidence 
outweighing their risk aversion with respect to demand uncertainty. Testing their model 
on the aggregate level, Wu and Knott (2006) find empirical support for their predictions. 
In an interview Brian Wu concludes: “in the end it’s their overconfidence that drives 
them to be entrepreneurs”14. 
What these findings have shown is that overconfidence plays an important role for the 
decision to start a business. This has – often unintendedly – added weight to the notion 
of the entrepreneur as someone particularly overconfident in his own skills. However, 
there is no empirical evidence that entrepreneurs actually do overestimate their relative 
skills more than others. Indeed, there is some evidence that entrepreneurs might actually 
not differ from others in this regards (Elston et al. 2006). Also Wu and Knott note that 
they “[…] do not postulate that entrepreneurs differ from wage-earners on either 
                                                 
14
 Brian Wu was interviewed on the results of his study by Stacy Perman for Bloomberg BusinessWeek. 
The interview was published in February 2005. The interview was titled “Ego makes entrepreneurs?” 
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dimension [risk aversion or overconfidence]” (2006, p. 1318). But while the literature is 
full of examples of people acting on overconfidence (e.g., Svenson 1981, Kramer et al. 
1993, Odean 1998) it is the entrepreneur who is characterized as especially 
overconfident (Busenitz and Barney 1997). Making a clear distinction between ‘acting 
on overconfidence’ and the notion of the entrepreneurs as someone particularly 
overconfident is important from a theoretical viewpoint as well as for institutional 
decision makers such as investors and policy makers who judge entrepreneurial 
ventures. This paper contributes to the literature on entrepreneurial overconfidence by 
clarifying the distinction and by testing potential differences in relative overconfidence 
between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs.  
So far, there are two studies that actually compared entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs susceptibility to being overconfident: Busenitz and Barney (1997) and 
Elston et al. (2006). Busenitz and Barney (1997) examined entrepreneurs’ ability to 
assess their own skills in a general knowledge quiz. They found that entrepreneurs 
overestimate their absolute skills more than managers of large organizations. In 
competitive markets, however, success and failure depend on being better than one’s 
competitors, i.e., on relative skills. Overconfidence in one’s relative skills can be caused 
by either overestimating one’s own absolute skills or by underestimating the ability 
level among one’s competitors, a phenomenon that has been called reference group 
neglect by Camerer and Lovallo (1999), or by both together. Thus, while 
overconfidence in absolute skills is important, the relevant factor to look at when it 
comes to competition is relative overconfidence. Entrepreneurs’ susceptibility to relative 
overconfidence has been studied by Elston et al. (2006) who conducted experiments at 
two large start-up conventions. Using the general experimental design of Camerer and 
Lovallo (1999) they found that entrepreneurs were not more overconfident with respect 
to their relative skills than a test-group of non-entrepreneurs. Now, given that relative 
overconfidence can be caused by overestimating one’s own absolute ability and/or by 
underestimating one’s competitors, the results of Busenitz and Barney (1997) and 
Elston et al. (2006) lead to the following inference: if entrepreneurs are more 
overconfident in their absolute skills than non-entrepreneurs (Busenitz and Barney 
1997) and at the same time not more prone to relative overconfidence (Elston et al. 
2006), they should c.p. be less susceptible to reference group neglect than non-
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entrepreneurs. An alternative explanation is that the managers in Busenitz and Barney 
(1997) were less overconfident in their absolute skills than the non-entrepreneurs in 
Elston et al. (2006). 
To clarify these potential differences in relative overconfidence, this study 
experimentally tests entrepreneurs’ and non-entrepreneurs’ willingness to enter skill-
based competition focusing on the role of reference group neglect. This requires 
disentangling the effects of absolute and relative overconfidence. As a first step, the 
literature on entrepreneurial overconfidence is reviewed outlining the different concepts 
of overconfidence that have been used and how these results relate to each other. In a 
second step, a controlled laboratory experiment has been conducted to test whether 
entrepreneurs are more prone to act out of relative overconfidence than non-
entrepreneurs. The effect of reference group information on entry behavior was tested to 
measure individual levels of reference group neglect. In order to compare the findings to 
previous results of Busenitz and Barney (1997), Elston et al. (2006), and Wu and Knott 
(2006) the experimental design incorporates measuring relative skills via a general 
knowledge questionnaire and giving ambiguous information about the size of the 
experimental market.  
The results show no significant differences in relative overconfidence and reference 
group neglect between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. They are in line with the 
results of Elston et al. (2006) and with other incentivized studies that suggest 
entrepreneurs’ decisions not to be so different from non-entrepreneurs’ decisions after 
all (Moore et al. 2007, Holm et al. 2010, Schade and Boewe 2011). Differences in 
relative overconfidence were instead mainly driven by gender; a result that is consistent 
with previous research on overconfidence in non-entrepreneurs. Furthermore, no 
overentry could be observed under demand uncertainty. This finding is argued to be 
driven by the generality of the task as entry rates have been found to be higher in 
markets in which participants self-select (Camerer and Lovallo 1999) like the market 
considered by Wu and Knott (2006). 
The next section gives an overview of the literature on entrepreneurial 
overconfidence. Section three describes the experiment. The results are presented in 
 131 
 
section four followed a discussion of the findings in section five. Finally, section six 
contains the conclusion.  
5.2 Entrepreneurial overconfidence 
The term overconfidence has been used in the literature to describe different 
phenomena that need to be distinguished (Moore and Healy 2008): (1) people might be 
overconfident in their absolute performance and skills; this is called absolute 
overconfidence or overestimation; (2) people might be overconfident in their 
performance and skills relative to others; this is called relative overconfidence or 
overplacement; and (3) people might be overconfident in their forecasts and estimations 
about future events; this is called overprecision. This paper deals with the first two.  
5.2.1 Absolute overconfidence  
Studies on entrepreneurial overconfidence have often dealt with absolute 
overconfidence: Busenitz and Barney (1997) compared entrepreneurs and managers 
with respect to their susceptibility to overconfidence and to the representativeness 
heuristic. For measuring overconfidence, they asked participants to answer general 
knowledge questions and to state the probability with which they believe to have 
answered the respective questions correctly. Actual and estimated percentages were then 
compared. The more a person overestimated his or her performance, the higher the 
overconfidence of this person. This method replicates and goes back to Fischhoff et al. 
(1977) and Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977). Koellinger et al. (2007) report on the 
influence of subjective judgments about one’s own absolute skills on entry decisions. 
They based their analysis on data from 18 countries collected for the 2001 population 
survey of the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). Investigating which variables 
are significantly associated with the decision to start a business they found that the 
strongest cross-national covariate is whether the respective person believed to have the 
sufficient skills, knowledge and ability to start a business. Furthermore, they found a 
negative correlation between this entrepreneurial confidence and survival chances of 
nascent entrepreneurs across countries. They argued that some countries exhibit 
relatively high rates of business start-ups because their inhabitants are more (over-) 
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confident than in other countries. Koellinger et al. (2007) showed that absolute 
overconfidence and subjective assessments of own absolute skills play an important role 
for business entry decisions. Forbes (2005) compares the degree of overconfidence of 
different types of entrepreneurs and finds that age, firm decision comprehensiveness and 
external equity funding affect the degree of overconfidence in entrepreneurs. In 
addition, founder-managers were found to be more overconfident than new-venture 
managers who did not found their firms. Forbes (2005) concludes that entrepreneurs’ 
overconfidence is determined by both individual and contextual factors. 
5.2.2 Relative overconfidence  
In a competitive environment, success and failure are not only determined by absolute 
skills. They are much more driven by being better than one’s competitors, i.e., by 
relative skills. Assessing their relative skills, people’s beliefs about their own absolute 
skills are important but there is also another important component: their beliefs about 
the dispersion of abilities among their competitors. As people might fail to accurately 
assess their own abilities, they might also fail to accurately assess the ability level 
among their competitors. The role of underestimating the skills of competitors for 
market entry decision has been investigated by Camerer and Lovallo (1999). They 
coined the term reference group neglect for this phenomenon. In their influential study, 
Camerer and Lovallo (1999) combined the experimental paradigm of the classic market 
entry game (Selten and Güth 1982, Kahneman 1988, Rapoport 1995, Sundali et al. 
1995, Rapoport et al. 1998) with skill-based payoffs that are typical for tournaments. 
They tested the hypothesis that overconfidence in own relative skills causes business 
entry mistakes and market overentry, a hypothesis that was previously stated by March 
and Shapira (1987) and Roll (1986). They find that over-entry is connected to 
overconfidence in one’s relative skills and to neglecting whom one is competing 
against
15
. In their experiment, participants had to decide simultaneously about entering 
or not entering an experimental market where payoffs from entering depended on the 
participant’s ‘rank’. The c best ranked entrants made a profit from entering. All other 
entrants made a loss. Thus, only participants who believed to be among the c best 
                                                 
15
 For discussions of alternative explanation to the findings of Camerer and Lovallo (1999) see Hogarth 
and Karelaia (2009).  
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ranked entrants should enter. Thereby, ranks depended on either a chance device 
(random condition) or on the participants’ relative skill compared to the other players in 
a logic puzzle, trivia quiz, or sports questions (skill condition). Importantly, these ranks 
were determined after entry decisions were made. Hence, when making their entry 
decisions, participants did not know their actual rank, but had to base their decision on 
their belief about their relative performance. Camerer and Lovallo (1999) compared 
entry rates in rounds with random ranks with the entry rates in rounds with skill ranks. 
They show that entry rates were significantly higher in rounds where payoffs were 
based on relative skill (skill condition) than in rounds with random ranks (random 
condition), leading to over-entry and negative industry profits in most rounds with skill-
based payoffs. Furthermore, they compared entry rates of participants that were 
recruited via standard recruiting instructions with participants that were recruited using 
a ‘self-selection’ instruction. In the self-selection condition, students were asked to 
participate in an experiment in which performance on sports or current event trivia 
would determine their payoff. By this comparison they tested whether the entry 
differential between rounds with skill ranks and rounds with random ranks is larger for 
groups that self-selected into the task because they considered themselves as especially 
skilled in this domain. Indeed, they found that the gap between entry rates in both 
conditions is three times larger in the self-selection group. Their results support the 
hypothesis that overconfidence in own relative skill and reference group neglect lead to 
excess market entry and that the later is especially pronounced in domains where people 
believe to be competent.  
Elston et al. (2006) conducted a series of experiments at two large start-up 
conventions, including a market entry experiment based on the experimental paradigm 
of Camerer and Lovallo (1999). Comparing entrepreneurs and a test-group that they 
classified as non-entrepreneurs, they did not find significant differences between 
entrepreneurs and the test group with respect to relative overconfidence. A result that 
can only be reconciled with the findings of Busenitz and Barney (1997) assuming either 
that entrepreneurs are less prone to underestimate their competitors than non-
entrepreneurs – an assumption that is rather unintuitive – , or by assuming that the 
managers in Busenitz and Barney (1997) were less affected by absolute overconfidence 
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than the non-entrepreneurs in Elston et al. (2006). This leaves room for further 
investigating potential differences between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs.  
5.2.3 Overconfidence and demand uncertainty 
The role of overconfidence in business entry decisions was also investigated by Wu 
and Knott (2006). They modeled and tested market entry decisions by simultaneously 
considering ability uncertainty and demand uncertainty. Reconciling the risk-bearing 
characterization of entrepreneurs with the empirical result that entrepreneurs exhibit 
conventional risk aversion profiles, they argued that entrepreneurs are risk-averse with 
respect to demand uncertainty but overconfident or ‘apparent risk-seeking’ with respect 
to ability uncertainty. Entrepreneurs’ overconfidence would outweigh risk aversion with 
respect to demand uncertainty when the degree of ability uncertainty is comparable to 
the degree of demand uncertainty. Testing their model on the aggregated market level 
with data from the banking industry, Wu and Knott (2006) find that entrepreneurs in 
aggregate behave as their model predicts. The present study considers demand 
uncertainty to account for these findings and to ascertain data that allows a comparison 
with Busenitz and Barney (1997), Wu and Knott (2006) and Elston et al. (2006). 
5.3 Experiment 
5.3.1 Experimental approach  
Differences in relative overconfidence between entrepreneurs’ and non-entrepreneurs’ 
were tested in an economic experiment. The experiment was based on a simultaneous 
market entry scenario with tournament payoffs introduced by Camerer and Lovallo 
(1999). Demand uncertainty as considered by Wu and Knott (2006) was included by 
ambiguous information about the market capacity.  
The experimental method allows specifying entry relevant skills in a way that enables 
to objectively measure these skills and to compare entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. 
In accordance to Busenitz and Barney (1997), Camerer and Lovallo (1999), and Elston 
et al. (2006) skill was instrumentalized measuring performance in a general knowledge 
questionnaire. Individual performance in the general knowledge quiz was set in relation 
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to the performance of the other players, determining the ‘rank’ of each player. The 
players’ ranks determined their payoffs from entering the experimental market. The 
better a player performed relative to the other players, the better his rank and the higher 
the probability that he would make a profit by entering.  
5.3.2 Experimental design, samples and procedure 
The experiment was conducted with 84 participants, 28 entrepreneurs and 56 non-
entrepreneurs. Six sessions were run with 14 participants each. Entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs participated in separate sessions. All sessions were run at the experimental 
laboratory of a German university. 
The entrepreneurs were recruited via online announcements. All of them were 
founders and managers of companies. Industries ranged from services, retailing, 
technology, and manufacturing. The average age of the entrepreneurs was 42 years  
(SD = 12.62). 53.6 percent of them were male and 46.4 percent were female. All 
entrepreneurs had been running their business for more than three years at the time they 
participated in the experiment. The non-entrepreneurs were students from different 
fields like in Camerer and Lovallo (1999) and Moore et al. (2007). Their average age 
was 26 years (SD = 0.64). They were recruited via class announcements and email 
invitations. The non-entrepreneurs sample consisted of 33.9 percent male and 66.1 
percent female students. In order to account for differences in opportunity costs and 
wealth the show-up fee and the payoffs in the experiment were scaled up by a factor of 
three for the entrepreneurs.  
Upon arrival participants were paid a show-up fee of 12 Euro (36 Euro for the 
entrepreneurs) and told to pocket it. Participants were then seated at separated computer 
desks. Communication between the participants was not allowed and participants did 
not know with whom they were playing. Instructions were displayed on the computer 
monitors and guided participants through the experiment. Additional hard copies of the 
instructions were distributed. Comprehension questions at the beginning assured that 
participants fully understood the instructions. The experiment consisted of three parts: 
In part one, all participants completed a general knowledge quiz with 14 binary choice 
questions knowing that their payoffs from the subsequent task would depend on how 
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well they performed in this quiz. The questions were pre-tested to avoid performance 
differences between men and women and to adjust difficulty. Having completed the 
quiz, participants did not receive feedback about their performance. Instead, they 
continued with part two without knowing how many questions they actually answered 
correctly
16
. For part two, they were matched in groups of seven playing the following 
market entry game: participants were asked to decide simultaneously whether or not to 
enter an experimental market with a limited capacity c (representing the market 
demand). In this market, success depended on the participant’s performance in the quiz 
as compared to the other six people in her group. Only the c best ranked entrants could 
make a profit. All further entrants would make a loss. The rank of a participant was 
determined by the number of correct answers in the quiz as compared to the other 
people in her group. The entrant with the highest number of correct answers had rank 1, 
the entrant with the second highest number of correct answers had rank 2. Ranks were 
unknown to the participants. Feedback about the ranks was only given at the very end of 
the experiment. All participants decided simultaneously and without being able to 
observe the others entering or not entering the market. The capacity (demand) of the 
market c was uncertain: it could vary between 1 and 5, whereby the distribution of c 
was not given to the participants in order to account for exogenous demand uncertainty 
as considered by Wu and Knott (2006). If a participant decided to enter and he was 
among the c best ranked entrants, he made a monetary profit of K. If he decided to enter 
but he was not among the c best ranked entrants, he made a monetary loss of L. The 
possible profit K was 22.50 Euro for the entrepreneurs and 7.50 Euro for the non-
entrepreneurs. The possible loss L was 30 Euro for the entrepreneurs and 10 Euro for 
the non-entrepreneurs. The respective payoffs are displayed in Table 20.  
  
                                                 
16
 In Camerer and Lovallo (1999) the trivia questions were presented only after the market entry 
experiment. However, previous research has shown, that people prefer to bet on things that are yet not 
realized (e.g., Rothbart and Snyder 1970).This is explained by peoples’ illusion of control. In order to 
eliminate potential effects of illusion of control, in the present study participants were confronted with 
the trivia task before the market entry game – still without giving them any information about the 
number of questions they answered correctly.  
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TABLE 20. PAYOFFS AS A FUNCTION OF ENTRANT RANK AND MARKET CAPACITY C 
 ENTRANT RANK 
C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 22.5€ [7.5€] - 30€ [-10€] - 30€ [-10€] - 30€ [-10€] - 30€ [-10€] - 30€ [-10€] - 30€ [-10€] 
2 22.5€ [7.5€] 22.5€ [7.5€] - 30€ [-10€] - 30€ [-10€] - 30€ [-10€] - 30€ [-10€] - 30€ [-10€] 
3 22.5€ [7.5€] 22.5€ [7.5€] 22.5€ [7.5€] - 30€ [-10€] - 30€ [-10€] - 30€ [-10€] - 30€ [-10€] 
4 22.5€ [7.5€] 22.5€ [7.5€] 22.5€ [7.5€] 22.5€ [7.5€] - 30€ [-10€] - 30€ [-10€] - 30€ [-10€] 
5 22.5€ [7.5€] 22.5€ [7.5€] 22.5€ [7.5€] 22.5€ [7.5€] 22.5€ [7.5€] - 30€ [-10€] - 30€ [-10€] 
Participants played five rounds of this simultaneous market entry game. After they 
completed this, they played another five rounds in which they received information on 
the ability level of their competitors. In each round, participants were randomly re-
matched so that they played against a different group of six opponents in each round. 
Between the rounds, participants did not receive any feedback about the outcome of a 
round. Instead, the outcomes of all rounds were presented in a table at the very end of 
the experiment. After all rounds were completed, participants were asked to state the 
number of players they expected to enter in the previous market entry game (a) in the 
first five rounds, and (b) in the second five rounds when they received information 
about the skill level of their competitors. For each correct estimate they received a small 
additional payoff to assure it was in their own interest to truthfully report on their 
expectations. Afterwards, participants risk attitude was measured using the Holt and 
Laury (2002) measure followed by a questionnaire including basic statistical data like 
age and gender. After all participants completed the questionnaire, one of the ten rounds 
was randomly selected as basis for the final payoff. Participants received a report about 
their performance in the quiz, about the results of all rounds, their decisions, and a list 
of their payoffs from the different parts of the experiment. Finally, participants were 
privately paid. The experiment was programmed and conducted using the software z-
Tree (Fischbacher 2007). 
5.3.3 Nash equilibria 
If players knew their rank and the size of the market capacity, the best c players in a 
group should enter. All others should stay out because they would make a loss by 
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entering. As in this experiment ranks – representing relative skills – and the market 
capacity – representing demand – were unknown, entry decisions mirrored the 
participants’ beliefs about their true ranks and their belief about the realized market 
capacity.  
Assuming, however, in accordance to Camerer and Lovallo (1999), that participants 
are risk-neutral and have common ignorant priors – i.e., assuming they believe to have 
equal chances to be among the c best-ranked players and assign equal probabilities to all 
possible realizations of c, the following payoff function can be derived: 
Let 0is  be the strategy of player i not to enter and let 1is  denote the strategy of 
player i to enter the market. The payoff function of the average player is then given by:
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where i  
denotes the payoff for player i given his strategy choice is  
and total number 
of entrants m (including player i). The market capacity is denoted by c . If the total 
number of entrants does not exceed the market capacity, the average entrant’s profit is K 
>0 (K = 22.50 Euro for the entrepreneurs and 7.50 Euro for the non-entrepreneurs). If 
the total number of entrants exceeds the market capacity, the payoff of the average 
entrant equals the industry profit divided by the number of entrants. The industry profit 
is the accumulated payoff (gains and losses) of all entrants, whereby c entrants make a 
profit of K and (m-c) entrants make a loss of L (L = 30 Euro for the entrepreneurs and 
10 Euro for the non-entrepreneurs), with K = 0.75 L. 
In equilibrium, players must be indifferent about entering or staying out of the market. 
If cm  , entering is a dominant strategy as K > 0. If m > c, the average player should 
be indifferent between entering and staying out when 0)/][(  mcmLKc . This 
happens when m = Kc/L + c; i.e., when m = 1.75 c. Consequently, in pure strategy 
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equilibria the number of entrants is m = 1.75 c; i.e., the highest integer of entrants 
below 1.75 c.  
To derive the mixed strategy equilibrium, let )(
1
sp be the probability with which each 
player selects to enter and let )(1)(
10
spsp  be the probability with which each player 
selects to stay out of the market. Then the probability that m players enter and N-m 
players stay out is 
(11)  mN
mNm spspmp  ))(1()()( 11  
In the mixed strategy equilibrium, players enter with probability *p solving: 
(12)   0))(*1()(*][))(*1()(* 1
75.1
111
][
 



m
N
m
cmLKc mNm
N
cm
spspspKsp  
Table 21 shows the total number entrants for which the players are indifferent 
between entering and staying out for different values of c, the number of entrants in 
pure strategy equilibria and the corresponding mixed strategy equilibrium.  
TABLE 21. OVERVIEW EQUILIBRIA 
C m = 1.75 c enter if # ENTRANTS IN PURE EQUILIBRIA MIXED STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA p* 
1 1.75 75.11m  1 0.14 
2 3.50 50.31m  3 0.43 
3 5.25 25.51m  5 0.71 
4 7 enter always 6 or 7 - 
5 8.75 enter always 7 - 
Assuming that people assign equal probabilities to all possible realizations of c = [1; 
5] they would expect a market capacity of 3 to be realized. In this case the mixed 
strategy equilibrium predicts a mean entry rate of 0.71.  
 140 
 
5.4 Results  
5.4.1 Analysis 
Random-effects logit regressions of entry have been estimated to test the following 
hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Entrepreneurs enter more frequently than non-entrepreneurs. 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Entrepreneurs are less affected by reference group neglect than non-
entrepreneurs; i.e., they react less to information about the ability dispersion in their 
reference group (interaction between group and reference group information).  
5.4.2 Entrepreneurs’ and non-entrepreneurs’ entry rates 
When no information about the reference group was given, entrepreneurs’ mean entry 
rate was 70 percent, non-entrepreneurs’ mean entry was 60 percent. In the last five 
rounds, when participants received information about their reference group 
performance, entry rates decreased to 63 percent among entrepreneurs and to 55 percent 
among non-entrepreneurs. Table 22 gives an overview of the mean entry rates of 
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs in rounds without and with reference group 
information (RG information).  
TABLE 22. MEAN ENTRY RATES 
GROUP GENDER RG INFORMATION  MEAN ENTRY RATE SD SE 
Entrepreneurs total  without 0.70 0.310 0.059 
 (N=28) with 0.63 0.356 0.067 
 male without 0.75 0.316 0.082 
  with 0.67 0.335 0.087 
 female without 0.65 0.307 0.085 
  with 0.59 0.387 0.107 
Non-entrepreneurs total without 0.60 0.318 0.043 
 (N=56) with 0.55 0.329 0.044 
 male without 0.78 0.282 0.065 
  with 0.79 0.294 0.068 
 female without 0.50 0.297 0.049 
  with 0.42 0.274 0.045 
In the regression analysis (Table 25), a dummy variable accounts for the effect of 
reference group information. Entry rate differentials between rounds without and with 
reference group information have been calculated for each individual, yielding the size 
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of individual reference group neglect. The effect of size of reference group neglect was 
considered in a separate logit model that has been estimated for the first five rounds (see 
Table 26 in the appendix). 
5.4.3 Skills, beliefs, risk attitude 
Table 23 contains mean values of the independent variables skill (and rank), risk 
aversion, and belief for entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs.  
TABLE 23. MEAN VALUES OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 ENTREPRENEURS NON-ENTREPRENEURS 
RIS6K ATTITUDE 
MEANS TOTAL 
5.8 
MALE 
4.1 
FEMALE TOTAL MALE 
4.1 
FEMALE 
Skill 8.1 8.6 7.3 8.0 9.6 7.2 
Rank 7.0 5.8 9.0 7.4 4.6 8.7 
Risk aversion 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.0 4.4 6.8 
Belief 4.4 4.5 4.2 4.2 4 4.3 
Entrepreneurs on average answered 8.1 out of 14 questions correctly, non-
entrepreneurs 8.0 questions. The belief about the total number of entrants was on 
average 4.4 out of a maximum possible of 7 within the group of entrepreneurs and 4.2 
within the group of non-entrepreneurs. Mean risk aversion was 6.3 among the 
entrepreneurs and 6.0 among non-entrepreneurs whereby a higher score represents a 
higher degree of risk aversion. Mean values show that some of these variables are 
differently distributed across gender. A significant correlation between gender and risk 
aversion was found; women being more risk-averse than man. This result is consistent 
with the literature on gender differences in risk attitudes (Eckel and Grossman 2002). 
There is also a highly significant correlation between gender and skill (and consequently 
with rank
17
) men answering more questions correctly than women. On average male 
respondents answered about 2 (out of 14) more questions correctly than female 
respondents. This result is surprising as the quiz questions were pre-tested and had been 
chosen to generate a medium difficulty and to avoid gender differences in performance. 
The result that there is still a gender difference in performance is thus likely to be a 
caused by the tournament character of the experiment that was absent in the pre-test of 
                                                 
17
 Rank and skill are correlated by definition. The fact that the correlation between rank and skill does not 
equal 1 goes back to the ranking rule. If two players had the same number of correct answers the 
ranking among them was based on the time they needed to complete the questionnaire. This ranking 
rule was also applied in Camerer and Lovallo (1999). 
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the questions. In the experiment, participants knew that their payoffs from the 
subsequent interactive task would depend on the number of questions they answer 
correctly and on the time they needed to answer these questions. This might have 
created a tournament atmosphere which is known to cause gender gaps in performance, 
particularly in mixed-sex sessions (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007). For belief no 
significant correlations were found. Table 24 presents the correlations among the 
independent variables. 
TABLE 24. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Group      
2. Gender 0.189     
3. Skill 
 
-0.034 0.450***    
4. Rank 
 
0.017 0.445*** -0.904***   
5. Belief  0.030 0.029 -0.089 0.075  
6. Risk aversion 0.076 -0.353
** -0.145 0.179 -0.207 
 *** Significant at the 1 percent level; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; * Significant at the 10 
percent level. 
5.4.4  Regressions 
Several random-effects logit regressions of entry have been estimated to test 
hypothesis 1 and 2
18
. The dependent variable entry is coded with ‘1’ when a participant 
decided to enter and ‘0’ when a participant decided not to enter. Gender is coded ‘1’ for 
male participants and ‘0’ for female participants. Group is coded ‘1’ for entrepreneurs 
and ‘0’ for non-entrepreneurs. The variable reference group information is coded with 
‘1’ for rounds in which the participants received information about the performance of 
their competitors (round 6-10) and ‘0’ for rounds where they did not receive this 
information (round 1-5). Model 1 considers group, gender, reference group information, 
the skill level of the respective participant, their level of risk aversion and their belief 
about the number of entrants in round 1-5. Model 2 also accounts for the interaction 
effect of group and gender. Model 3 considers the interaction between reference group 
information and skill, while model 4 further considers interactions of reference group 
information and group and reference group information and gender.  
  
                                                 
18
 All estimations were run in STATA.  
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TABLE 25. RANDOM-EFFECTS LOGIT MODELS 
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Group (0/1) 
 
0.303 (0.477) 0.848 (0.645) 0.305 (0 .477) 0.810 (0.686) 
Gender (0/1) 1.263*(0.517) 1.813**(0.684) 1.261*(0.517) 1.819*(0.725) 
Reference group information (0/1) -0.402*(0.192) -0.402*(0.192) -0.802 (0.715) -0.422 (0.248) 
Skill 0.028 (0.103) 0.011 (0.103)  0.001 (0.113) 0.011 (0.103) 
Risk aversion 
 
-0.472***(0.131) -0.415**(0.136) -0.472***(0.132) -0.415**(0.136) 
Belief 0.327*(0.154) 0.364*(0.156) 0.327*(0.154) 0.364 (0.156) 
Group*gender  -1.238 (0.992)  -1.241 (0.992) 
Reference group information*skill   0.051(0.088)  
Reference group information*group 
 
   0.075 (0.456) 
Reference group information*gender    -0.009 (0.448) 
Constant 1.567 (1.479)   1.038 (1.521) 1.772 (1.521) 1.046 (1.521) 
σu 1.463 (0.202)  1.442 (0.200)  1.462 (0.202) 1.442 (0.200) 
χ2 
 
39.16 40.67 39.54 40.69 
Number of observations 
 
740 740 740 740 
Number of participants 
 
74 74 74 74 
Dependent variable = entry (0/1) 
Random-effects specification = subject id 
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 
Group does not have a significant main effect on entry. Also the interaction effect of 
group and reference group information was not significant. Instead behavior was largely 
driven by gender – men enter more than women – and risk aversion. Furthermore, when 
reference group information was given, participants entered significantly less than 
without this information. The absolute skill level of the participants did not have an 
influence on their entry behavior. Entry beliefs had a positive influence on entry. 
Interactions between reference group information and skill and reference information 
and gender were not significant.  
Considering entry behavior in the first five rounds separately, the effect of the size of 
reference group neglect was considered (Table 26 in the appendix contains the results). 
The size of the reference group neglect did not have a significant effect on entry. Also, 
possible interactions between the size of the reference group neglect and group and 
between the size of the reference group neglect and gender did not have an effect on 
entry. The direction of the other effects remains.  
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5.5 Discussion 
The main result presented here indicates that entrepreneurs are not more susceptible 
to relative overconfidence and not more willing to enter skill-based competition than 
non-entrepreneurs. Being confronted with the same situation, participants in both 
groups exhibit similar entry decisions – even in the presence of ambiguous market 
information. This implies that it is not their ‘ego’ that distinguishes entrepreneurs from 
non-entrepreneurs. This result is in line with the findings by Elston et al. (2006) and 
consistent with other recent studies that used incentivized experiments and do not find 
significant differences in the decision making of entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs 
where one would expect differences (Sandri et al. 2010, Holm et al. 2010, Schade and 
Boewe 2011).  
Given the small sample size in the present study, small differences between 
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs might not have been detected just because they 
were too small. However, the fact that the gender gap in entry remains within the group 
of entrepreneurs, supports the reported findings: If overconfidence was a trait necessary 
to overcome the risk associated with founding a business the difference between male 
and female entrepreneurs should be smaller than between female entrepreneurs and 
other women. Results show, however, that the gender effect outweighs being an 
entrepreneur.  
Entrepreneurs were also not less (or more) effected by the reference group neglect 
than non-entrepreneurs. This result raises questions about the compatibility of the 
findings of Busenitz and Barney (1997) and Elston et al. (2006). Among the many 
possible explanations for the incompatibility of Busenitz and Barney (1997) and Elston 
et al. (2006) but also the incompatibility with the present results, the following two 
seem most plausible: (1) Busenitz and Barney (1997) compared managers of large 
companies with entrepreneurs while Elston et al. (2006) considered salaried employees 
as a test group. This study tested differences between entrepreneurs and students which 
are used as subjects in most studies on overconfidence (e.g., Camerer and Lovallo 1999, 
Moore et al. 2007). These sample differences might have lead to the incompatibility of 
results. However, the results of Elston et al. (2006) and the present study are consistent. 
(2) The study by Busenitz and Barney (1997) was based on a questionnaire while Elston 
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et al. (2006) and this study used monetary incentives to assure that people behave in 
accordance to their true preferences. This also might have affected results.  
Comparing entry rates with the mixed strategy equilibrium, no overentry could be 
observed under demand uncertainty. Hence, in the present study the level of 
overconfidence was not high enough to outweigh participants risk aversion with regards 
to uncertainty about the market size. This result differs from Wu and Knott (2006). They 
suggest that overconfidence should outweigh aversion towards demand uncertainty 
when ability uncertainty is comparable to or higher than demand uncertainty. This was 
the case in the present study: ability uncertainty had a variance of 2.3 while demand 
uncertainty had a variance of 2. However, Camerer and Lovallo (1999) have shown that 
relative overconfidence increases and is up to three times larger when people self-select 
into to task which was the case in the study by Wu and Knott (2006). Hence, assuming 
that the effect would have been three times larger when people would have self-selected 
into the task would have lead to a distinct overentry and makes the results reconcilable. 
For the present study self-selection was not possible as this would not have allowed 
comparing entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs and in particular to compare the results 
to previous findings by Busenitz and Barney (1997) and Elston et al. (2006). 
5.6 Conclusion 
This study investigated whether entrepreneurs are more overconfident in their relative 
skills than non-entrepreneurs and more willing to enter skill-based competition under 
demand uncertainty. Results show no significant differences in relative overconfidence 
between entrepreneurs and others. Hence, it is not their level of relative overconfidence 
that distinguishes entrepreneurs from non-entrepreneurs. Also entrepreneurs did not 
differ from non-entrepreneurs in their susceptibility to reference group neglect. Instead, 
behavior was largely driven by gender differences, a result that is in line with findings 
on overconfidence in non-entrepreneurs. The fact that these differences remain in the 
group of entrepreneurs underlines that entrepreneurs do not necessarily need a high 
degree of overconfidence to overcome the risk associated with starting a business. 
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Appendices  
Appendix I: Tables  
TABLE 26. RANDOM-EFFECTS LOGIT MODEL FOR ROUND 1-5 
MODEL (1) (2) (3) 
Group (0/1) 
 
0.127 (0.489) 0.178 (0.472) 0.195 (0.462) 
(Gender (0/1) 1.118*(0.535) 1.097*(0.517) 1.128*(0.505) 
Skill 0.031 (0.107) 0.030 (0.103) 0.035 (0.101) 
Risk aversion 
 
-0.318*(0.136) -0.323*(0.132) -0.321*(0.128) 
Belief 0.358*(0.159) 0.327*(0.154) 0.315*(0.153) 
Reference group neglect  -1.149 (0.900)  
Group* reference group neglect    1.906 (1.830) 
Belief* reference group neglect    -0.3741 (0.265) 
Constant 0.513 (1.515) 0.649 (1.464) 0.571 (1.434) 
σu  1.218 (0.279) 1.139 (0.280)  1.091 (0.282) 
χ2 
 
20.94 23.43 24.47 
Number of observations 
 
296 296 296 
Number of participants 
 
74 74 74 
Dependent variable = entry (0/1) 
Random-effects specification = subject id 
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 
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Appendix II: Instructions - selected parts 
Explanations of experimental procedures are added in italic. All payoffs were scaled up down 
by factor 3 for the non-entrepreneurs. 
At arrival in the experimental laboratory participants were paid a participation fee in cash. 
After being seated at their computer desks, and before beginning with the actual experiment, 
they received following information: 
 
Welcome! 
In this experiment, you will be asked to take various decisions. At the end of the experiment you 
will be paid for your participation. The amount you will receive depends on the decision you have 
made and on the decisions other participants have made. 
The experiment consists of three parts. In the first part, you will take a knowledge quiz. In the 
second part, you will play a game with six other players. In the third part, you will be asked to 
compare different lotteries. In the end we will ask you a few further questions. The entire 
experiment will take about 60-90 minutes. 
After you have concluded all parts of the experiment we will clear the payoffs from each part of 
the experiment and pay out the final amount to you in cash. 
All information will be treated as strictly confidential. Your anonymity is being ensured at any 
time. 
Next 
 
Participants then answered 14 binary choice quiz questions. They did not receive information 
about their results. 
 
Part 2: The Game 
In the second part of the experiment you will play 10 rounds of a 7-player game. In each round 
you will play against another randomly chosen group of 6 anonymous counterparts. 
Next 
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Part 2: The Game 
Rules of the game:  
In this game, 7 players will decide simultaneously to enter a market or not. The market has a 
limited size, i.e., only a certain number of players can enter with profits. The rest who enters will 
suffer a loss. Whether you gain a profit or make a loss when you enter depends on the number of 
correct answers given in the quiz in part 1. 
From all entrants only the ones who performed best in the quiz will make profits. The ones who 
enter the market and did worse in the quiz will suffer a loss. The number of players that can 
possibly make a profit (the so called market capacity c) might vary from round to round.  
Example: If the market capacity is c=3 the three best ranked players who enter the market will 
make profits and all the other players who enter will make a loss. If we have a market capacity of 
c=4, the four best ranked players will make profits while the rest who enters makes losses, and so 
on. 
If a player decides not to enter he will make neither profits nor losses in this particular round. 
None of the players knows their own number of correct answers from the quiz or the number of 
correct answers of their counter players. 
Next 
 
 
Part 2: The Game 
During the experiment you will not receive feedback about the results of previous rounds. Instead 
the results of all rounds will be summarized in an overview at the end of the experiment. One of 
the rounds will be randomly chosen. The profit/ loss that you achieved in this round will then be 
added or deducted from your payoff from the experiment. The other rounds will not be paid out. 
Since every round could be chosen, please consider all decisions with equal attentiveness. 
Next 
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Participants played 5 rounds with the following instructions: 
 
Round 1 
You and six other players will decide simultaneously to enter a market or not.  
The market has a limited size so that only a certain number of players can enter with profits. 
The payoffs for those who enter the market are determined in the following way: 
According to the number of right answers in the quiz, a rank is assigned to each entering player. 
The player with the highest number of correct answers is ranked number 1, the player with second 
highest number of correct answers is ranked number 2 and so on. In case several players have the 
same number of correct answers they will additionally be ranked by their speed answering the 
quiz. Thereby the fastest player gets the best and the second fastest player the second best rank 
and so on.  
Depending on the market capacity c the best ranked players receives a payoff of 22.50 €. The 
others who chose to enter the market loose each 30 €. The market seize is unknown to every 
player when taking the decisions. Once each player has taken her decision, the size of the market 
will be determined via a random mechanism.  
The players merely know that the following market sizes are possible: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 
The possible payoffs are presented below. 
In case of market entry: 
 
 Rank of the player in the quiz 
C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 22.50 € - 30 € - 30 € - 30 € - 30 € - 30 € - 30 € 
2 22.50 € 22.50 € - 30 € - 30 € - 30 € - 30 € - 30 € 
3 22.50 € 22.50 € 22.50 € - 30 € - 30 € - 30 € - 30 € 
4 22.50 € 22.50 € 22.50 € 22.50 € - 30 € - 30 € - 30 € 
5 22.50 € 22.50 € 22.50 € 22.50 € 22.50 € - 30 € - 30 € 
In case of not-entering: If a player chooses not to enter he neither makes a profit nor a loss in this 
round. 
Please decide now whether you want to enter the market or not: 
Entry  No Entry 
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After five rounds, participants entered a second block of rounds in which they received 
additional information about the performance distribution in their reference group: 
 
New Information 
For each of the following rounds players will receive information on their counterparts’ results 
from the knowledge quiz, i.e., the number of correct answers in the knowledge quiz. 
Since you will be playing against different players in each round, you will receive information 
on your counterparts’ results before each round.  
Next 
 
 
Further Rounds 
In each of the following rounds players will be informed about their counterparts’ number of 
correctly answered quiz questions (out of 14). 
You will now continue playing the game for another five rounds. The same conditions apply 
as before: 
In each round, players are randomly re-matched so that you play against another group of 6 
players.  
The results of each round will only be reported to you by the end of the experiment. 
At the end of the experiment, the payoff relevant round will be determined via a random draw.  
Next 
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Example screen for reference group information: 
 
Round 6 
The following table presents the quiz results of each of your counterparts in this round. 
For instance, you see how many questions (out of 14) your counterparts answered correctly. 
Counterpart Number of Correct Answers 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Number of Correct Answers 
 
Participants played five further rounds (round 6-10) receiving reference group information in 
each round.  
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